Influencing Clients in Counterinsurgency:U.S. Involvement in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1979–92

After a decade and a half of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. policymakers want to change their approach to COIN by providing aid and advice to local governments rather than directly intervening with U.S. forces. Both this strategy and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in general, however, do not acknowledge the difficulty of convincing clients to follow U.S. COIN prescriptions. The historical record suggests that, despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the United States and its local partners have had significantly different goals, priorities, and interests with respect to the conduct of their counterinsurgency campaigns. Consequently, a key focus of attention in any future counterinsurgency assistance effort should be on shaping the client state's strategy and behavior. Although it is tempting to think that providing significant amounts of aid will generate the leverage necessary to affect a client's behavior and policies, the U.S. experience in assisting the government of El Salvador in that country's twelve-year civil war demonstrates that influence is more likely to flow from tight conditions on aid than from boundless generosity. </jats:p

The Forgotten Front:Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency

After a decade and a half of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, US policymakers are seeking to provide aid and advice to local governments&amp;apos; counterinsurgency campaigns rather than directly intervening with US forces. This strategy, and US counterinsurgency doctrine in general, fail to recognize that despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the US and its local partner frequently have differing priorities with respect to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Without some degree of reform or policy change on the part of the insurgency-plagued government, American support will have a limited impact. Using three detailed case studies - the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem, and the Salvadorian Civil War - Ladwig demonstrates that providing significant amounts of aid will not generate sufficient leverage to affect a client&amp;apos;s behaviour and policies. Instead, he argues that influence flows from pressure and tight conditions on aid rather than from boundless generosity.</jats:p

Replication Data for: “Executive Particularism and Ministerial Selection in India,” Legislative Studies Quarterly

Replication Data for: Walter C. Ladwig III, “Executive Particularism and Ministerial Selection in India,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, forthcoming

Trump and Modi: Seeking a Global Partnership?

The visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Washington DC provides an opportunity for the US and India to set aside some of the uncertainties that have set into the relationship. President Trump and Prime Minister Modi must be ambitious and spell out a vision befitting a global partnership