Illusory perceptions of space and time preserve cross-saccadic perceptual continuity

When voluntary saccadic eye movements are made to a silently ticking clock, observers sometimes think that the second hand takes longer than normal to move to its next position. For a short period, the clock appears to have stopped (chronostasis). Here we show that the illusion occurs because the brain extends the percept of the saccadic target backwards in time to just before the onset of the saccade. This occurs every time we move the eyes but it is only perceived when an external time reference alerts us to the phenomenon. The illusion does not seem to depend on the shift of spatial attention that accompanies the saccade. However, if the target is moved unpredictably during the saccade, breaking perception of the target's spatial continuity, then the illusion disappears. We suggest that temporal extension of the target's percept is one of the mechanisms that 'fill in' the perceptual 'gap' during saccadic suppression. The effect is critically linked to perceptual mechanisms that identify a target's spatial stability

Recurrent Activity in Higher Order, Modality Non-Specific Brain Regions: A Granger Causality Analysis of Autobiographic Memory Retrieval

It has been proposed that the workings of the brain are mainly intrinsically generated recurrent neuronal activity, with sensory inputs as modifiers of such activity in both sensory and higher order modality non-specific regions. This is supported by the demonstration of recurrent neuronal activity in the visual system as a response to visual stimulation. In contrast recurrent activity has never been demonstrated before in higher order modality non-specific regions. Using magneto-encephalography and Granger causality analysis, we tested in a paralimbic network the hypothesis that stimulation may enhance causal recurrent interaction between higher-order, modality non-specific regions. The network includes anterior cingulate/medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate/medial parietal cortices together with pulvinar thalami, a network known to be effective in autobiographic memory retrieval and self-awareness. Autobiographic memory retrieval of previous personal judgments of visually presented words was used as stimuli. It is demonstrated that the prestimulus condition is characterized by causal, recurrent oscillations which are maximal in the lower gamma range. When retrieving previous judgments of visually presented adjectives, this activity is dramatically increased during the stimulus task as ascertained by Granger causality analysis. Our results confirm the hypothesis that stimulation may enhance causal interaction between higher order, modality non-specific brain regions, exemplified in a network of autobiographical memory retrieval

Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple

The notion that free will is an illusion has achieved such wide acceptance among philosophers and neuroscientists that it seems to be acquiring the status of dogma. Nonetheless, research in this area continues, and this review offers a new analysis of the design limitations and data interpretations of free-will experiments. This review presents 12 categories of questionable conclusions that some scholars use to promote the idea that free will is an illusion. The next generation of less ambiguous experiments is proposed

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly non-naturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will

Emergence of qualia from brain activity or from an interaction of proto-consciousness with the brain: which one is the weirder? Available evidence and a research agenda

This contribution to the science of consciousness aims at comparing how two different theories can explain the emergence of different qualia experiences, meta-awareness, meta-cognition, the placebo effect, out-of-body experiences, cognitive therapy and meditation-induced brain changes, etc. The first theory postulates that qualia experiences derive from specific neural patterns, the second one, that qualia experiences derive from the interaction of a proto-consciousness with the brain\u2019s neural activity. From this comparison it will be possible to judge which one seems to better explain the different qualia experiences and to offer a more promising research agenda

The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility

Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise

Time perception and the experience of agency in meditation and hypnosis

Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are related in opposing ways to awareness of intentions. The cold control theory of hypnosis proposes that hypnotic responding involves the experience of involuntariness while performing an actually intentional action. Hypnosis therefore relies upon inaccurate metacognition about intentional actions and experiences. Mindfulness meditation centrally involves awareness of intentions and is associated with improved metacognitive access to intentions. Therefore, mindfulness meditators and highly hypnotizable people may lie at opposite ends of a spectrum with regard to metacognitive access to intention‐related information. Here we review the theoretical background and evidence for differences in the metacognition of intentions in these groups, as revealed by chronometric measures of the awareness of voluntary action: the timing of an intention to move (Libet's “W” judgments) and the compressed perception of time between an intentional action and its outcome (“intentional binding”). We review these measures and critically evaluate their proposed connection to the experience of volition and sense of agency

Illusory temporal binding in meditators

We investigate conditions in which more accurate metacognition may lead to greater susceptibility to illusion; and thus conditions under which mindfulness meditation may lead to less accurate perceptions. Specifically, greater awareness of intentions may lead to an illusory compression of time between a voluntary action and its outcome (“intentional binding”). Here we report that experienced Buddhist mindfulness meditators rather than non-meditators display a greater illusory shift of the timing of an outcome towards an intentional action. Mindfulness meditation involves awareness of causal connections between different mental states, including intentions. We argue that this supports improvements in metacognition targeted at motor intentions. Changes in metacognitive ability may result in an earlier and less veridical experience of the timing of action outcomes either through increased access to sensorimotor pre-representations of an action outcome or by affording greater precision to action timing judgements. Furthermore, as intentional binding is an implicit measure of the sense of agency, these results also provide evidence that mindfulness meditators experience a stronger sense of agency