On the edge of good neighbourliness in EU law: lessons from Cyprus

Article 8 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) sets out a duty for the Union to develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries based inter alia on the good neighbourliness principle, on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful cooperation. This is proposed to be achieved through the conclusion of ‘specific agreements with the countries concerned’, possibly based on reciprocity of rights and obligations and/or joined activities. As evidenced by the various contributions in the present volume, many questions spring to mind when reading this new provision, regarding its raison d’être, its scope and its implications within the framework of the EU Treaties and the wider good neighbourliness principle deriving from international law. The role of Member States vis-à-vis the Union’s neighbours has been outlined in this volume in various contexts, and the Member States’ own commitment towards good neighbourliness within the EU. As rightly pointed out by another contributor to this volume in the context of the EU enlargement policy, ‘[d]epending upon the involvement of EU Member States and the risks for the importation of regional disputes into the EU’s internal structures, the requirement of good neighbourliness is either translated into an obligation of conduct or an obligation of result’, thereby revealing the changing or flexible nature of good neighbourliness. To determine the scope of good neighbourliness in the EU legal order, as enshrined in particular in Article 8 TEU, and delimit any underlying commitment on the part of Member States, there is arguably a need to examine the ‘micro’ or individual relations a Member State maintains with its own neighbours. Such a micro-analysis of essentially bilateral relations should also permit reflections on the question of reciprocity and ‘sharing of values’ underlying good neighbourliness in a given relationship or set of relations. In this context, Cyprus is believed to be a unique case study, arguably standing both geographically and substantively at the ‘edge’ of good neighbourliness and as such, outlining the flexible nature of good neighbourliness through its atypical or ‘outer’ application in EU law. The micro-analysis in the case of Cyprus would focus on the ‘de facto neighbouring’ relations the Republic of Cyprus maintains with the part of its own sovereign territory under Turkish military control (internal relations) and, as a result, on the rather uneasy relations Cyprus maintains with Turkey as its neighbour, at the Union’s door-step and also as a candidate country currently undergoing the accession negotiation process (external relations). This chapter therefore proposes to deepen our understanding of the good neighbourliness principle in EU law, as enshrined in Article 8 TEU and within the overall fabric of the EU Treaties, from the perspective of the Member States – more specifically of a single one, Cyprus – in an attempt to identify some of the outer limits of good neighbourliness. This will be done through a review of the scope of Article 8 TEU, including from the perspective of a single Member State (2), followed by an analysis of the outward application of good neighbourliness in the context of Cyprus ‘from within’ the EU (3) and finally ‘from outside’ the EU, also from the lens of reciprocity and shared values arguably lying at the core of good neighbourliness (4). The lessons to be learnt from Cyprus will relate to the scope of good neighbourliness in the EU legal order and to the specific forms it may take when considering the troubled relations of a single Member State with its ‘neighbours’. Good neighbourliness may be more ‘demanding’ on a specific Member State in a situation internal to the EU, but there may be counterparts in this case. This chapter will also assess the extent to which uneasy bilateral relations between a Member State and a third country can be efficiently addressed through EU external relations, the form this good neighbourliness will take and the legal and political implications it may have on other EU Member States, the third country concerned and the values of the Union

