Influence Diagram Use With Respect to Technology Planning and Investment

Influence diagrams are relatively simple, but powerful, tools for assessing the impact of choices or resource allocations on goals or requirements. They are very general and can be used on a wide range of problems. They can be used for any problem that has defined goals, a set of factors that influence the goals or the other factors, and a set of inputs. Influence diagrams show the relationship among a set of results and the attributes that influence them and the inputs that influence the attributes. If the results are goals or requirements of a program, then the influence diagram can be used to examine how the requirements are affected by changes to technology investment. This paper uses an example to show how to construct and interpret influence diagrams, how to assign weights to the inputs and attributes, how to assign weights to the transfer functions (influences), and how to calculate the resulting influences of the inputs on the results. A study is also presented as an example of how using influence diagrams can help in technology planning and investment. The Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) used this technique to examine the impact of R&D spending on the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of a space transportation system. The question addressed was the effect on the recurring and the non-recurring portions of LCC of the proportion of R&D resources spent to impact technology objectives versus the proportion spent to impact operational dependability objectives. The goals, attributes, and the inputs were established. All of the linkages (influences) were determined. The weighting of each of the attributes and each of the linkages was determined. Finally the inputs were varied and the impacts on the LCC determined and are presented. The paper discusses how each of these was accomplished both for credibility and as an example for future studies using influence diagrams for technology planning and investment planning

Using Technical Performance Measures

All programs have requirements. For these requirements to be met, there must be a means of measurement. A Technical Performance Measure (TPM) is defined to produce a measured quantity that can be compared to the requirement. In practice, the TPM is often expressed as a maximum or minimum and a goal. Example TPMs for a rocket program are: vacuum or sea level specific impulse (lsp), weight, reliability (often expressed as a failure rate), schedule, operability (turn-around time), design and development cost, production cost, and operating cost. Program status is evaluated by comparing the TPMs against specified values of the requirements. During the program many design decisions are made and most of them affect some or all of the TPMs. Often, the same design decision changes some TPMs favorably while affecting other TPMs unfavorably. The problem then becomes how to compare the effects of a design decision on different TPMs. How much failure rate is one second of specific impulse worth? How many days of schedule is one pound of weight worth? In other words, how to compare dissimilar quantities in order to trade and manage the TPMs to meet all requirements. One method that has been used successfully and has a mathematical basis is Utility Analysis. Utility Analysis enables quantitative comparison among dissimilar attributes. It uses a mathematical model that maps decision maker preferences over the tradeable range of each attribute. It is capable of modeling both independent and dependent attributes. Utility Analysis is well supported in the literature on Decision Theory. It has been used at Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne for internal programs and for contracted work such as the J-2X rocket engine program. This paper describes the construction of TPMs and describes Utility Analysis. It then discusses the use of TPMs in design trades and to manage margin during a program using Utility Analysis

Advanced Low-Cost O2/H2 Engines for the SSTO Application

The recent NASA Access to Space study examined future Earth to orbit (ETO) transportation needs and fleets out to 2030. The baseline in the option 3 assessment was a single stage to orbit (SSTO) vehicle. A study was conducted to assess the use of new advanced low cost O2/H2 engines for this SSTO application. The study defined baseline configurations and ground rules and defined six engine cycles to explore engine performance. The cycles included an open cycle, and a series of closed cycles with varying abilities to extract energy from the propellants to power he turbomachinery. The cycles thus varied in the maximum chamber pressure they could reach and in their weights at any given chamber pressure. The weight of each cycle was calculated for two technology levels versus chamber pressure up to the power limit of the cycle. The performance in the SSTO mission was then modeled using the resulting engine weights and specific impulse performance using the Access to Space option 3 vehicle. The results showed that new O2/H2 engines are viable and competitive candidates for the SSTO application using chamber pressures of 4,000 psi

Shuttle Shortfalls and Lessons Learned for the Sustainment of Human Space Exploration

Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space flight experience be well understood. Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There was significant reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall. Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the architecture, element and sub-system levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects - technical, as in design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle program experience, that must be a part of any 2l century initiatives furthering a growing human presence beyond earth

The Need for Technology Maturity of Any Advanced Capability to Achieve Better Life Cycle Cost (LCC)

Programs such as space transportation systems are developed and deployed only rarely, and they have long development schedules and large development and life cycle costs (LCC). They have not historically had their LCC predicted well and have only had an effort to control the DDT&E phase of the programs. One of the factors driving the predictability, and thus control, of the LCC of a program is the maturity of the technologies incorporated in the program. If the technologies incorporated are less mature (as measured by their Technology Readiness Level - TRL), then the LCC not only increases but the degree of increase is difficult to predict. Consequently, new programs avoid incorporating technologies unless they are quite mature, generally TRL greater than or equal to 7 (system prototype demonstrated in a space environment) to allow better predictability of the DDT&E phase costs unless there is no alternative. On the other hand, technology development programs rarely develop technologies beyond TRL 6 (system/subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment). Currently the lack of development funds beyond TRL 6 and the major funding required for full scale development leave little or no funding available to prototype TRL 6 concepts so that hardware would be in the ready mode for safe, reliable and cost effective incorporation. The net effect is that each new program either incorporates little new technology or has longer development schedules and costs, and higher LCC, than planned. This paper presents methods to ensure that advanced technologies are incorporated into future programs while providing a greater accuracy of predicting their LCC. One method is having a dedicated organization to develop X-series vehicles or separate prototypes carried on other vehicles. The question of whether such an organization should be independent of NASA and/or have an independent funding source is discussed. Other methods are also discussed. How to make the choice of which technologies to pursue to the prototype level is also discussed since, to achieve better LCC, first the selection of the appropriate technologies

