Requirements of time management tools for outpatient physiotherapy practice

The effects of electronic appointment booking systems on the time management activities of health professionals have received little attention to date. We report on time management practices in three outpatient physiotherapy departments with different paper and electronic systems. The study has identified a set of time management activities and associated social behaviours common to physiotherapy departments. The convenience, flexibility and expressive nature of paper diary systems is of significant value to users, whilst the clarity and superior database functionality of electronic systems are valued by staff using this medium. The study highlights several potential barriers to the effective deployment of electronic booking systems in physiotherapy departments, including poor resource and training provision, concerns regarding restrictive diary control measures, the continued reliance on burdensome duplication procedures and the need to coordinate multiple information artefacts, which need to be addressed if such technology is to be successfully designed and deployed. Copyright © 2005 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

Exploring the links between skills and productivity

An assessment of the direct and indirect link between skills and productivity in the context of the Treasury's '5 drivers' of growth. Based on a literature review covering the debate around the extent and nature of the contribution of skills to economic performance, tested through an analysis of labour market data for the East Midlands region

Cosmological perturbations in massive gravity with doubly coupled matter

We investigate the cosmological perturbations around FLRW solutions to non- linear massive gravity with a new effective coupling to matter proposed recently. Unlike the case with minimal matter coupling, all five degrees of freedom in the gravity sector propagate on generic self-accelerating FLRW backgrounds. We study the stability of the cosmological solutions and put constraints on the parameters of the theory by demanding the correct sign for the kinetic terms for scalar, vector and tensor perturbations

The prevalence of Type 2 diabetes and its associated health problems in a community-dwelling elderly population.

AIMS: Prevalence estimates of Type 2 diabetes and its associated health problems in elderly populations are rare, especially in the very elderly. METHODS: A sample of 15 095 community-dwelling older people aged > or = 75 years were assessed. Type 2 diabetes and associated health problems were identified using self-reporting, general practitioner records, drug histories, and blood and urine measurements. RESULTS: There were 1177 people identified as having Type 2 diabetes mellitus, giving an overall prevalence of 7.8% (95% confidence interval 7.1, 8.5), 9.4% (8.4, 10.5) for men and 6.8% (6.1, 7.6) for women. The age, sex and smoking adjusted odds ratios for various health problems, comparing people with and without diabetes were: low vision 1.6 (1.3, 1.9), proteinuria 1.7 (1.4, 2.1), chronic kidney disease stage 4 or 5 1.5 (1.0, 2.1), angina 1.3 (1.1, 1.6), myocardial infarction 1.5 (1.2, 1.8), cerebrovascular event 2.0 (1.8, 2.1) and foot ulceration 1.7 (1.2, 2.4). CONCLUSIONS: The prevalence of Type 2 diabetes is not high in community-dwelling older people, but diabetes was a contributory factor to a number of health problems

The Epidemiology of Multiple Sclerosis in Scotland: Inferences from Hospital Admissions

PMCID: PMC3029296This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited

On the frequency barrier of surface integral equations from a circuit point of view

Proceedings of the Progress In Electromagnetics Research Symposium, 2010, p. 46Session 1A4: Robust and E±cient Electromagnetic Solutions for Large-scale Problemspostprin

Group Strategyproof Pareto-Stable Marriage with Indifferences via the Generalized Assignment Game

We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that is group strategyproof for one side of the market. Our key technique involves modeling the stable marriage market as a generalized assignment game. We also show that our mechanism can be implemented efficiently. These results can be extended to the college admissions problem with indifferences

Ovarian and cervical cancer awareness: development of two validated measurement tools.

The aim of the study was to develop and validate measures of awareness of symptoms and risk factors for ovarian and cervical cancer (Ovarian and Cervical Cancer Awareness Measures)

Manipulation Strategies for the Rank Maximal Matching Problem

We consider manipulation strategies for the rank-maximal matching problem. In the rank-maximal matching problem we are given a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup P, E)$ such that $A$ denotes a set of applicants and $P$ a set of posts. Each applicant $a \in A$ has a preference list over the set of his neighbours in $G$, possibly involving ties. Preference lists are represented by ranks on the edges - an edge $(a,p)$ has rank $i$, denoted as $rank(a,p)=i$, if post $p$ belongs to one of $a$'s $i$-th choices. A rank-maximal matching is one in which the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank one posts and subject to this condition, the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank two posts, and so on. A rank-maximal matching can be computed in $O(\min(c \sqrt{n},n) m)$ time, where $n$ denotes the number of applicants, $m$ the number of edges and $c$ the maximum rank of an edge in an optimal solution. A central authority matches applicants to posts. It does so using one of the rank-maximal matchings. Since there may be more than one rank- maximal matching of $G$, we assume that the central authority chooses any one of them randomly. Let $a_1$ be a manipulative applicant, who knows the preference lists of all the other applicants and wants to falsify his preference list so that he has a chance of getting better posts than if he were truthful. In the first problem addressed in this paper the manipulative applicant $a_1$ wants to ensure that he is never matched to any post worse than the most preferred among those of rank greater than one and obtainable when he is truthful. In the second problem the manipulator wants to construct such a preference list that the worst post he can become matched to by the central authority is best possible or in other words, $a_1$ wants to minimize the maximal rank of a post he can become matched to