REPORT IN THE FORM OF A DISCUSSION PAPER: APPOINTMENT OF ADVOCATE GENERALS AT THE CJEU

In light of the upcoming opportunity for Cyprus and other Member States to appoint by rotation an Advocate General (‘AG’) to the Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) in 2020-21, the objective of the present report taking the form of a discussion paper is to clarify the law and practice related to such appointments and set out recommendations accordingly. It does so by looking in particular into the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), namely the Article 253 TFEU requirements themselves, the reports of the Article 255 TFEU Panel, and the selection processes carried out at the national levels. Article 253 TFEU requires only that such nominees are persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who either meet the requirements for highest national judicial office or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence. An Article 255 TFEU Panel was established with the Treaty of Lisbon and is responsible for advising the Council of the EU on the suitability of candidates appointed to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Panel has elaborated upon the Article 253 TFEU requirements, taking six considerations into account in their assessment: i. legal capabilities; ii. professional experience; iii. ability to perform duties of a judge (or Advocate General); iv. language skills; v. ability to work in a team in an international environment in which several legal systems are represented; and vi. whether their independence, impartiality, probity and integrity are beyond doubt.1 In a 2018 report, the Panel stated that ‘[i]t considers all professional paths in the field of law to be equally legitimate to apply for the office of Judge or [AG]’, ‘in particular, those of judge, university professor, jurisconsult, lawyer or senior official specialised in the field of law.’2 The Panel is further elaborated upon in Part I, including through its latest report published in January 2020. To further assist in understanding the nature of Advocate General appointments in the EU, a study was undergone into the law and practice at the national level related to ECJ appointments (Part II and the Tables in the Annex), and also into the characteristics of the profiles of the AGs that have been successfully appointed to date (Part III)

‘The Substantive Requirements of Judicial Independence in the EU: Lessons from Times of Crisis’ (EU-POP Jean Monnet Module Working Paper 1/2021)

In 2018, it was clarified that, “every Member State must ensure that the bodies which, as ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, come within its judicial system in the fields covered by that law, meet the requirements of effective judicial protection.” This statement by the Court of Justice (ECJ) in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP) represented an important clarification in respect to the possibility of protecting the independence of the EU judiciary under EU law, which falls under the principle of effective judicial protection. This was perhaps the most consequential development in the Court’s judicial independence-related case law to date, in which the Court, “establishe[d] a general obligation for Member States to guarantee and respect the independence of their national courts and tribunals” via their interpretation of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union second subparagraph. The year 2018 also witnessed “the first time a Member State was found to have failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations by violating the principle of judicial independence”, when the Commission brought proceedings against Poland via Article 258 TFEU alleging an infringement of Article 19(1) TEU second subparagraph. Section 1 takes stock of guarantees that the ECJ has deemed “essential” to safeguarding judicial independence. According to the Court, such essential guarantees include the provision of appropriate disciplinary regimes (1.1) and commensurate remuneration (1.2). An analysis of those guarantees serves to inform the identification of other possible “essential guarantees”, which arguably include safeguards against executive discretion that results in undue external intervention or pressure on the judiciary (1.3). The latter half of this paper then turns to the second category of substantive requirements of judicial independence identified in the research underlying this piece: respect for existing rules identified by the Court as “fundamental rules forming an integral part of the establishment and functioning of [the] judicial system”. In Simpson and HG (2020), the Court used this formula to determine when a breach of an existing rule related to the supranational EU judiciary also entails a breach of independence, by distinguishing between ‘fundamental’ and non-fundamental rules related to judicial appointments and term durations (2.1). However, it is further argued here that additional rules related to other types of measures – i.e. judicial remuneration and disciplinary regimes – can also be considered integral to the establishment and functioning of the judiciary (2.2). In order to understand and demonstrate how these “essential guarantees” and “fundamental rules” of judicial independence operate in practice, several contemporary crisis-related issues are explored throughout these sections, including: the rule of law crises affecting several Member States, the exit of the UK from the EU (“Brexit”), economic crises that have arisen as a result of the global financial crisis and euro-area sovereign debt crises, and now the COVID-19 pandemic, which has exacerbated the aforementioned rule of law and economic issues. Though crises of different natures will inevitably come and go, this does not mean that the EU judiciary’s judicial infrastructure cannot be made more resilient. Indeed, as will be seen, insight as to the substance of the judicial independence provisions can be drawn from these situations in a way that can be used to bolster the independence of the EU judiciary. In light of the findings and arguments presented herein, the authors’ approach is first that where a case concerns the introduction or application of a measure affecting the judiciary, under Article 19 TEU, the question should be whether the given measure fails to provide the “essential guarantees” of judicial independence required in that context. Second, where the case concerns a breach of a rule related to the judiciary (and this rule does not in itself fail to provide an essential guarantee of judicial independence), it can be asked whether that breach concerned a “fundamental rule” integral to the judiciary’s establishment or functioning. If the answer is “yes” to either question, the independence of the relevant judge or court required by Article 19 TEU has been infringed, and vice versa

