[Introduction to] Cooperation under Fire: Anglo- German Restraint During World War II

Why do nations cooperate even as they try to destroy each other? Jeffrey Legro explores this question in the context of World War II, the total war that in fact wasn\u27t. During the war, combatant states attempted to sustain agreements limiting the use of three forms of combat considered barbarous—submarine attacks against civilian ships, strategic bombing of civilian targets, and chemical warfare. Looking at how these restraints worked or failed to work between such fierce enemies as Hitler\u27s Third Reich and Churchill\u27s Britain, Legro offers a new understanding of the dynamics of World War II and the sources of international cooperation. While traditional explanations of cooperation focus on the relations between actors, Cooperation under Fire examines what warring nations seek and why they seek it—the preference formation that undergirds international interaction. Scholars and statesmen debate whether it is the balance of power or the influence of international norms that most directly shapes foreign policy goals. Critically assessing both explanations, Legro argues that it was, rather, the organizational cultures of military bureaucracies—their beliefs and customs in waging war—that decided national priorities for limiting the use of force in World War II. Drawing on documents from Germany, Britain, the United States, and the former Soviet Union, Legro provides a compelling account of how military cultures molded state preferences and affected the success of cooperation. In its clear and cogent analysis, this book has significant implications for the theory and practice of international relations.https://scholarship.richmond.edu/bookshelf/1263/thumbnail.jp

Sell Unipolarity? The Future of an Overvalued Concept

For at least the past thirty years, scholarship on international relations has been bewitched by a simple proposition: the polarity of the international system is a central cause of great power strategies and politics. The number of poles (dominant countries) in the system is like an invisible fence that shapes states as if they were dogs with electronic collars or a Skinner box that conditions national rats. States can choose to ignore the fence or box, but if they do, they must pay the consequences. The polarity of the international system as defined by the number of great powers - involving more than two (multipolarity), two (bipolarity), or one (unipolarity) - is expected to mold states and international politics in different predictable ways. The central place of polarity in IR theory is such that it is commonly assumed that the appropriate way to study the world is to examine the impact of polarity first and then move on to other lesser factors to mop up any unexplained variance

Purpose Transitions: China and the American Response

We know that China is rising, but what will China do with that power? Distracted by power trends, both American policymakers and political scientists have not paid enough attention to purpose--what states intend to do with their power. Power is critical in international relations, but it is not destiny. The dominant lens for understanding the rise of China has been power transition theory, which insightfully probes the effects of power trajectories between rising and falling countries (e.g., the expected future of China and the United States). Yet what we also need to understand is purpose transition --that is, when and why the core intentions of countries in international politics change. This is a critical question because China today is mostly a cooperative participant in the existing international order. Will it remain so? And what can the United States do to shape that trajectory

The Ties that Bind the United States: A Recount (Book Review)

Review of the book, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy by Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlworth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008

Why Were Chemical Weapons Not Used in World War II?

Chemical warfare had played an important enough role in World War I that there was widespread expectation of its use in World War II. Certainly, Germany\u27s army and its chemists had no qualms about adding poison gas to the Third Reich\u27s arsenal. When war began, however, many of the latest chemical warfare agents were not available in deliverable form. The early successes of conventional-war making, combined with an increasing shortage of raw material, led Germany to deemphasize gas warfare even apart from the fear of Allied retaliation that significantly influenced at least the armed forces

The Military Meaning of the New Soviet Doctrine

The current ferment in Soviet military doctrine has led to uncertainty and debate over its implications. On one hand, Gorbachev\u27s peaceful rhetoric, backed by force reductions, is competing with the Bolshoi\u27s ballerinas for favorable Western press reviews. Public opinion-and many public officials-perceive a reduced military threat from the Soviet army. On the other hand, skeptics believe that recent doctrinal changes are compatible with a modernized, more efficient Soviet military machine. In their view, the Soviet army is definitely changing, but the threat will not. A review of the operational implications of the new Soviet security themes indicates that neither the optimist nor pessimist is wholly justified. The effect on the military situation in Europe will be mixed: some changes appear to benefit NATO\u27s position, while others suggest new challenges. Understanding the specifics of this evolution is crucial for determining how the West should respond

Bilateralism

Bilateralism concerns relations or policies of joint action between two parties. It can be contrasted with unilateralism (where one party acts on its own) and multilateralism (where three or more parties are involved). Typically, the term has applications concerning political, economic, and security matters between two states. Bilateralism has both costs and benefits, and there is a debate on its merits relative to unilateral or multilateral approaches

Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II

How can the use of unthinkable means of warfare be avoided? How can states successfully observe mutually desired limitations on taboo forms of combat? These questions are important because of concern that nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and terrorism will spread and be used. The growing number of states--e.g., Israel, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Ukraine--that have such means of inflicting harm increases the likelihood that any future conflict will involve a desire for restrictions. Countries may pursue restraint because popular opinion vilifies certain weapons; because leaders calculate that escalation would damage their domestic and international political support; or because states fear retaliatory attacks. Unfortunately, even when nations agree that limitations are desirable, restraint does not always endure. A key source of this disparity can be found in accidents and inadvertent escalation. In contemporary affairs among major powers, the apparent absence of grounds for intentional aggression, against a backdrop of change and instability, makes the unintended expansion of conflict a central concern. States may not seek a spiral of hostility but still can stumble into escalation. Why