1,298 research outputs found

    Tax Evasion and Social Interactions

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    The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects (i.e., correlated effects). Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given their tax rate and audit probability, and given those faced by the other members of their group as well as their mean reported income. The estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses is sufficient to identify the model without imposing any exclusion restrictions. Our results are consistent with fairness effects but reject social conformity and correlated effects.social interactions; tax evasion; simultaneous tobit; laboratory experiments

    Tax Evasion and Social Interactions

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    The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects (i.e., correlated effects). Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given their tax rate and audit probability, and given those faced by the other members of their group as well as their mean reported income. The estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses is sufficient to identify the model without imposing any exclusion restrictions. Our results are consistent with fairness effects but reject social conformity and correlated effects.laboratory experiments; simultaneous Tobit; social interactions; tax evasion

    Tax Evasion and Social Interactions

    Get PDF
    The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects (i.e., correlated effects). Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given their tax rate and audit probability, and given those faced by the other members of their group as well as their mean reported income. The estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses is sufficient to identify the model without imposing any exclusion restrictions. Our results are consistent with fairness effects but reject social conformity and correlated effects.Social interactions, tax evasion, simultaneous tobit, laboratory experiments

    Tax Evasion and Social Interactions

    Get PDF
    The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account endogenous interactions, i.e., social conformity effects, exogenous interactions, i.e., fairness effects, and correlated effects. Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given individual and group tax rates and audit probabilities, and given a feedback on theother members' reporting behavior. Myopic and self-consistent expectations are considered in the analysis. In the latter case, the estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses helps identify the model. Our results provide evidence of fairness effects but reject social conformity.laboratory experiments; simultaneous Tobit; social interactions; tax evasion

    Convergence of a Finite Volume Scheme for a Corrosion Model

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    In this paper, we study the numerical approximation of a system of partial dif-ferential equations describing the corrosion of an iron based alloy in a nuclear waste repository. In particular, we are interested in the convergence of a numerical scheme consisting in an implicit Euler scheme in time and a Scharfetter-Gummel finite volume scheme in space

    The existence of solutions to a corrosion model

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    AbstractIn this work, we consider a corrosion model of iron based alloy in a nuclear waste repository. It consists of a PDE system, similar to the steady-state drift–diffusion system arising in semiconductor modelling. The main difference lies in the boundary conditions, since they are Robin boundary conditions and imply an additional coupling between the equations. Using a priori estimates for the solution and Schauder’s fixed point theorem, we show the existence of solutions to the corrosion model

    Chronologie holocĂšne des feux de forĂȘts et dynamique Ă©olienne pour le secteur de Radisson, QuĂ©bec nordique

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    Cette recherche vise Ă  documenter l'Ă©volution de la dynamique Ă©olienne holocĂšne, en relation avec les feux de forĂȘt pour l'HolocĂšne moyen et supĂ©rieur en JamĂ©sie. La chronostratigraphie et l'analyse macrofossile des palĂ©osols dunaires combinĂ©e Ă  l'analyse pollinique ont permis d'identifier quatre pĂ©riodes. La pĂ©riode I (6600-4200 ans Ă©tal. AA), est caractĂ©risĂ©e par l'occurrence des feux ponctuels, la pĂ©riode II (4200-2600 ans Ă©tal. AA) est marquĂ©e par une frĂ©quence plus Ă©levĂ©e de feux et correspond Ă  une phase de densification de la forĂȘt Ă  l'Ă©chelle rĂ©gionale. Durant la pĂ©riode Ul (2600-1600 ans Ă©tal. AA), les dĂ©pĂŽts Ă©oliens furent probablement soumis Ă  des conditions plus arides. Étant dĂ©nudĂ©s de vĂ©gĂ©tation, aucun palĂ©osol ni aucun feu n'a Ă©tĂ© enregistrĂ©. La pĂ©riode IV (1600 ans Ă©tal. AA - prĂ©sent) est caractĂ©risĂ©e par un retour Ă  une frĂ©quence plus Ă©levĂ©e des feux. Les donnĂ©es macrofossiles des palĂ©osols dunaires indiquent que le pin gris fut prĂ©sent dans cette rĂ©gion dĂšs 6300 ans Ă©tal. AA, soit plus de 2000 ans que seules les donnĂ©es polliniques ne le suggĂšrent

    Tax Evasion and Social Interactions

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    The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski’s (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects (i.e., correlated effects). Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given their tax rate and audit probability, and given those faced by the other members of their group as well as their mean reported income. The estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses is sufficient to identify the model without imposing any exclusion restrictions. Our results are consistent with fairness effects but reject social conformity and correlated effects. Cet article gĂ©nĂ©ralise le modĂšle standard de fraude fiscale en permettant la prĂ©sence d’interactions sociales. Suivant la nomenclature de Manski (1993), notre modĂšle tient compte des effets de conformitĂ© sociale (i.e. interactions endogĂšnes), des effets d’équitĂ© (i.e. interactions exogĂšnes) et des effets de sĂ©lection (i.e. effets corrĂ©lĂ©s). Le modĂšle est testĂ© Ă  l’aide de donnĂ©es expĂ©rimentales. Les participants doivent choisir le montant dĂ©clarĂ© de leur revenu, Ă©tant donnĂ© leur taux d’impĂŽt, leur probabilitĂ© d’ĂȘtre contrĂŽlĂ© par le fisc et Ă©tant donnĂ© ceux de leur groupe de rĂ©fĂ©rence ainsi que le revenu moyen dĂ©clarĂ© par ce dernier. L’estimation se fonde sur un modĂšle tobit simultanĂ© Ă  deux bornes avec des effets fixes de groupe. Un Ă©quilibre social unique existe lorsque le modĂšle satisfait des conditions de cohĂ©rence. Suivant en cela Brock et Durlauf (2001b), la non-linĂ©aritĂ© intrinsĂšque entre les rĂ©ponses individuelles et celles du groupe est suffisante pour identifier le modĂšle sans avoir Ă  imposer des restrictions d’exclusion. Nos rĂ©sultats sont cohĂ©rents avec la prĂ©sence d’effets d’équitĂ© mais rejettent la conformitĂ© sociale ainsi que les effets corrĂ©lĂ©s.social, interactions, tax evasion, simultaneous tobit, laboratory experiments., interactions sociales, fraude fiscale, tobit simultanĂ©, Ă©conomie expĂ©rimentale

    On the existence of solutions for a drift-diffusion system arising in corrosion modelling

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    International audienceIn this paper, we consider a drift-diffusion system describing the corrosion of an iron based alloy in a nuclear waste repository. In comparison with the classical drift-diffusion system arising in the modeling of semiconductor devices, the originality of the corrosion model lies in the boundary conditions which are of Robin type and induce an additional coupling between the equations. We prove the existence of a weak solution by passing to the limit on a sequence of approximate solutions given by a semi-discretization in time

    First question. Reports on the brief of Ms. Monique Mund-Dopchie. Commissioners' reports.

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    Rapport du mémoire de Mme Monique Mund-Dopchie sur l'artiste grec Eschyle en 1979. Les membres du jury sont Claire Préaux, Jules Labarbe et Léon Lacroix.Report on the memoir of Mrs Monique Mund-Dopchie on the Greek artist Aeschylus in 1979. The members of the jury were Claire Préaux, Jules Labarbe and Léon Lacroix
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