COVID-19 at War: The Joint Forces Operation in Ukraine

The ongoing pandemic disaster of coronavirus erupted with the first confirmed cases in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV2) novel coronavirus, the disease referred to as coronavirus disease 2019, or COVID-19. The World Health Organization (WHO) confirmed the outbreak and determined it a global pandemic. The current pandemic has infected nearly 300 million people and killed over 3 million. The current COVID-19 pandemic is smashing every public health barrier, guardrail, and safety measure in underdeveloped and the most developed countries alike, with peaks and troughs across time. Greatly impacted are those regions experiencing conflict and war. Morbidity and mortality increase logarithmically for those communities at risk and that lack the ability to promote basic preventative measures. States around the globe struggle to unify responses, make gains on preparedness levels, identify and symptomatically treat positive cases, and labs across the globe frantically rollout various vaccines and effective surveillance and therapeutic mechanisms. The incidence and prevalence of COVID-19 may continue to increase globally as no unified disaster response is manifested and disinformation spreads. During this failure in response, virus variants are erupting at a dizzying pace. Ungoverned spaces where nonstate actors predominate and active war zones may become the next epicenter for COVID-19 fatality rates. As the incidence rates continue to rise, hospitals in North America and Europe exceed surge capacity, and immunity post infection struggles to be adequately described. The global threat in previously high-quality, robust infrastructure health-care systems in the most developed economies are failing the challenge posed by COVID-19; how will less-developed economies and those healthcare infrastructures that are destroyed by war and conflict fare until adequate vaccine penetrance in these communities or adequate treatment are established? Ukraine and other states in the Black Sea Region are under threat and are exposed to armed Russian aggression against territorial sovereignty daily. Ukraine, where Russia has been waging war since 2014, faces this specific dual threat: disaster response to violence and a deadly infectious disease. To best serve biosurveillance, aid in pandemic disaster response, and bolster health security in Europe, across the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and Black Sea regions, increased NATO integration, across Ukraine’s disaster response structures within the Ministries of Health, Defense, and Interior must be reinforced and expanded to mitigate the COVID-19 disaster

Russia's smart power in Crimea: Sowing the seeds of trust

The purpose of this article is to determine whether a 'dark side' exists to Russia's trust-building in the Black Sea region. An empirical analysis is made of whether, and how, Russia uses soft power to deter democratization by anchoring the promotion of pro-Russian separatism in Crimea to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. It is argued that despite the unavoidable methodological challenges the topic brings with it, one cannot ignore it even in academic research because of its constantly growing empirical importance. A presentation is made of some of the actors and activities that built trust between the Crimean population and Russia by affecting Ukraine's soft power security. The legitimacy of such activities and the extent to which they may be linked to the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus are also considered

The soft side of dark power : a study in soft power, national security and the political-criminal nexus with a special focus on the post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus, the Russian Black Sea Fleet and separatism in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea

