"A Theoretical Perspective on Multi-level Systems in Europe: Constitutional Power and Partisan Conflict"

types: ArticleThis article distinguishes three constitutionally defined categories of multi-level systems – confederations, federal arrangements and regionalized arrangements, which differ in whether their lower-level governments enjoy constitutional protection and whether we find a constitutional hierarchy between central and lower levels of government. We argue that the constitutional category a multi-level system belongs to systematically shapes first, the dominant mode of day-to-day intergovernmental coordination, second, the mode of formal competence (re)allocation; and third, the relative impact of party (in)congruence across central and lower-level governments on these coordination processes, respectively. The article then specifies the indicators used to test the hypotheses across the range of case studies. It finally shows how the multi-level systems covered in this special issue span the confederal – federal – regionalized spectrum and thus allow for an encompassing comparative assessment of multi-level dynamics and their long-term evolution.ESR

Constitutional dynamics and partisan conflict:A comparative assessment of multi-level systems in Europe

publication-status: Publishedtypes: ArticleThe case studies revealed that the constitutional nature of a multi-level system indeed shapes its modes of day-to-day intergovernmental coordination and, with it, the way competences are (re)allocated in the longer term. Both in federal arrangements and in confederations, the ‘subunits’ – whose status is constitutionally protected – could more easily defend their decision-making capacity within their areas of jurisdiction because they can veto changes in the allocation of competences, an advantage lower-level governments in regionalized systems do not enjoy. Similarly, in federal and confederal systems day-to-day interaction in Inter Governmental Relations (IGR) predominantly took place in multilateral structures, while in regionalized systems bilateralism was more pronounced. The relative influence of party-political (in)congruence on IGR, in contrast, was more varied than theoretically expected

Problems of democratic accountability in network and multi level-governance

1 Research for this paper has benefited from generous funding by the Swiss federal government (Secrétariat d’Etat à la recherché). Previous versions of this paper were presented at various events organised by the “Connex ” network: the conference “Linking European, national and subnational levels of governance: drawing lessons from structural funds, regional and environmental policy”

Federalism and the European Union Representation, party competition and scenarios for political development

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:9348.5763(no 10) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo