61 research outputs found
Cryptographic protocol design
In this work, we investigate the security of interactive computations. The main emphasis is on the mathematical methodology that is needed to formalise and analyse various security properties. Differently from many classical treatments of secure multi-party computations, we always quantify security in exact terms. Although working with concrete time bounds and success probabilities is technically more demanding, it also has several advantages. As all security guarantees are quantitative, we can always compare different protocol designs. Moreover, these security guarantees also have a clear economical interpretation and it is possible to compare cryptographic and non-cryptographic solutions. The latter is extremely important in practice, since cryptographic techniques are just one possibility to achieve practical security. Also, working with exact bounds makes reasoning errors more apparent, as security proofs are less abstract and it is easier to locate false claims.
The choice of topics covered in this thesis was guided by two principles. Firstly, we wanted to give a coherent overview of the secure multi-party computation that is based on exact quantification of security guarantees. Secondly, we focused on topics that emerged from the author's own research. In that sense, the thesis generalises many methodological discoveries made by the author.
As surprising as it may seem, security definitions and proofs mostly utilise principles of hypothesis testing and analysis of stochastic algorithms. Thus, we start our treatment with hypothesis testing and its generalisations. In particular, we show how to quantify various security properties, using security games as tools. Next, we review basic proof techniques and explain how to structure complex proofs so they become easily verifiable. In a nutshell, we describe how to represent a proof as a game tree, where each edge corresponds to an elementary proof step. As a result, one can first verify the overall structure of a proof by looking at the syntactic changes in the game tree and only then verify all individual proof steps corresponding to the edges.
The remaining part of the thesis is dedicated to various aspects of protocol design. Firstly, we discuss how to formalise various security goals, such as input-privacy, output-consistency and complete security, and how to choose a security goal that is appropriate for a specific setting. Secondly, we also explore alternatives to exact security. More precisely, we analyse connections between exact and asymptotic security models and rigorously formalise a notion of subjective security. Thirdly, we study in which conditions protocols preserve their security guarantees and how to safely combine several protocols. Although composability results are common knowledge, we look at them from a slightly different angle. Namely, it is irrational to design universally composable protocols at any cost; instead, we should design computationally efficient protocols with minimal usage restrictions. Thus, we propose a three-stage design procedure that leads to modular security proofs and minimises usage restrictions
Formal Analysis of Non-Malleability for Commitments in EasyCrypt
In this work, we perform a formal analysis of definitions of
non-malleability for commitment schemes in the EasyCrypt theorem
prover. There are two distinct formulations of non-malleability found
in the literature: the comparison-based definition and the simulation-
based definition. In this paper, we do a formal analysis of both. We
start by formally proving that the comparison-based definition which was
originally introduced by Laur et al. is unsatisfiable. Also, we propose a
novel formulation of simulation-based non-malleability and show that it
is satisfiable in the Random Oracle Model. Moreover, we validate our
definition by proving that it implies hiding and binding of the commitment
scheme. Finally, we relate the novel definition to the existing definitions
of non-malleability
Round-efficient Oblivious Database Manipulation
Most of the multi-party computation frameworks can be viewed as
oblivious databases where data is stored and processed in a
secret-shared form. However, data manipulation in such databases can
be slow and cumbersome without dedicated protocols for certain
database operations. In this paper, we provide efficient protocols
for oblivious selection, filtering and shuffle---essential tools in
privacy-preserving data analysis. As the first contribution, we
present a -out-of- oblivious transfer protocol with
rounds, which achieves optimal communication and
time complexity and works over any ring . Secondly, we show
that the round complexity of a bit decomposition protocol can
be almost matched with oblivious transfer, and that there exists an
oblivious transfer protocol with rounds. Finally,
we also show how to construct round-efficient shuffle protocols with
optimal asymptotic computation complexity and provide several
optimizations
Cryptographically Private Support Vector Machines
We study the problem of private classification using kernel methods. More specifically, we propose private protocols implementing the Kernel Adatron and Kernel Perceptron learning algorithms, give private classification protocols and private polynomial kernel computation protocols. The new protocols return their outputs---either the kernel value, the classifier or the classifications---in encrypted form so that they can be decrypted only by a common agreement by the protocol participants. We also show how to use the encrypted classifications to privately estimate many properties of the data and the classifier. The new SVM classifiers are the first to be proven private according to the standard cryptographic definitions
From oblivious AES to efficient and secure database join in the multiparty setting
AES block cipher is an important cryptographic primitive with many applications. In this work, we describe how to efficiently implement the AES-128 block cipher in the multiparty setting where the key and the plaintext are both in a secret-shared form. In particular, we study several approaches for AES S-box substitution based on oblivious table lookup and circuit evaluation. Given this secure AES implementation, we build a universally composable database join operation for secret shared tables. The resulting protocol scales almost linearly with the database size and can join medium sized databases with 100,000 rows in few minutes, which makes many privacy-preserving data mining algorithms feasible in practice. All the practical implementations and performance measurements are done on the Sharemind secure multi-party computation platform
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