9 research outputs found
On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies
over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a
dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time
and thereby to give rise to a new environment. A coalition that considers a
deviation needs to take the consequences into account because from the
deviation point on, the game is no longer played with the original set of
players. The deviating coalition becomes the new grand coalition which, in
turn, induces a new dynamic game. The stage games of the new dynamical game
depend on all previous allocation including those that have materialized from
the deviating time on.
We define three types of core solutions: fair core, stable core and credible
core. We characterize the first two in case where the instantaneous game
depends on the last allocation (rather than on the whole history of
allocations) and the third in the general case. The analysis and the results
resembles to a great extent the theory of non-cooperative dynamic games.Comment: 25 page
The bargaining set in strategic market games
Strategic market games, Bargaining set, Competition, D50, C71, C72,