'Against the World': Michael Field, female marriage and the aura of amateurism'

This article considers the case of Katherine Bradley and Edith Cooper, an aunt and niece who lived and wrote together as ‘Michael Field’ in the fin-de-siècle Aesthetic movement. Bradley’s bold statement that she and Cooper were ‘closer married’ than the Brownings forms the basis for a discussion of their partnership in terms of a ‘female marriage’, a union that is reflected, as I will argue, in the pages of their writings. However, Michael Field’s exclusively collaborative output, though extensive, was no guarantee for success. On the contrary, their case illustrates the notion, valid for most products of co-authorship, that the jointly written work is always surrounded by an aura of amateurism. Since collaboration defied the ingrained notion of the author as the solitary producer of his or her work, critics and readers have time and again attempted to ‘parse’ the collaboration by dissecting the co-authored work into its constituent halves, a treatment that the Fields too failed to escape

The philosophical foundations of humanistic psychology: A reply to McMullen

McMullen (1982) attempted in his critique of humanistic psychology to attack its philosophical foundations, taking these to be phenomenology and a doctrine of self determination. In this paper we argue that McMullen has misrepresented the philosophical position of the humanists, then we examine McMullen's own philosophical assumptions. We show that he has assumed the philosophy of empirical realism which we argue is inadequate as a foundation for science. It is shown that it is the inadequacy of McMullen's assumptions which underlies his failure to comprehend the position of the humanists. We then present a version of theoretical realism and show how, in terms of this, a conception of being can be justified which allows for the emergence of hierarchical order. On the basis of this conception of being we reassess the nature of self-determination and motivation, showing how, in opposition to both the empirical realism of McMullen and the philosophical dualism of conventional humanistic psychology, a naturalistic form of humanistic psychology is justified