ABSTRACT: Psychological warfare uses soft power - the power of attraction - as a weapon. It lures citizens into believing or doing things they would otherwise not do. It does so by changing the way they view themselves, each other and the world around them. Great states use it to gain territorial power by manipulating human perceptions; even to the extent of strategically promoting ethnic conflict and war. Yet, to date, the legitimacy of such policies and the linkages between soft power and national security have remained relatively unknown. Lada L. Roslycky creates the first framework for the empirical analysis of soft power warfare. Soft power wars are fought inside human hearts and minds and are intricately interlinked with the most pivotal and intangible components of national security. Markedly, Roslycky shows that informal foreign policies aimed at the acquisition of power are not restricted to the realm of legitimacy. She presents the political-criminal nexus as a social structure through which states transform transnational organized crime into a foreign policy instrument. In a clear step-by-step analysis, the reader is shown how Russia’s strategy of deterring Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration was effectuated by a hostile soft power strategy aimed at promoting pro-Russian separatism in The Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The hearts and minds of the Crimean population were targeted to influence each component of Ukraine’s soft power security. Moreover, this hostile strategy was supported by a Russia-centred, post-Soviet political-criminal nexus made up of intelligence services, government executives and non-governmental organizations. This research provides new and unique insight into Russian-Ukrainian relations. It shows that knowing the character of a state’s political-criminal nexus facilitates the understanding of its identity and behaviour. KORTE SAMENVATTING: Psychologische oorlogvoering maakt gebruik van soft power, de macht van de aantrekkelijkheid, als een wapen. Het verleidt burgers om dingen te geloven of om dingen te doen die ze anders niet zouden geloven of doen. Oorlogvoering met soft power is psychologisch. Het richt zich op het veranderen van de ideeën en percepties die de mensen hebben van zichzelf, van elkaar, en zelfs van de natie waartoe ze behoren. Grote naties gebruiken het om territoriale macht te verwerven door de menselijke percepties te manipuleren en gaan zelfs zo ver dat ze strategisch etnische conflicten en oorlog bevorderen. Echter, de wettigheid van dit beleid en het verband tussen soft power en de nationale veiligheid zijn tot op heden relatief onbekend gebleven. Lada L. Roslycky heeft als eerste een opzet geschapen voor de empirische analyse van oorlogvoering met soft power. Soft-power-oorlogen worden binnen de menselijke harten en geesten uitgevochten en ze zijn nauw verbonden met de meest cruciale en ontastbare onderdelen van de nationale veiligheid. Opmerkelijk is dat Roslycky laat zien dat informeel buitenlands beleid dat is gericht op het verwerven van macht, zich niet tot de grenzen van de wettigheid beperkt. Zij presenteert de politiek-criminele banden als een sociale structuur, via welke naties de transnationale, georganiseerde misdaad omvormen tot een instrument voor buitenlands beleid. In een heldere stap-voor-stap analyse laat zij in haar proefschrift zien hoe de Russische strategie van afschrikking van de Oekraïnse Euro-Atlantische integratie werd bewerkstelligd door een vijandige soft-power-strategie, gericht op het bevorderen van pro-Russisch separatisme in de Autonome Republiek van de Krim. De harten en geesten van de bevolking van de Krim waren het doelwit bij de beïnvloeding van elk onderdeel van Oekraïnes soft-powerveiligheid. Bovendien werd deze vijandige strategie ondersteund door Russocentrisch, post-Sovjet-politiek-criminele banden, bestaande uit inlichtingendiensten, regeringsfunctionarissen en niet-politieke organisaties. Roslyckys onderzoek levert een nieuw en uniek inzicht in de Russisch-Oekraïense relaties. Het demonstreert dat kennis van het karakter van de politiek-criminele banden van een natie het begrijpen van haar identiteit, haar nationale en internationale gedrag vergemakkelijkt.

Proxy wars and the contemporary security environment

The chapter is structured as follows: first, attention is be paid to the issue of theorising proxy wars. The chapter defines proxy wars by observing how they differ from cases of third-party military intervention. Here, the focus is on differentiating the Proxy Agent from third parties such as mediators or auxiliaries. Second, the chapter addresses the question of ‘Why do states engage in proxy wars?’, and attempts an examination of contenting and competing explanations. These two aims are then put to the empirical test. By using two recent and ongoing cases of proxy wars, the theoretical discussion is brought into the empirical realm. The chosen cases are, first, the situation in Ukraine emerging from the 2013 protests and culminating with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and, second, the collapse of the Syrian state and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Because proxy wars have generally been linked to the Cold War period and, thus, came to be associated with a superpower practice of avoiding direct interaction, the chapter moves away from discussing classic proxy wars such as the 1954 Guatemalan coup d’état, the civil war in Angola (1975–2002), or the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977–1978). A view from a post-Cold War security standpoint significantly expands our understanding of this ever-present security problem