7,043 research outputs found
Retrocausal Quantum Mechanics: Maudlin's Challenge Revisited
In 1994, Maudlin proposed an objection to retrocausal approaches to quantum mechanics in general, and to the transactional interpretation (TI) in particular, involving an absorber that changes location depending on the trajectory of the particle. Maudlin considered this objection fatal. However, the TI did not die; rather, a number of responses were developed, some attempting to accommodate Maudlin's example within the existing TI, and others modifying the TI. I argue that none of these responses is fully adequate. The reason, I submit, is that there are two aspects to Maudlin's objection; the more readily soluble aspect has received all the attention, but the more problematic aspect has gone unnoticed. I consider the prospects for developing a successful retrocausal quantum theory in light of this second aspect of the objection
Automatic Annotation of Images from the Practitioner Perspective
This paper describes an ongoing project which seeks to contribute to a wider understanding of the realities of bridging the semantic gap in visual image retrieval. A comprehensive survey of the means by which real image retrieval transactions are realised is being undertaken. An image taxonomy has been developed, in order to provide a framework within which account may be taken of the plurality of image types, user needs and forms of textual metadata. Significant limitations exhibited by current automatic annotation techniques are discussed, and a possible way forward using ontologically supported automatic content annotation is briefly considered as a potential means of mitigating these limitations
On the Status of Primitive Ontology
Spontaneous collapse theories provide a promising solution to the measurement problem. But they also introduce a number of problems of their own concerning dimensionality, vagueness, and locality. In response to these problems, advocates of collapse theories have proposed various accounts of the primitive ontology of collapse theories—postulated underlying entities governed by the collapse theory and underwriting our observations. The most prominent of these are a mass density distribution over three-dimensional space, and a set of discrete “flash” events at space-time points. My argument here is that these primitive ontologies are redundant, in the sense that the structures exhibited by the primitive ontologies that allow them to solve the problems facing spontaneous collapse theories are also present in the wave function. But redundancy is not nonexistence; indeed, the fact that the relevant structures are already there in the wave function shows that the mass density ontology and the flash ontology exist whether they are explicitly postulated or not. By the same token, there is no need to decide between a wave function ontology, a mass density ontology and a flash ontology
Collapse Theories
The collapse postulate in quantum mechanics is problematic due to the measurement problem. The problem lies not with collapse per se, but with the appeal to measurement; a theory that could underwrite the collapse process without ineliminable reference to measurement would constitute a solution to the measurement problem. This is the strategy pursued by dynamical (or spontaneous) collapse theories. But dynamical collapse theories face a number of challenges. First, they make different empirical predictions from standard quantum mechanics, and hence are potentially empirically refutable. Second, there are difficulties reconciling the dynamical collapse mechanism with special relativity. Third, the post-collapse state is not the same as the post-measurement state of standard quantum mechanics, raising the possibility that dynamical collapse theories do not solve the measurement problem after all. Assuming that these challenges can be met, dynamical collapse theories can lay claim to being serious contenders for the correct description of the quantum world. And the description they provide has a number of interesting consequences. First, it makes indeterminism an irreducible fact about the physical world. It has been argued that this has important consequences for the foundations of statistical mechanics, for free will, and for consciousness. Second, many dynamical collapse theories can be taken to imply that the quantum wave function is fundamental, giving rise to a new kind of vagueness, since a wave can be fuzzy around the edges in a way that a particle cannot. Furthermore, the quantum wave function is defined over a high-dimensional space, not the three-dimensional space of experience, suggesting to some that three-dimensionality is an illusion
Against “experience”
Just as Bell proposed that we excise the word “measurement” from physics, so I propose that we should excise the word “experience”: “experience” and its cognates should not appear in the formulation of any physical theory, including quantum mechanics and its various interpretations. The reasons are more or less the same as Bell gives for “measurement”: “experience” is a vague term, and experiencing systems are made out of atoms obeying quantum mechanics. Bell’s exhortation concerning “measurement” has largely been taken on board in the foundations of quantum mechanics. But appeals to “experience” remain—in part, I will argue, because of a bad argument that can be traced back to von Neumann, and in part because of mistaken impressions about the fundamentality of experience
Quantum mechanics, emergence, and fundamentality
Quantum mechanics arguably provides the best evidence we have for strong emergence. Entangled pairs of particles apparently have properties that fail to supervene on the properties of the particles taken individually. But at the same time, quantum mechanics is a terrible place to look for evidence of strong emergence: the interpretation of the theory is so contested that drawing any metaphysical conclusions from it is risky at best. I run through the standard argument for strong emergence based on entanglement, and show how it rests on shaky assumptions concerning the ontology of the quantum world. In particular, I consider two objections: that the argument involves Bell's theorem, whose premises are often rejected, and that the argument rests on a contested account of parts and wholes. I respond to both objections, showing that, with some important caveats, the argument for emergence based on quantum mechanics remains intact
Bohmian Philosophy of Mind?
