6,091 research outputs found
Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace
Neoclassical theory postulates that preferences between two goods are independent of the consumer's current entitlements. Several experimental studies have recently provided strong evidence that this basic independence assumption, which is used in most theoretical and applied economic models to assess the operation of markets, is rarely appropriate. These results, which clearly contradict closely held economic doctrines, have led some influential commentators to call for an entirely new economic paradigm to displace conventional neoclassical theory e.g., prospect theory, which invokes psychological effects. This paper pits neoclassical theory against prospect theory by investigating three clean tests of the competing hypotheses. In all three cases, the data, which are drawn from nearly 500 subjects actively participating in a well-functioning marketplace, suggest that prospect theory adequately organizes behavior among inexperienced consumers, whereas consumers with intense market experience behave largely in accordance with neoclassical predictions. The pattern of results indicates that learning primarily occurs on the sell side of the market: agents with intense market experience are more willing to part with their entitlements than lesser-experienced agents.
Friend or Foe? A Natural Experiment of the Prisoner's Dilemma
This study examines data drawn from the game show Friend or Foe?, which is similar to the classic prisoner%u2019s dilemma tale: partnerships are endogenously determined, players work together to earn money, after which, they play a one-shot prisoner%u2019s dilemma game over large stakes: varying from 22,000. If one were to conduct such an experiment in the laboratory, the cost to gather the data would be well over $350,000. The data reveal several interesting insights; perhaps most provocatively, they suggest that even though the game is played in front of an audience of millions of viewers, there is some evidence consistent with a model of discrimination. The observed patterns of social discrimination are unanticipated, however. For example, there is evidence consistent with the notion that certain populations have a general %u201Cdistaste%u201D for older participants.
Testing Neoclassical Competitive Theory in Multi-Lateral Decentralized Markets+
This study presents results from a pilot field experiment that tests predictions of competitive market theory. A major advantage of this particular field experimental design is that my laboratory is the marketplace: subjects are engaged in buying, selling, and trading activities whether I run an exchange experiment or am a passive observer. In this sense, I am gathering data in a natural environment while still maintaining the necessary control to execute a clean comparison between treatments. The main results of the study fall into two categories. First, the competitive model predicts reasonably well in some market treatments: the expected price and quantity levels are approximated in many market rounds. Second, the data suggest that market composition is important: buyer and seller experience levels impact not only the distribution of rents but also the overall level of rents captured. An unexpected result in this regard is that average market efficiency is lowest in markets that match experienced buyers and experienced sellers and highest when experienced buyers engage in bargaining with inexperienced sellers. Together, these results suggest that both market experience and market composition play an important role in the equilibrium discovery process.
Substitutability, Experience, and the Value Disparity: Evidence from the Marketplace
Recent empirical evidence suggests that important disparities exist between willingness to pay and compensation demanded for the same good. These results, which clearly contradict closely held economic doctrines, have led some influential commentators to call for an entirely new economic paradigm to displace conventional neoclassical theory. This study examines the generality of these experimental findings by going to a well-functioning marketplace and examining more than 350 individual decisions across two incentive-compatible elicitation mechanisms. The data suggest that behavior of individuals with intense experience approaches neoclassical predictions: any observed WTA/WTP disparity amongst this group is negligible.WTP/WTA disparity, Field experiment, Marketlike experience
Internal Increasing Returns to Scale and Economic Growth
This study develops a model of endogenous growth based on increasing returns due to firms' technology choices. Particular attention is paid to the implications of these choices, combined with the substitution of capital for labor, on economic growth in a general equilibrium model in which the R&D sector produces machines to be used for the sector producing final goods. We show that incorporating oligopolistic competition in the sector producing finals goods into a general equilibrium model with endogenous technology choice is tractable, and we explore the equilibrium path analytically. The model illustrates a novel manner in which sustained per capita growth of consumption can be achieved -- through continuous adoption of new technologies featuring the substitution between capital and labor. Further insights of the model are that during the growth process, the size of firms producing final goods increases over time, the real interest rate is constant, and the real wage rate increases over time.
