Seismicity relocation and fault structure near the Leech River Fault Zone, southern Vancouver Island

Relatively low rates of seismicity and fault loading have made it challenging to correlate microseismicity to mapped surface faults on the forearc of southern Vancouver Island. Here we use precise relocations of microsciesmicity integrated with existing geologic data, to present the first identification of subsurface seismogenic structures associated with the Leech River fault zone (LRFZ) on southern Vancouver Island. We used HypoDD double difference relocation method to relocate 1253 earthquakes reported by the Canadian National Seismograph Network (CNSN) catalog from 1985 to 2015. Our results reveal an ~8-10 km wide, NNE-dipping zone of seismicity representing a subsurface structure along the eastern 30 km of the terrestrial LRFZ and extending 20 km farther eastward offshore, where the fault bifurcates beneath the Juan de Fuca Strait. Using a clustering analysis we identify secondary structures within the NNE-dipping fault zone, many of which are sub-vertical and exhibit right-lateral strike-slip focal mechanisms. We suggest that the arrangement of these near-vertical dextral secondary structures within a more general NE-dipping fault zone, located well beneath (10-15 km) the Leech River fault (LRF) as imaged by LITHOPROBE, may be a consequence of the reactivation of this fault system as a right-lateral structure in the crust with pre-existing NNE-dipping foliations. Our results provide the first confirmation of active terrestrial crustal faults on Vancouver Island using a relocation method. We suggest that slowly slipping active crustal faults, especially in regions with pre-existing foliations, may result in microseismicity along fracture arrays rather than along single planar structures

"Asymmetric Market Shares, Advertising, and Pricing: Equilibrium with an Information Gatekeeper"

We analyze the impact of market share on advertising and pricing decisions by firms that sell to loyal, non-shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through an information intermediary or "gatekeeper." In equilibrium the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market, and there is no equilibrium in which both firms advertise with probability 1. The results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes all prices are revealed to shoppers and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as Shopper.com.online markets, E-commerce, market share, information gatekeeper, equilibrium price dispersion, advertising