Enveloping Sophisticated Tools into Process-Centered Environments

We present a tool integration strategy based on enveloping pre-existing tools without source code modifications or recompilation, and without assuming an extension language, application programming interface, or any other special capabilities on the part of the tool. This Black Box enveloping (or wrapping) idea has existed for a long time, but was previously restricted to relatively simple tools. We describe the design and implementation of, and experimentation with, a new Black Box enveloping facility intended for sophisticated tools --- with particular concern for the emerging class of groupware applications

Institutional interactions and economic growth: The joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital

We investigate the possible interaction effects that the extent of property rights protection and separation of powers in a political system have on economic growth. Using analysis of panel data from more than countries over the period 1970-2010 we find that the growth effects of property rights increase when political power is divided among more veto players. When distinguishing between institutional veto players (political institutions) and partisan veto players (fractionalization among political parties), we further find that the growth effects of property rights are driven mainly by checks on the chief executive (in bicameral systems) and primarily found in countries with large stocks of democratic capital