Internal Increasing Returns to Scale and Economic Growth
This study develops a model of endogenous growth based on increasing returns due to firms' technology choices. Particular attention is paid to the implications of these choices, combined with the substitution of capital for labor, on economic growth in a general equilibrium model in which the R&D sector produces machines to be used for the sector producing final goods. We show that incorporating oligopolistic competition in the sector producing finals goods into a general equilibrium model with endogenous technology choice is tractable, and we explore the equilibrium path analytically. The model illustrates a novel manner in which sustained per capita growth of consumption can be achieved?through continuous adoption of new technologies featuring the substitution between capital and labor. Further insights of the model are that during the growth process, the size of firms producing final goods increases over time, the real interest rate is constant, and the real wage rate increases over time.
Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment
We conducted a natural field experiment to explore the effect of price changes on charitable contributions. To operationalize our tests, we examine whether an offer to match contributions to a non-profit organization changes the likelihood and amount that an individual donates. Direct mail solicitations were sent to over 50,000 prior donors. We find that the match offer increases both the revenue per solicitation and the probability that an individual donates. While comparisons of the match treatments and the control group consistently reveal this pattern, larger match ratios (i.e., 1 and 1) relative to smaller match ratios (1) had no additional impact. The results have clear implications for practitioners in the design of fundraising campaigns and provide avenues for future empirical and theoretical work on charitable giving. Further, the data provide an interesting test of important methods used in cost-benefit analysis.microfinance, group lending, information asymmetries, contract theory, experimental economics
THE HIDDEN COSTS AND RETURNS OF INCENTIVES — TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS AMONG CEOs
We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students. We find that CEOs are considerably more trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness than students—thus reaching substantially higher efficiency levels than students. Moreover, we find that, for CEOs as well as for students, incentives based on explicit threats to penalize shirking backfire by inducing less trustworthy behavior—giving rise to hidden costs of incentives. However, the availability of penalizing incentives also creates hidden returns: if a principal expresses trust by voluntarily refraining from implementing the punishment threat, the agent exhibits significantly more trustworthiness than if the punishment threat is not available. Thus trust seems to reinforce trustworthy behavior. Overall, trustworthiness is highest if the threat to punish is available but not used, while it is lowest if the threat to punish is used. Paradoxically, however, most CEOs and students use the punishment threat, although CEOs use it significantly less.HIDDEN COSTS, RETURNS OF INCENTIVES, TRUST, TRUSTWORTHINESS, CEO
The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs
We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students. We find that CEOs are considerably more trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness than students - thus reaching substantially higher efficiency levels than students. Moreover, we find that, for CEOs as well as for students, incentives based on explicit threats to penalize shirking backfire by inducing less trustworthy behavior - giving rise to hidden costs of incentives. However, the availability of penalizing incentives also creates hidden returns: if a principal expresses trust by voluntarily refraining from implementing the punishment threat, the agent exhibits significantly more trustworthiness than if the punishment threat is not available. Thus trust seems to reinforce trustworthy behavior. Overall, trustworthiness is highest if the threat to punish is available but not used, while it is lowest if the threat to punish is used. Paradoxically, however, most CEOs and students use the punishment threat, although CEOs use it significantly less.
Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence From a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment
We conducted a natural field experiment to explore the effect of price changes on charitable contributions. To operationalize our tests, we examine whether an offer to match contributions to a non-profit organization changes the likelihood and amount that an individual donates. Direct mail solicitations were sent to over 50,000 prior donors. We find that the match offer increases both the revenue per solicitation and the probability that an individual donates. While comparisons of the match treatments and the control group consistently reveal this pattern, larger match ratios (i.e., 1 and 1) relative to smaller match ratios (1) had no additional impact. The results have clear implications for practitioners in the design of fundraising campaigns and provide avenues for future empirical and theoretical work on charitable giving. Further, the data provide an interesting test of important methods used in cost-benefit analysis.
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