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Studiens syfte var att öka förståelsen för verksamma pedagogers förhållningssätt till de minsta barnen med fokus på dess språkliga och kommunikativa förmåga. Syftet var även att ta reda på hur pedagoger arbetar för att stimulera och utmana de små barnens språkutveckling. Studien tar sin utgångspunkt från fem pedagogers egna uppfattningar, vilket har undersökts genom kvalitativa intervjuer som metod. Undersökningens resultat visar att arbetet med barnens språkutveckling utifrån förskolans uppdrag är en tolkningsfråga, där de centrala begreppen språk och kommunikation har en komplex innebörd. Vidare framkommer att kroppsspråket är de minsta barnens främsta kommunikationsredskap, något som bör tas i beaktning i dess utvecklande mot ett talat språk. Pedagogernas generella uppfattning pekar på att det skett stora förändringar i synen på de minsta barnen över tid. Den rådande barnsynen präglas av en respekt och tilltro till barnet och dess förmågor. Ramfaktorer såsom stora barngrupper utgör dock hinder i pedagogernas arbete med de minsta barnens språkutveckling, med anledning av detta får det eftersträvansvärda förhållningssättet många gånger stå tillbaka i förskolans verksamhet

Will Privatization Reduce Costs?

I develop a model of public sector contracting based on the multitask framework by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). In this model, an agent can put effort into increasing the quality of a service or reducing costs. Being residual claimants, private owners have stronger incentives to cut costs than public employees. However, if quality cannot be perfectly measured, providing a private firm with incentives to improve quality forces the owner of the firm to bear risk. As a result, private firms will always be cheaper for low levels of quality but might be more expensive for high levels of quality. Extending the model to allow for differences in task attractiveness, I find that public firms shun unattractive tasks, whereas private firms undertake them if incentives are strong enough.Privatization; public sector contracting; incomplete contracts; contracting out

Acquisiton Strategies: Empirical Evidence of Outsider-Toeholds

Theoretically, cross ownership may mitigate mergers, i.e. market concentrations. Holding a share in a competing firm before the acquisition of another firm, outsider-toehold, is more profitable in some market constellations, due to the positive externality on the outsider (competing) firm when a merger occurs. The purposes of this paper are to empirically observe when US firms buy outsider-toeholds and through event-studies estimate the gains of buyers, outsider firms and competitors when firms holding outsider-toeholds merge.Acquisition; Antitrust; Insiders’ Dilemma; Mergers; Toeholds

Will Privatization Reduce Costs?

I develop a model of public sector contracting based on the multitask framework by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). In this model, an agent can put effort into increasing the quality of a service or reducing costs. Being residual claimants, private owners have stronger incentives to cut costs than public employees. However, if quality cannot be perfectly measured, providing a private firm with incentives to improve quality forces the owner of the firm to bear risk. As a result, private firms will always be cheaper for low levels of quality but might be more expensive for high levels of quality. Extending the model to allow for differences in task attractiveness, I find that public firms shun unattractive tasks, whereas private firms undertake them if incentives are strong enough.Privatization; Public Sector Contracting; Incomplete Contracts; Contracting Out