Familisme, despotisme et discipline dans le languedoc rural

Cet article examine les mécanismes au sein des exploitations familiales qui contrôlent la main-d’oeuvre des femmes et des hommes dans le Languedoc rural. L’auteure soutient qu’il y a deux systèmes de gestion de la main-d’oeuvre dans les entreprises familiales et viticoles qui contribuent à façonner des femmes et des hommes en travailleurs disciplinés. On peut appeler un de ces systèmes le régime de l’« hégémonie familiale », et l’autre, le régime du « despotisme familial ». Dans ce dernier, la gestion est basée sur la coercition, alors que dans un régime d’hégémonie familiale, elle repose sur le consentement. Tout en utilisant des exemples tirés de son travail de terrain dans le Languedoc, l’auteure démontre comment les mécanismes propres à ces deux régimes instaurent les dimensions idéologiques et matérielles d’une éthique familiale, — le « familisme » —, dans un contexte où la dépopulation menace la survie des exploitations familiales.This paper is an examination of the mechanisms through which the labour of women and men is controlled in family based farms in rural Languedoc. It argues that the fashioning of women and men into disciplined workers on local wine-growing enterprises is accomplished through the establishment of two management systems. I call one the regime of “familial hegemony” and the other, I call the regime of “familial despotism”. In a despotic regime coercion is a key in the management and control of labour. By contrast, a regime of familial hegemony is based on consent and consent governs the management system. Focusing on the ways in which women and men are differentially affected by the mechanisms of the two regimes, the paper uses examples from Languedoc to illustrate the ways in which both despotic and hegemonic regimes draw on the ideological and material dimensions of a familistic ethic — what I shall refer to as “familism” — to control labour on family farms

Building an Economic Field with Supranational Supports? Lessons from Wine Production in Romania

In empirical studies of the real estate market, Pierre Bourdieu shows that the structuring of the 'economic field' is closely linked to that of the 'bureaucratic field'. Through its regulatory activity, government plays a part in the legitimation of particular forms of economic activity as well as in the construction of the resulting hierarchies. This analytical framework is generally applied at the level of the State. Our point is to extend the scope of that analysis. An extension of the bureaucratic field can be characterized if one takes the view that international and supranational administrations play an active role in the organization of economic activities. In order to assess the relevance of this interpretative standpoint, light is shed on the case of the Romanian wine-making economy. The aim is to study a sectoral policy over which the European Commission has recently taken control and to measure its effects within a new Member State. This perspective is even more informative because Romanian wine production is being restructured: new operators have made their presence felt over the last decade, while the national government has lacked the means to make a determined effort to place these operators within a hierarchy. The Commission offers support to various agents who speak on behalf of Romanian 'wine-making interests' and influences the directions taken by conflicts between these interests. At the same time, it maintains a structural contradiction which prevents the formation of an economic field in the full sense of the term: the points at issue are defined in such a way as to conflict with the shape of any stable coalition between the dominant agents. The demonstration is supported by qualitative data collected during field studies carried out in 2010 and 2011