Problematic legal pluralism: causes and some potential ‘cures’

The tools of analytical positivism and economic analysis are applied to the phenomenon of legal pluralism. An analytical framework is developed to ascertain when legal pluralism is problematic in the control of wrongdoing. It is demonstrated that there are three specific cases: rivalrous compliance, sanctions for wrong behaviour that are deemed to be wrongs themselves, and the uncoordinated sanctioning of common wrongs. Then there is a discussion of the consequences and some approaches that can be used to ameliorate each case that has been identified. It is hoped that this framework will be used to guide future practical and theoretical discussions on legal pluralism and its potential problems.This is the accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07329113.2014.892335#.VOXJ3S6Qne4

Do Voluntary Commons Associations Deliver Sustainable Grazing Outcomes? An Empirical Study of England

In 1965, the Commons Registration Act came into force in England and Wales. The Act led to the removal of the capacity of commoners to regulate the intensity of grazing via traditional legal means. From this policy shock a number of voluntary commons associations were formed. These voluntary groups relied on their members to agree upon how the commons should be managed. Using two-stage least squares regression analysis we find that commons governed by these associations are much more likely to produce sustainable grazing outcomes. These results are robust to the existence of a variety of controls, including overlapping institutional frameworks. Importantly, they highlight the ability of voluntary environmental organisations to deliver sustainable environmental outcomes

The benefits of forced experimentation: strikingevidence from the London Underground network

We estimate that a significant fraction of commuters on the London underground do not travel their optimal route. Consequently, a tube strike (which forced many commuters to experiment with new routes) taught commuters about the existence of superior journeys, bringing about lasting changes in behaviour. This effect is stronger for commuters who live in areas where the tube map is more distorted, thereby pointing towards the importance of informational imperfections. We argue that the information produced by the strike improved network-efficiency. Search costs are unlikely to explain the suboptimal behaviour. Instead, individuals seem to under-experiment in normal times, as a result of which constraints can be welfare-improvin

Precolonial institutions and deforestation in Africa

We find that local institutions inherited from the precolonial era continue to play an important role in natural resource governance in Africa. Using satellite image data, we find a significant and robust relationship between deforestation and precolonial succession rules of local leaders (local chiefs). In particular, we find that those precolonial areas where local leaders were appointed by ‘social standing’ have higher rates of deforestation compared to the base case of hereditary rule and where local leaders were appointed from above (by paramount chiefs). While the transmission mechanisms behind these results are complex, we suggest that areas where local leaders were appointed by social standing are more likely to have poorer institutions governing local leadership and forest management.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.10.03

On the perils of commitment to punishment when criminals are strategic

For some crimes the perpetrator can be detected costlessly but can only be apprehended at significant cost, or not at all for some period of time. To deter strategic behavior in the period between detection and apprehension, authorities may wish to commit themselves to punishing the criminal once apprehended, regardless of the perpetrator’s behavior or threats. However we show that such efforts at commitment to ex post punishment may induce worse behavior and that it selects potential criminals of a worse type. We show that when law enforcement authorities cannot commit themselves perfectly, it is dangerous for them to try to commit as it may invoke a strategic response that can worsen the situation. When law enforcement authorities do increase their commitment to punish such offenders, it is likely to lead to less but more gruesome crimes.Mare Sarr gratefully acknowledges financial support from the South African National Research Foundation (NRF)

Regulating the water-energy-food nexus: Interdependencies, transaction costs and procedural justice

There have been calls for an overhaul of regulatory and governance frameworks to incorporate the implications of the water-energy-food nexus. We map one small component of the regulatory space of the nexus and highlight its immense complexity. We draw on insights from the economics and socio-legal literatures to show that a decentralised approach to regulation based upon procedural justice can enable the trade-offs of the nexus to be considered and addressed. We use a nexus case study of micro hydro-electricity generation in Dartmoor National Park in England to show that when we take into account interactions between state and non-state regulation, the economic concepts of interdependencies and transaction costs, and a recognition that regulation of the nexus is a process involving decisions of procedural justice, some existing regulatory frameworks are already well-equipped to deal with the implications of nexus analysis.This work was supported by EPSRC grant number EP/N005600/1