Bohm’s theory is in many ways an attractive solution to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It provides an intuitive explanation for the distinctive quantum phenomena of interference and entanglement without the need for any problematic “collapse” of the wave function. But it faces several serious difficulties. First, the dynamical law via which the wave function “pushes around” the Bohmian particles is explicitly non-local, against the spirit of
special relativity (Bell 1987, 115). Second, the Bohmian particles can be seen as redundant in the context of an Everettian solution to the measurement problem (Brown and Wallace 2005). And third, the Bohmian solution to the measurement problem apparently depends on an implausible and problematic account of mental awareness (Stone 1994; Brown and Wallace 2005). I do not wish to minimize the significance of the first two difficulties; they are serious
threats to the tenability of Bohm’s theory. But the third difficulty, I think, rests on a confusion concerning the way in which Bohmian particles encode the outcomes of measurements. In particular, my concern here is to respond to the accusations of Stone (1994) and Brown and Wallace (2005) that Bohm’s theory requires a mysterious kind of direct awareness of the positions of the Bohmian particles in our brains, and also to the claim of Brown and Wallace
(2005) that such direct awareness threatens the quantum no-signaling theorem
On the Status of Primitive Ontology
Spontaneous collapse theories provide a promising solution to the measurement problem. But they also introduce a number of problems of their own concerning dimensionality, vagueness, and locality. In response to these problems, advocates of collapse theories have proposed various accounts of the primitive ontology of collapse theories—postulated underlying entities governed by the collapse theory and underwriting our observations. The most prominent of these are a mass density distribution over three-dimensional space, and a set of discrete “flash” events at space-time points. My argument here is that these primitive ontologies are redundant, in the sense that the structures exhibited by the primitive ontologies that allow them to solve the problems facing spontaneous collapse theories are also present in the wave function. But redundancy is not nonexistence; indeed, the fact that the relevant structures are already there in the wave function shows that the mass density ontology and the flash ontology exist whether they are explicitly postulated or not. By the same token, there is no need to decide between a wave function ontology, a mass density ontology and a flash ontology
On Closing the Circle
Ghirardi sought to “close the circle”—to find a place for human experience of measurement outcomes within quantum mechanics. I argue that Ghirardi’s spontaneous collapse approach succeeds at this task, and in fact does so even without the postulation of a particular account of “primitive ontology”, such as a mass density distribution or a discrete “flashes”. Nevertheless, I suggest that there is a remaining ontological problem facing spontaneous collapse theories concerning the use of classical concepts like “particle” in quantum mechanical explanation at the micro-level. Neither the mass density nor the flash ontology is any help with this problem
Holism and Time Symmetry
Quantum mechanics is often taken to entail holism. I examine the arguments for this claim, and find that although there is no general argument from the structure of quantum mechanics to holism, there are specific arguments for holism available within the three main realist interpretations (Bohm, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber and many-worlds). However, Evans, Price and Wharton's sideways Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell example challenges the holistic conclusion. I show how the symmetry between the sideways and standard Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell set-ups can be used to argue against holism. I evaluate the prospects for extending this insight to more general quantum systems, with a view to producing a genuinely time-symmetric hidden variable theory. I conclude that, although this extension undermines the analogy between the sideways and standard cases, quantum mechanics without holism remains a live possibility.Quanta 2016; 5: 85–92
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