Current Human Rights Frameworks (Sherpa project of Smart Information Systems, Horizon 2020, 2019)

Smart Information Systems (SIS), which are a combination of big data analytics and Artificial Intelligence (AI), constitute an integral part of our lives. From Google search, Amazon’s Alexa, surgery robots, digital libraries, location-based devices, affective computing, and human machine symbiosis, almost everybody in high-income regions is affected by SIS on daily basis. Meanwhile, human rights and ethics discussions about SIS are taking place whilst the technologies are already omnipresent. The UK House of Lords, the UNESCO, the European Commission and the Pope, are only a few examples of those working on the human rights and ethics aspects of SIS

Artificial intelligence for human flourishing – Beyond principles for machine learning

open access articleThe technical and economic benefits of artificial intelligence (AI) are counterbalanced by legal, social and ethical issues. It is challenging to conceptually capture and empirically measure both benefits and downsides. We therefore provide an account of the findings and implications of a multi-dimensional study of AI, comprising 10 case studies, five scenarios, an ethical impact analysis of AI, a human rights analysis of AI and a technical analysis of known and potential threats and vulnerabilities. Based on our findings, we separate AI ethics discourse into three streams: (1) specific issues related to the application of machine learning, (2) social and political questions arising in a digitally enabled society and (3) metaphysical questions about the nature of reality and humanity. Human rights principles and legislation have a key role to play in addressing the ethics of AI. This work helps to steer AI to contribute to human flourishing

ICLAIM receives the European citizen prize 2020 from the European Parliament

The Interdisciplinary Centre for Law, Alternative and Innovative Methods (ICLAIM), an independent non-profit organisation working in close association with the School of Law at the University of Central Lancashire in Cyprus (UCLan Cyprus), is proud to announce that out of the 30 laureates of the European Parliament’s European Citizen Prize 2020 from 25 countries of the EU, ICLAIM is one of the two recipients from Cyprus! The laureates for Cyprus were announced by the European Parliament Office in Cyprus on 12 February 2021, being ICLAIM Founder, Prof. Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, on behalf of ICLAIM for its ‘Social Mediation in Practice’ programme, and Mr Costas Vichas for his long-term humanitarian assistance to those in need. Since 2008, the European Parliament awards the European Citizen’s Prize every year to projects and initiatives that facilitate cross-border cooperation or promote mutual understanding within the EU. The prize, which has symbolic value, is also intended to acknowledge the work of those who through their day-to-day activities promote European values

The Substantive Requirements of Judicial Independence in the EU: Lessons from Times of Crisis

Since 2018, there have been a number of ground-breaking cases on the matter of judicial independence in the EU, clarifying in particular the broad scope of application of (most notably) Article 19 TEU. In light of these developments, we found it important that a comprehensive investigation be undergone into the substantive requirements of the judicial independence provisions in EU law. When Article 19 TEU applies, what exactly does it require, including in times of crisis? Throughout a detailed analysis of the Court's case law, we identified certain i) 'essential guarantees' and ii) 'fundamental rules' of judicial independence, on which we elaborate in this new piece, an EU-POP Jean Monnet Module Working Paper

Challenges to Fundamental Human Rights in the age of Artificial Intelligence Systems: Shaping the digital legal order while upholding Rule of Law principles and European values

While there is no uniform definition of Artificial Intelligence (AI) or Artificial Intelligence Systems (AIS) in the European legal order at large – several attempts have been made to provide ‘all-encompassing but change-resistant’ definitions AIS’s serious impact on fundamental human rights is not doubtful anymore. For this reason, the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade proposes an anthropocentric interaction with such systems. As will be discussed in this paper, being human-centered in the field of AI and AIS can become more and more difficult, as we move along the path of digitalisation and algorithmisation. Taking this into account, this paper reviews the regulatory framework of AI and proposes potential new/renewed/modernised rights that should enhance and/or supplement the current catalogue of fundamental human rights, as contained inter alia in the EU Charter and the ECHR. This paper also argues that regulatory standards, especially in relation to AI, should be clearer and not be based on a half-hearted approach or on a “muddling through”.14 Some wordings of rights and standards will be suggested in this paper