5 research outputs found
COVID-19 at War: The Joint Forces Operation in Ukraine
The ongoing pandemic disaster of coronavirus erupted with the first confirmed cases in Wuhan,
China, in December 2019, caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV2) novel coronavirus, the disease referred to as coronavirus disease 2019, or
COVID-19. The World Health Organization (WHO) confirmed the outbreak and determined
it a global pandemic. The current pandemic has infected nearly 300 million people and killed
over 3 million. The current COVID-19 pandemic is smashing every public health barrier,
guardrail, and safety measure in underdeveloped and the most developed countries alike, with
peaks and troughs across time. Greatly impacted are those regions experiencing conflict and
war. Morbidity and mortality increase logarithmically for those communities at risk and that
lack the ability to promote basic preventative measures. States around the globe struggle to unify
responses, make gains on preparedness levels, identify and symptomatically treat positive cases,
and labs across the globe frantically rollout various vaccines and effective surveillance and therapeutic mechanisms. The incidence and prevalence of COVID-19 may continue to increase globally
as no unified disaster response is manifested and disinformation spreads. During this failure in
response, virus variants are erupting at a dizzying pace. Ungoverned spaces where nonstate actors
predominate and active war zones may become the next epicenter for COVID-19 fatality rates.
As the incidence rates continue to rise, hospitals in North America and Europe exceed surge capacity, and immunity post infection struggles to be adequately described. The global threat in previously high-quality, robust infrastructure health-care systems in the most developed economies are
failing the challenge posed by COVID-19; how will less-developed economies and those healthcare infrastructures that are destroyed by war and conflict fare until adequate vaccine penetrance in
these communities or adequate treatment are established? Ukraine and other states in the Black Sea
Region are under threat and are exposed to armed Russian aggression against territorial sovereignty daily. Ukraine, where Russia has been waging war since 2014, faces this specific dual threat:
disaster response to violence and a deadly infectious disease. To best serve biosurveillance, aid in
pandemic disaster response, and bolster health security in Europe, across the North Atlantic Treaty
Alliance (NATO) and Black Sea regions, increased NATO integration, across Ukraine’s disaster
response structures within the Ministries of Health, Defense, and Interior must be reinforced and
expanded to mitigate the COVID-19 disaster
Russia's smart power in Crimea: Sowing the seeds of trust
The purpose of this article is to determine whether a 'dark side' exists to Russia's trust-building in the Black Sea region. An empirical analysis is made of whether, and how, Russia uses soft power to deter democratization by anchoring the promotion of pro-Russian separatism in Crimea to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. It is argued that despite the unavoidable methodological challenges the topic brings with it, one cannot ignore it even in academic research because of its constantly growing empirical importance. A presentation is made of some of the actors and activities that built trust between the Crimean population and Russia by affecting Ukraine's soft power security. The legitimacy of such activities and the extent to which they may be linked to the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus are also considered
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Proxy wars and the contemporary security environment
The chapter is structured as follows: first, attention is be paid to the issue of theorising proxy wars. The chapter defines proxy wars by observing how they differ from cases of third-party military intervention. Here, the focus is on differentiating the Proxy Agent from third parties such as mediators or auxiliaries. Second, the chapter addresses the question of ‘Why do states engage in proxy wars?’, and attempts an examination of contenting and competing explanations. These two aims are then put to the empirical test. By using two recent and ongoing cases of proxy wars, the theoretical discussion is brought into the empirical realm. The chosen cases are, first, the situation in Ukraine emerging from the 2013 protests and culminating with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and, second, the collapse of the Syrian state and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Because proxy wars have generally been linked to the Cold War period and, thus, came to be associated with a superpower practice of avoiding direct interaction, the chapter moves away from discussing classic proxy wars such as the 1954 Guatemalan coup d’état, the civil war in Angola (1975–2002), or the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977–1978). A view from a post-Cold War security standpoint significantly expands our understanding of this ever-present security problem