Blockchain Mining Games

We study the strategic considerations of miners participating in the bitcoin’s protocol. We formulate and study the stochastic game that underlies these strategic considerations. The miners collectively build a tree which consists of a long path and potentially short branches out of it, and they are paid when they create a node (mine a block) which will end up in the main path. Since the miners can hide newly mined nodes, they play a game with incomplete information. Here we consider two simplified forms of this game in which the miners have complete information. In the simplest game the miners release every mined block immediately, but are strategic on which blocks to mine. In the second more complicated game, when a block is mined it is announced immediately, but it may not be released so that other miners cannot continue mining from it. A miner not only decides which blocks to mine, but also when to release blocks to other miners. In both games, we show that when the computational power of each miner is relatively small, their best response matches the expected behavior of the bitcoin designer. However, when the computational power of a miner is large, he deviates from the expected behavior, and other Nash equilibria arise

“Reverse Gerrymandering”: Manipulation in Multi-Group Decision Making

District-based manipulation, or gerrymandering, is usually taken to refer to agents who are in fixed location, and an external division is imposed upon them. However, in many real-world setting, there is an external, fixed division – an organizational chart of a company, or markets for a particular product. In these cases, agents may wish to move around (“reverse gerrymandering”), as each of them tries to maximize their influence across the company’s subunits, or resources are “working” to be allocated to areas where they will be most needed.In this paper we explore an iterative dynamic in this setting, finding that allowing this decentralized system results, in some particular cases, in a stable equilibrium, though in general, the setting may end up in a cycle. We further examine how this decentralized process affects the social welfare of the system

SPECTRE: A Fast and Scalable Cryptocurrency Protocol

A growing body of research on Bitcoin and other permissionless cryptocurrencies that utilize Nakamoto\u27s blockchain has shown that they do not easily scale to process a high throughput of transactions, or to quickly approve individual transactions; blocks must be kept small, and their creation rates must be kept low in order to allow nodes to reach consensus securely. As of today, Bitcoin processes a mere 3-7 transactions per second, and transaction confirmation takes at least several minutes. We present SPECTRE, a new protocol for the consensus core of cryptocurrencies that remains secure even under high throughput and fast confirmation times. At any throughput, SPECTRE is resilient to attackers with up to 50\% of the computational power (up until the limit defined by network congestion and bandwidth constraints). SPECTRE can operate at high block creation rates, which implies that its transactions confirm in mere seconds (limited mostly by the round-trip-time in the network). Key to SPECTRE\u27s achievements is the fact that it satisfies weaker properties than classic consensus requires. In the conventional paradigm, the order between any two transactions must be decided and agreed upon by all non-corrupt nodes. In contrast, SPECTRE only satisfies this with respect to transactions performed by honest users. We observe that in the context of money, two conflicting payments that are published concurrently could only have been created by a dishonest user, hence we can afford to delay the acceptance of such transactions without harming the usability of the system. Our framework formalizes this weaker set of requirements for a cryptocurrency\u27s distributed ledger. We then provide a formal proof that SPECTRE satisfies these requirements

Using Convolutional Neural Networks to Analyze Function Properties from Images

We propose a system for determining properties of mathematical functions given an image of their graph representation. We demonstrate our approach for two-dimensional graphs (curves of single variable functions) and three-dimensional graphs (surfaces of two variable functions), studying the properties of convexity and symmetry. Our method uses a Convolutional Neural Network which classifies functions according to these properties, without using any hand-crafted features. We propose algorithms for randomly constructing functions with convexity or symmetry properties, and use the images generated by these algorithms to train our network. Our system achieves a high accuracy on this task, even for functions where humans find it difficult to determine the function's properties from its image

Knowing What to Ask: A Bayesian Active Learning Approach to the Surveying Problem

We examine the surveying problem, where we attempt to predict how a target user is likely to respond to questions by iteratively querying that user, collaboratively based on the responses of a sample set of users. We focus on an active learning approach, where the next question we select to ask the user depends on their responses to the previous questions. We propose a method for solving the problem based on a Bayesian dimensionality reduction technique. We empirically evaluate our method, contrasting it to benchmark approaches based on augmented linear regression, and show that it achieves much better predictive performance, and is much more robust when there is missing data

Predicting Gaming Related Properties from Twitter Accounts

We demonstrate a system for predicting gaming related properties from Twitter accounts. Our system predicts various traits of users based on the tweets publicly available in their profiles. Such inferred traits include degrees of tech-savviness and knowledge on computer games, actual gaming performance, preferred platform, degree of originality, humor and influence on others. Our system is based on machine learning models trained on crowd-sourced data. It allows people to select Twitter accounts of their fellow gamers, examine the trait predictions made by our system, and the main drivers of these predictions. We present empirical results on the performance of our system based on its accuracy on our crowd-sourced dataset

Balance: dynamic adjustment of cryptocurrency deposits.

Financial deposits are fundamental to the security of cryptoeconomic protocols as they serve as insurance against potential misbehaviour of agents. However, protocol designers and their agents face a trade-off when choosing the deposit size. While substantial deposits might increase the protocol security, for example by minimising the impact of adversarial behaviour or risks of currency fluctuations, locked-up capital incurs opportunity costs. Moreover, some protocols require over-collateralization in anticipation of future events and malicious intentions of agents. We present Balance, an application-agnostic system that reduces over-collateralization without compromising protocol security. In Balance, malicious agents receive no additional utility for cheating once their deposits are reduced. At the same time, honest and rational agents increase their utilities for behaving honestly as their opportunity costs for the locked-up deposits are reduced. Balance is a round-based mechanism in which agents need to continuously perform desired actions. Rather than treating agents' incentives and behaviour as ancillary, we explicitly model agents' utility, proving the conditions for incentive compatibility. Balance improves social welfare given a distribution of honest, rational, and malicious agents. Further, we integrate Balance with a cross-chain interoperability protocol, XCLAIM, reducing deposits by 10% while maintaining the same utility for behaving honestly. Our implementation allows any number of agents to be maintained for at most 55,287 gas (ca. USD 0.07) to update all agents' scores, and at a cost of 54,948 gas (ca. USD 0.07) to update the assignment of all agents to layers