A magyar kormány erőfeszítései a Nyugat-Bánság visszaszerzésére 1941-ben

In April 1941, in the occupation of Yugoslavia, Hitler claimed the participation of the Hungarian army. The Hungarian Government first of all agreed to military collaboration because of the possibility of the reannexation of areas that were earlier under Hungary’s control. However, this area was occupied by German troops as a result of the Romanian protestation against Hungarian invasion and the local German minority’s request. During the German–Italian negotiations deciding about splitting up Yugoslavia, this territory was awarded to Hungary in theory, but for the time being the region on the left bank of the River Tisza remained under German control. The Hungarian Government urged the handing over of the territory several times. Prime Minister László Bárdossy held talks with Berlin to provide economic benefits to Germany in exchange for handing over the area. The Hungarian Government tried to send officials and teachers to the Banat in order to strengthen the position of the Hungarians living there. However, the Germans prevented this. In the meantime, the Germans had settled down in this area, and the Western Banat was administratively proclaimed as part of the Serbian satellite state being under German control

Tervek a Felvidék visszafoglalására 1920-ban

In 1920, the Hungarian political and military leadership still saw a realistic opportunity to modify the peace conditions. The idea was partly built on the serious interior problems of the Czecho-Slovakian. On the other hand, a crisis situation might have been created in the region by the success of the Soviet-Russian Red Army that was pushing forward towards the West. In both cases, it could have been possible to count on the Western powers’ favourable receipt of the act of the National Army in order to help Poland that was threatened by the Soviets, to stabilise the region, and to eliminate Bolshevik threat. However, in order to do that, the Hungarian troops had had to march in the Highlands. The Hungarian Government held confidential negotiations with French personalities who would have propended to accept that in turn of Hungarian help, Highland or at least its Eastern part could belong again under Hungarian control. Eventually, the military plans (Awakening, Dawn, Arpad) could not be implemented because of the lack of political conditions. The Polish stopped the Soviets’ sudden attack, while in Czecho-Slovakia no Bolshevik turn took place

Budapest légiháborús tűzkeresztsége = The baptism of fire in the air war of Budapest

The Hungarian capital was not hit by an air attack until September 1942. At the time of the First Vienna Award, the attack on Yugoslavia and the entry into the war against the Soviet Union, there were air raid alarms in Budapest, but no bombing took place. In August-September 1942, the Soviet strategic air force launched attacks against Berlin and the capitals of the satellite states of the Third Reich. Budapest was bombed on the night of September 4 and 9. A total of 122 machines participated in the 2 campaigns. The Soviet planes flew 1,400–1,500 km from their base to the Hungarian capital, both times in bad weather conditions, so only half of the planes reached the destination. The bombs dropped from a great height without precise targeting caused only minor material damage, the personal loss was 18 dead and 84 wounded. The first attack hit Budapest unexpectedly. Until now, the Hungarian capital lived in the deceptive illusion that nothing bad could happen to him. At the time of the second attack, the military air defence and civil air raid precaution were already better prepared. In the following weeks, additional defensive measures were taken, but no further bombing occurred until 1944

Honvédség Balkáni alkalmazására vonatkozó német igény elutasítása

1943 tavaszán a Honvéd Vezérkar főnöke javaslatot tett, hogy magyar csapatok is kapcsolódjanak be a Balkán német megszállásába. Ezen az áron a németek beleegyeznének a Donnál szétvert 2. magyar hadsereg megmaradt erőinek hazahozásába. Ezzel a magyar erők kevésbé veszélyes feladatot látnak el és közelebb állomásoznak az ország határához. Így könnyebb megőrizni a haderőt, hogy a szomszédokkal való területi viták rendezéséhez kellő erő álljon Magyarország rendelkezésre. A magyar kormány elvetette a szerb területek megszállásában való részvételt. Nem akarták kockáztatni, hogy a szövetségesek balkáni partraszállása esetén a magyar katonák szembe kerüljenek angol vagy amerikai erőkkel. Úgy gondolták, hogy a honvédség megjelenése csak tovább rontaná az egyébként is feszült magyar–szerb viszonyt. Titkos üzenetváltás során kiderült, hogy egy ilyen lépést a nyugati hatalmak is elítélnének. A kialakuló vita megrontotta a Vezérkar főnöke és a miniszterelnök viszonyát. In spring 1943, the Chief of the General Staff, made a proposal that the Hungarian troopsshould have also joined theGerman occupational operations of the Balkans. In return the Germans would have agreed to bring home the remaining forces of the 2nd Hungarian Army routed at Don. The Hungarian forces would have had a less dangerous task and stayed closer to the Hungarian border. In this way it is easier to prevent the military force, so that there is enough force available for Hungary to settle territorial debates with the neighbours. However, the Hungarian Government rejected Hungary’s participation in occupying Serbian territories. They did not want to risk that in case the allies landed in the Balkans the Hungarian soldiers would have to face English or American forces. They thought that the appearance of the Hungarian army would have only worsened further the otherwise stressed relationship between the Hungarians and the Serbians. In the course of a secret exchange of messages, it turned out that even the western powers would have disapproved such a step. This debate infected the relationship between the Chief of the General Staff and the Prime Minister

