20 research outputs found
Spatial models of political competition with endogenous political parties
Two important human action selection processes are the choice by citizens of parties to support in elections and the choice by party leaders of policy ‘packages’ offered to citizens in order to attract this support. Having reviewed approaches analysing these choices and the reasons for doing this using the methodology of agent-based modelling, we extend a recent agent-based model of party competition to treat the number and identity of political parties as an output of, rather than an input to, the process of party competition. Party birth is modelled as an endogenous change of agent type from citizen to party leader, which requires describing citizen dissatisfaction with the history of the system. Endogenous birth and death of parties transforms into a dynamic system even in an environment where all agents have otherwise non-responsive adaptive rules. A key parameter is the survival threshold, with lower thresholds leaving citizens on average less dissatisfied. Paradoxically, the adaptive rule most successful for party leaders in winning votes makes citizens on average less happy than under other policy-selection rules
COMPARATIVE MORPHOLOGY OF MEASLES VIRUS AND PARAMYXOVIRUS-LIKE TUBULES IN MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS USING RUTHENIUM RED STAIN
Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany
"There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one’s vote if one is
liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral
systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to cast a strategic vote.They not only
determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ.
Strategic voters employ either a wasted-vote or a coalition insurance strategy, but do not
automatically cast their vote for large parties as the current literature suggest. This has
important implications for the consolidation of party systems. Moreover, even when facing
the same institutional incentives, voters vary in their proclivity to vote strategically." (author's abstract