A variance screen for collusion

In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by 16%, the standard deviation increased by over 200%. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for "pockets" of low price variation as indicators of collusion in the retail gasoline industry in Louisville. We observe no such areas around Louisville in 1996-2002. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Two Contexts for Economics in Competition Law - Justifying Competition Law in the Face of Consumers' Bounded Rationality - Deterrence Effects and Competitive Effects

Competition law accommodates two different contexts within which economics may be applied, each defined by a distinct type of cause-effect relationships. First, there are effects of competition law on business conduct (deterrence effects), embodying the fact that businesses take into account legal sanctions when planning their actions. The field studying these effects is Economic Analysis of Law. Second, there are effects of business conduct on competition (competitive effects), which occur through the influence of businesses with market power on behaviour of their customers, suppliers and competitors. This influence falls within the ambit of Industrial Organization. Awareness of the distinction makes it possible to appreciate certain aspects of the application of economics to competition law issues. For instance, within the discourse on this application, the context of competitive effects receives significantly more attention than the context of deterrence effects. Also the often voiced observation that economics and competition law are closely related regards predominantly the former context