Horthy kormányzó németországi látogatása 1938 augusztusában

In summer 1938, Hitler was already preparing to gain control of Czechoslovakia. Hitler expected full co6operation of the Hungarian Government for the sake of re6acquiring Highland annexed in 1920. On 21st August 1938, Regent Horthy, accompanied by several of his ministers, visited Germany, where he was welcomed with high celebration. During the discussions, Hitler made attempts to induce the Hungarian delegation to get involved in the military action against Czechoslovakia. However, Horthy and his ministers rejected it. They referred to the unpreparedness of the Hungarian military forces, the intervention of France and Great Britain, and the unpredictable reactions of the Little Entente states. Hungarian politicians insisted on revision, but preferably they wanted to implement it by by way of negotiations. Consequently, on 22nd August they agreed with the Little Entente states that Hungary was allowed to get armed freely; however, they mutually relinquished to resort to force. The German government was disappointed to find that it could not count on Hungary in its plans

Tervek a Felvidék visszafoglalására 1920-ban

A magyar politikai és katonai vezetés és 1920-ban még reális lehetőséget látott az békefeltételek, módosítására. Az elképzelés részben a csehszlovák állam komoly belső problémáira épített. Másrészt szovjet-orosz Vörös Hadsereg Közép-Európát veszélyeztető sikerei teremthettek a régióban válsághelyzetet. Mindkét esetben számítani lehetetett arra, hogy a nyugati hatalmak kedvezően fogadnák a Magyar Nemzeti Hadsereg fellépését, a szovjetek által fenyegetett Lengyelország megsegítésére, a térség stabilizálására, a bolsevik veszély elhárítására. Ehhez azonban a magyar csapatoknak be kellett volna vonulniuk a Felvidékre. A magyar kormány titkos tárgyalásokat folytatott francia személyiségekkel, melyek hajlottak volna arra, hogy a magyar segítségért cserébe Felvidék, vagy annak legalább a keleti része ismét magyar fennhatóság alá kerülhessen. A katonai tervek (Ébredés, Pirkadás, Árpád) végül a politikai feltételek hiánya miatt nem valósulhattak meg. A szovjet előretörést a lengyelek megállították, Csehszlovákiában pedig nem került sor bolsevik fordulatra.   In 1920, the Hungarian political and military leadership still saw a realistic opportunity to modify the peace conditions. The idea was partly built on the serious interior problems of the Czecho-Slovakian. On the other hand, a crisis situation might have been created in the region by the success of the Soviet-Russian Red Army that was pushing forward towards the West. In both cases, it could have been possible to count on the Western powers’ favourable receipt of the act of the Hungarian National Army in order to help Poland that was threatened by the Soviets, to stabilise the region, and to eliminate Bolshevik threat. However, in order to do that, the Hungarian troops had had to march in the Highlands. The Hungarian Government held confidential negotiations with French personalities who would have propended to accept that in turn of Hungarian help, Highland or at least its Eastern part could belong again under Hungarian control. Eventually, the military plans (Awakening, Dawn, Arpad) could not be implemented because of the lack of political conditions. The Polish stopped the Soviets’ sudden attack, while in Czecho-Slovakia no Bolshevik turn took place

Kettős játszma : Magyarország és az Antikomintern paktum

The Imrédy Government already took steps to join the Anti-Comintern Pact at the end of 1938. However, the Pact was signed by Pál Teleki who replaced Béla Imrédy in the post of the prime minister. The Hungarian leadership considered it important to commit itself even in an agreement for the German and Italian foreign policy in order to strengthen the trust of the Axis Powers. They expected from this act that Berlin and Rome would finally support the Hungarian claim concerning Subcarpathia. This closer relationship with Germany and the open standpoint represented against the communist efforts seemed to be suitable even for neutralising the anti-government critics of the Hungarian extreme right wing. In addition, Teleki hoped that the symbolic step against the Soviet Union is welcomed by British politics. Thus, Hungary can take advantage of the Western powers against Czechoslovak leadership, which signed a military agreement with Moscow. The Western Powers did not show serious interest in relation to this Hungarian action. The Soviet Government harshly reacted. It froze diplomacy relationships. However, it was not primarily because of Budapest’s anti-communist announcement, but because of the Hungarian action’s precedent character so that the rest of the small states in Eastern Europe would not follow it

Magyarország csatlakozása a háromhatalmi egyezményhez

On 27th September, 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the tripartite pact. Hungary announced it immediately that it wanted to join the alliance. The Hungarian Government hoped to keep Germany away from Hungarian internal affairs and prevent Hitler’s raising the extreme right to power. On the other hand, the Government wanted to gain support from the Axis powers to get back all the Hungarian territories that had been detached in Trianon. For Berlin, expansion was important in order to gain control over the Balkans. On 20th November, Hungary joined, then in the following days Romania and Slovakia also joined. In order to counterbalance this Pact, Pál Teleki made efforts to improve the relationship with neutral Yugoslavia. With this joining, the Hungarian Government eventually committed itself to the Axis powers. In return, however, it could only strengthen its positions a bit compared to the local extreme right

A kormányzó utódlásának kérdése a Horthy-korszakban

The Treaty of Trianon prohibited the return of either Charles IV or any other member of the Habsburg family to the Hungarian throne. However, the Hungarian political forces hoped that the „king” question would be solved soon. By the 1930-ies, however, it became clear that for the time being it was impossible to occupy the throne, consequently, the institution of regency would last for a longer period. That was why regent succession needed to be regulated. Miklós Horthy wanted to have a determinant voice in his successor’s denomination. But the parliament wanted to keep this right to itself. Finally, in 1937, a compromise was reached. The regent was able to propose 3 people as successor, while the parliament had the right either to choose from them or nominate a 4th prospect. At the beginning of the 1940-ies, as a result of the war situation, it became inevitable to regulate even the substitution of the regent. That was why in February 1942, upon Horthy’s request, the parliament elected a vice regent. The new post was allocated to István Horthy (elder son of the regent). The vice regent, however, did not have the right of succession. He could only function as the head of state temporarily, until the parliament elected a new regent