Measuring Employment Standards Violations, Evasion and Erosion Using a Telephone Survey

This article reports on efforts to develop a telephone survey that measures the overall prevalence of employment standards (ES) violations as well as their evasion and erosion in lowwage jobs in Ontario, without requiring that respondents have any pre-existing legal knowledge. The result is a survey instrument that is unique in the Canadian context and reflects the concerns of both academic researchers and workers’ rights activists. Pilot survey results show that Ontario workers do not necessarily distinguish between ES violations and other workplace grievances and complaints. With careful questionnaire design, it is nevertheless possible to measure the prevalence of ES violations, evasion and erosion. In order to track the effects of ES policies and their implementation, it is crucial to establish baseline measures and standardized reporting tools. </p

Who to inspect? Using employee complaint data to inform workplace inspections in Ontario

   In Ontario, as in many other jurisdictions, employment standards enforcement includes reactively investigating employee complaints and, to a lesser extent, proactively inspecting workplaces. Analyses of administrative data from Ontario’s Ministry of Labour (MOL) show that the use of complaint data to inform workplace inspections is quite limited. Yet strict adherence to the MOLs procedures for workplace inspections is not conducive to the investigation of some of the empirically most common complaints. Accordingly, we argue for more strategic enforcement by making greater use of complaint data to guide workplace inspections triggered by complaints, and for the increased use of penalties in these inspections.</p

Are franchisees more prone to employment standards violations than other businesses? Evidence from Ontario, Canada

Using an administrative dataset from the Ontario Ministry of Labour, we investigate three hypotheses about employment standards violations among franchised businesses: (1) franchisees have a higher probability of violating employment standards than other businesses, (2) franchisees have a higher probability of monetary/wage-related ES violations than other businesses, and (3) franchisees have a lower probability of repaying monetary/wage-related violations than other businesses. The results of our statistical models suggest that overall, franchisees are indeed more likely to violate ES, have a higher probability of monetary/wage-related violations, and are less likely to repay such violations. However, the results vary substantially by industry. While franchisees had only marginally higher probabilities of an ES violation in two of the seven industry-groups examined, five of the seven industries showed substantially higher probabilities of a monetary violation. The results also show that franchisees in three industry groups (retail, accommodation and food services, and education, public administration, healthcare and social services) are particularly prone to monetary violations. </p

Using tickets in employment standards inspections: Deterrence as effective enforcement in Ontario, Canada?

 It is widely agreed that there is a crisis in labour/employment standards enforcement. A key issue is the role of deterrence measures that penalise violations. Employment standards enforcement in Ontario, like in most jurisdictions, is based mainly on a compliance framework promoting voluntary resolution of complaints and, if that fails, ordering restitution. Deterrence measures that penalise violations are rarely invoked. However, the Ontario government has recently increased the role of proactive inspections and tickets, a low-level deterrence measure which imposes fines of CAD295 plus victim surcharges. In examining the effectiveness of the use of tickets in inspections, we begin by looking at this development in the broader context of employment standards enforcement and its historical trajectory. Then, using administrative data from the Ministry of Labour, we examine when and why tickets are issued in the course of workplace inspections. After demonstrating that even when ticketable violations are detected, tickets are issued only rarely, we explore factors associated with an increased likelihood of an inspector issuing a ticket. Finally, we consider how the overall deterrent effect of workplace inspections is influenced by the use or non-use of deterrence tools.</p

Closing the Employment Standards Enforcement Gap: An Agenda For Change

Precarious employment is increasing in Ontario. A growing share of Ontario’s private sector employees earns low wages while a shrinking portion belongs to unions. These trends are fueled by changes in the structure of Ontario’s labour force. In many industries, including accommodation and food services, administrative services, and cleaning, workplaces are being transformed through greater use of contracting out, franchising, and extended supply chains. These ways of structuring work contribute to driving working conditions downward. </p