Propulsion System Choices and Their Implications

In defining a space vehicle architecture, the propulsion system and related subsystem choices will have a major influence on achieving the goals and objectives desired. There are many alternatives and the choices made must produce a system that meets the performance requirements, but at the same time also provide the greatest opportunity of reaching all of the required objectives. Recognizing the above, the SPST Functional Requirements subteam has drawn on the knowledge, expertise, and experience of its members, to develop insight that wiIJ effectively aid the architectural concept developer in making the appropriate choices consistent with the architecture goals. This data not only identifies many selected choices, but also, more importantly, presents the collective assessment of this subteam on the "pros" and the "cons" of these choices. The propulsion system choices with their pros and cons are presented in five major groups. A. System Integration Approach. Focused on the requirement for safety, reliability, dependability, maintainability, and low cost. B. Non-Chemical Propulsion. Focused on choice of propulsion type. C. Chemical Propulsion. Focused on propellant choice implications. D. Functional Integration. Focused on the degree of integration of the many propulsive and closely associated functions, and on the choice of the engine combustion power cycle. E. Thermal Management. Focused on propellant tank insulation and integration. Each of these groups is further broken down into subgroups, and at that level the consensus pros and cons are presented. The intended use of this paper is to provide a resource of focused material for architectural concept developers to use in designing new advanced systems including college design classes. It is also a possible source of input material for developing a model for designing and analyzing advanced concepts to help identify focused technology needs and their priorities

Concepts for Life Cycle Cost Control Required to Achieve Space Transportation Affordability and Sustainability

Cost control must be implemented through the establishment of requirements and controlled continually by managing to these requirements. Cost control of the non-recurring side of life cycle cost has traditionally been implemented in both commercial and government programs. The government uses the budget process to implement this control. The commercial approach is to use a similar process of allocating the non-recurring cost to major elements of the program. This type of control generally manages through a work breakdown structure (WBS) by defining the major elements of the program. If the cost control is to be applied across the entire program life cycle cost (LCC), the approach must be addressed very differently. A functional breakdown structure (FBS) is defined and recommended. Use of a FBS provides the visibifity to allow the choice of an integrated solution reducing the cost of providing many different elements of like function. The different functional solutions that drive the hardware logistics, quantity of documentation, operational labor, reliability and maintainability balance, and total integration of the entire system from DDT&E through the life of the program must be fully defined, compared, and final decisions made among these competing solutions. The major drivers of recurring cost have been identified and are presented and discussed. The LCC requirements must be established and flowed down to provide control of LCC. This LCC control will require a structured rigid process similar to the one traditionally used to control weight/performance for space transportation systems throughout the entire program. It has been demonstrated over the last 30 years that without a firm requirement and methodically structured cost control, it is unlikely that affordable and sustainable space transportation system LCC will be achieved

Advanced Space Transportation Concepts and Propulsion Technologies for a New Delivery Paradigm

This paper describes Advanced Space Transportation Concepts and Propulsion Technologies for a New Delivery Paradigm. It builds on the work of the previous paper "Approach to an Affordable and Productive Space Transportation System". The scope includes both flight and ground system elements, and focuses on their compatibility and capability to achieve a technical solution that is operationally productive and also affordable. A clear and revolutionary approach, including advanced propulsion systems (advanced LOX rich booster engine concept having independent LOX and fuel cooling systems, thrust augmentation with LOX rich boost and fuel rich operation at altitude), improved vehicle concepts (autogeneous pressurization, turbo alternator for electric power during ascent, hot gases to purge system and keep moisture out), and ground delivery systems, was examined. Previous papers by the authors and other members of the Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) focused on space flight system engineering methods, along with operationally efficient propulsion system concepts and technologies. This paper continues the previous work by exploring the propulsion technology aspects in more depth and how they may enable the vehicle designs from the previous paper. Subsequent papers will explore the vehicle design, the ground support system, and the operations aspects of the new delivery paradigm in greater detail

Advanced Transportation System Studies. Technical Area 3: Alternate Propulsion Subsystem Concepts

The Alternate Propulsion Subsystem Concepts contract had seven tasks defined that are reported under this contract deliverable. The tasks were: FAA Restart Study, J-2S Restart Study, Propulsion Database Development. SSME Upper Stage Use. CERs for Liquid Propellant Rocket Engines. Advanced Low Cost Engines, and Tripropellant Comparison Study. The two restart studies, F-1A and J-2S, generated program plans for restarting production of each engine. Special emphasis was placed on determining changes to individual parts due to obsolete materials, changes in OSHA and environmental concerns, new processes available, and any configuration changes to the engines. The Propulsion Database Development task developed a database structure and format which is easy to use and modify while also being comprehensive in the level of detail available. The database structure included extensive engine information and allows for parametric data generation for conceptual engine concepts. The SSME Upper Stage Use task examined the changes needed or desirable to use the SSME as an upper stage engine both in a second stage and in a translunar injection stage. The CERs for Liquid Engines task developed qualitative parametric cost estimating relationships at the engine and major subassembly level for estimating development and production costs of chemical propulsion liquid rocket engines. The Advanced Low Cost Engines task examined propulsion systems for SSTO applications including engine concept definition, mission analysis. trade studies. operating point selection, turbomachinery alternatives, life cycle cost, weight definition. and point design conceptual drawings and component design. The task concentrated on bipropellant engines, but also examined tripropellant engines. The Tripropellant Comparison Study task provided an unambiguous comparison among various tripropellant implementation approaches and cycle choices, and then compared them to similarly designed bipropellant engines in the SSTO mission This volume overviews each of the tasks giving its objectives, main results. and conclusions. More detailed Final Task Reports are available on each individual task