Shared Standards Versus Competitive Pressures in Journalism

Democratic societies need media that uphold journalistic standards of truthfulness and objectivity. But sensationalism has always been a temptation for journalists, and given the intense competition between news outlets, especially in the online world, there is pressure on them to 'chase the clicks.' The article analyzes the incentive structures for journalists - focusing on the harmfulness of sensationalist framing as an example - and the challenges of establishing shared standards in a highly competitive online environment. Drawing on concepts and arguments from business ethics, it argues that the structure of this problem points to the need for an 'ethics of sportsmanship' that upholds journalistic standards despite competitive pressures. But the specific role and nature of the media imply that there can be no once-and-for-all solution. Instead, there is a need for reflexivity, that is, for an ongoing dialogue about journalistic standards and the role of media in democratic societies

The epistemic division of labour in markets:knowledge, global trade and the preconditions of morally responsible agency

Markets allow for the processing of decentralized information through the price mechanism. But in addition, many markets rely on other mechanisms in markets, or non-market institutions, that provide and manage other forms of knowledge. Within national economies, these institutions form an 'epistemic infrastructure' for markets. In global markets, in contrast, this epistemic infrastructure is very patchy, undermining the preconditions for morally responsible agency. New technologies might help to improve the epistemic infrastructure of global markets, but they require conceptualizing knowledge not only as a tradable good, but also as a precondition of morally responsible agency

Institutional Analysis of a Natural History Museum: Formation and dissemination of scientific knowledge

When the canonization of scientific knowledge is considered as a point of sociological inquiry the interrelations of popular culture, commerce, and enterprise become crucial elements to understanding how forms of knowledge are produced and reproduced. Scientific knowledge is an integral part of our social world. We use it to better understand the natural processes behind global climates, health issues, ecology and biology. And yet most individuals outside the field of production are unaware of the processes behind obtaining this knowledge. Museums with research and collections are an arena for this topic. Their operations persist in influencing the selection of knowledge forming fields of study in both direct and indirect ways. In this study, The Field Museum of Natural History is used as a focal point to analyze ways in which the operation of an institution coincides and/or conflicts with scientific research. Data was collected through direct personal observation, interviews and published financial and historical records. Results from this analysis show that institutional operations within a museum persist in influencing the selection of knowledge forming fields of study in both direct and indirect ways and add to the literature on scientific knowledge

Lying, Misleading, and the Argument from Cultural Slopes

This paper discusses a novel kind of argument for assessing the moral significance of acts of lying and misleading. It is based on considerations about valuable social norms that might be eroded by these actions, because these actions function as signals. Given that social norms can play an important role in supporting morality, individuals have a responsibility to preserve such norms and to prevent 'cultural slopes' that erode them. Depending on whether there are norms against lying, misleading, or both, and how likely it is that they might be eroded, these actions can thus have different moral significance. In cases in which the rule 'do not lie', as a relatively simple rule, functions as a 'focal point', acts of misleading are often morally preferable. In other words, in such cases the possibility of 'cultural slopes' can ground a context-dependent slippery slope argument for a moral difference between lying and misleading

Sympathy, Empathy, and Twitter:Reflections on Social Media Inspired by an Eighteenth-Century Debate

How can the harm caused by waves of fake news or derogatory speech on social media be minimized without unduly limiting freedom of expression? I draw on an eighteenth-century debate for thinking about this problem: Hume and Smith present two different models of the transmission of emotions and ideas. Empathetic processes are causal, almost automatic processes; sympathy, in contrast, means putting oneself into the other person’s position and critically evaluating how one should react. I use this distinction to argue that the architectural logic of social media should be improved to prevent cumulative harms and to facilitate sympathetic processes

Old Facts, New Beginnings:Thinking with Arendt about Algorithmic Decision-Making

More and more decisions in our societies are made by algorithms. What are such decisions like, and how do they compare to human decision-making? I contrast central features of algorithmic decision-making with three key elements—plurality, natality, and judgment—of Hannah Arendt's political thought. In “Arendtian practices,” human beings come together as equals, exchange arguments, and make joint decisions, sometimes bringing something new into the world. With algorithmic decision-making taking over more and more areas of life, opportunities for “Arendtian practices” are under threat. Moreover, there is the danger that algorithms are tasked with decisions for which they are ill-suited. Analyzing the contrast with Arendt's thinking can be a starting point for delineating realms in which algorithmic decision-making should or should not be welcomed

Eonomic ethics for real humans: the contribution of behavioral economics to economic ethics

"In diesem Beitrag wird diskutiert, wie Ergebnisse der Verhaltensökonomie für die Wirtschaftsethik fruchtbar gemacht werden können. Im Gegensatz zur neo-klassischen Hauptströmung der Ökonomie setzt die Verhaltensökonomie nicht das Modell des homo oeconomicus voraus, sondern untersucht die ökonomische Entscheidungsfindung echter Menschen. Wie das Beispiel der akrasia und deren Auswirkung auf das Sparverhalten für die Altersvorsorge zeigt, erschließt die Verhaltensökonomie neue Felder für die Wirtschaftsethik. Ein zentraler ethischer Gesichtspunkt ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Frage nach der moralischen Autonomie ökonomischer Akteure. Ein Rawlsianischer Ansatz zeigt, dass 'opt-out'-Systeme, die typische Verhaltensweisen berücksichtigen, unter bestimmten Bedingungen die Desiderate der Unterstützung rationalen Verhaltens und der Sicherstellung von Autonomie gewährleisten können." (Autorenreferat)"This paper discusses how economic ethics can profit from taking into account the results of behavioral economics. In contrast to the neo-classical mainstream of economics, behavioral economics does not presuppose the model of 'economic man', but explores the ways in which real human beings make economic decisions. The example of akrasia and its effects on old-age saving shows that behavioral economic research opens new fields for economic ethics. A central ethical aspect in this context is the question about the moral autonomy of economic agents. A Rawlsian approach shows that opt-out systems, which take into account typical behavioral tendencies, can, under certain conditions, be a way of combining the desiderata of supporting rational behavior and safe-guarding autonomy." (author's abstract

Wer sind wir, wenn wir arbeiten?: Soziale Identität im Markt bei Smith und Hegel

This article examines the ways in which Adam Smith and G. W. F Hegel conceptualize the identity of workers in a market economy. Although both see human beings as shaped in and through social relationships, the relation between the worker and his work is seen in different ways. For Smith, workers "have” human capital, while for Hegel workers "are” brewers, butchers or bakers; their profession is part of their identity. This conceptual difference, which is reflected in different "varieties of capitalism” today, shows that not only degrees, but also kinds of embeddedness need to be taken into account in discussions of the relation between individual and societ