Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?

Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We exhibit two necessary conditions that a theory of rational decision must satisfy in order to solve the paradox. We then show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve it because each theory meets either one or the other necessary condition, but not both. However, the paradox of not voting is consistent with an amended version of third-generation prospect theory in which the reference is merely to vote or abstain.paradox of not voting, probability transformation, reference point, regret

Cognition in Seemingly Riskless Choices and Judgments

The assumption of given and known preferences and possibilities so common in economic theory stands in contradiction with the kind of unsystematic change that charaterizes many experimental and real situations. Consequently the theory misspecifies rational choice and generates many puzzles relating to marginal analysis, sunk costs, judgments of fairness, the endowment effect, etc. We instillate rational cognition and learning in seemingly riskless choices and judgments. Preferences and possibilities are given in a stochastic sense and based on revisable expectations. The theory predicts experimental preference reversals and passes a sharp econometric test of the status quo bias drawn from a field study. En sciences économiques, l'hypothèse que les préférences et les possibilités sont connues et données est largement contredite par des changements peu systématiques observés dans plusieurs expériences et situations réelles. La conséquence est que la théorie ne semble pas spécifier correctement la rationalité des choix et pose aux économistes plusieurs paradoxes reliés à l'analyse marginale, aux coûts historiques, sur les jugements de justice, sur les effets de dotation ou de statu quo, etc. Dans cette étude, nous concidérons la rationalité cognitive et l'apprentissage dans des situations de choix et de jugements apparemment sans risque. Les préférences et les possibilités sont données dans un sens stochastique et elles sont basées sur les anticipations qui sont révisées. La théorie proposée prédit des renversements de préférence dans les expériences et passe avec succès un test économétrique sur données réelles du paradoxe du biais du statu quo.

Reported job satisfaction : What does it mean?

We emphasize the major influences of experienced utility gaps or regret, i.e. the difference between what happened and what might have happened, on job satisfaction. The main prediction that we test is that job satisfaction correlates with the wage gaps experienced in the past and present, holding other job-related satisfactions constant, with the possible exception of young workers. We further test that this effect of wage gaps on job satisfaction declines with working experience. We find evidence on a Canadian cross-section that the past matters.Job Satisfaction, experienced wage gaps

The Demand for the Arts

This paper discusses the demand for the arts from a theoretical and an empirical perspectives. We suggest that the demand for the arts is price elastic and that art is a luxury good. Education, and learning experiences are also important factors affecting that demand. Ce texte traite de la demande pour les arts d'un point de vue théorique et empirique. Nous suggérons que la demande pour les arts se caractérise par une élasticité-prix relativement importante et que l'art est un bien de luxe. L'éducation et l'expérience en matière d'art jouent également un rôle important sur cette demande.Demand for the arts, learning by consuming, Demande pour les arts, Apprentissage par la consommation

Aspiration Levels and Educational Choices An experimental study

The explanation of social inequalities in education is still a debated issue in economics. Recent empirical studies tend to downplay the potential role of credit constraint. This article tests a different potential explanation of social inequalities in education, specifically that social differences in aspiration level result in different educational choices. Having existed for a long time in the sociology of education, this explanation can be justified if aspiration levels are seen as reference points in a Prospect Theory framework. In order to test this explanation, this article applies the method of experimental economics to the issue of education choice and behaviour. One hundred twenty-nine individuals participated in an experiment in which they had to perform a task over fifteen stages grouped in three blocks or levels. In order to continue through the experiment, a minimum level of success was required at the end of each level. Rewards were dependent on the final level successfully reached. At the end of each level, participants could either choose to stop and take their reward or to pay a cost to continue further in order to possibly receive higher rewards. To test the impact of aspiration levels, outcomes were either presented as gains or losses relative to an initial sum. In accordance with the theoretical predictions, participants in the loss framing group choose to go further in the experiment. There was also a significant and interesting gender effect in the loss framing treatment, such that males performed better and reached higher levels. Expliquer les inégalités sociales en éducation demeure un défi pour les économistes. Des études récentes tendent à indiquer que les contraintes de crédit ne joueraient pas un rôle déterminant dans l’explication. Notre étude examine l’importance de niveaux d’aspirations sociales différentes pour expliquer les différences observées dans les choix éducationnels. Cette explication trouve sa logique en associant les aspirations sociales à des points de référence dans le cadre de la théorie des perspectives (prospect theory). Notre article mobilise l’économie expérimentale pour étudier la question des choix éducationnels dans ce contexte. Cent trente-neuf sujets ont participé à une expérience dans laquelle ils devaient réaliser une tâche distribuée sur quinze étapes regroupées en blocs ou niveaux. Pour poursuivre l’expérience, un minimum de succès dans les tâches réalisées devait être atteint. À la fin de chaque niveau, les participants choisissaient d’arrêter et d’encaisser leurs gains acquis ou de poursuivre contre un tarif donné pour espérer réaliser des gains supérieurs. Pour tester l’impact des différents niveaux d’aspirations, les résultats étaient mesurés comme des gains ou des pertes relativement à un montant donné. En conformité avec les prédictions théoriques, les participants dans le traitement perte ont choisi de poursuivre plus souvent l’expérience que ceux dans le traitement gain. Nous avons également noté un effet lié au genre du participant dans le traitement perte, avec les hommes performant mieux que les femmes et atteignant des niveaux supérieurs.education inequality, prospect theory, experimental economics, inégalité en éducation, théorie de la prospective, économie expérimentale

A Behavioral Laffer Curve: Emergence of a Social Norm of Fairness in a Real Effort Experiment

This paper demonstrates, through a controlled experiment, that the “Laffer curve” phenomenon does not always reflect a conventional income - leisure trade-off. Whether out of reason or out of emotion, taxpayers may also be willing to punish intentionally unfair tax setters by working less than they would under the same exogenous circumstances. We conduct a real effort experiment in which a player A (the "tax receiver") is matched with a player B (the "worker") to elicit the conditions under which tax revenues will increase under a certain threshold and decrease thereafter. We ran four different treatments by manipulating work opportunities and the power to tax. Consistent with the history of tax revolts, the working partner overreacts to the perceived unfairness of taxation when the tax rate exceeds 50%, most strongly so in the high effort treatment. With two types of players, selfish and empathic, our model predicts the emergence of a social norm of fairness under asymmetric information, and elicits the optimal and emotional patterns of punishments and rewards consistent with the norm's enforcement. The social norm allows players to coordinate tacitly on a “focal equilibrium”, which offers a solution to the indeterminacy raised by the Folk theorem for infinitely-repeated games and a behavioral justification for the tit-for-tat strategy. The social norm of fairness enhances productive efficiency in the long run.Taxation and labor supply; Laffer curve; experimental economics; fairness and efficiency; social norms and sanctions; informational asymmetry; emotions.

Aspiration Levels and Educational Choices : An experimental study

The explanation of social inequalities in education is still a debated issue in economics. Recent empirical studies tend to downplay the potential role of credit constraint. This article tests a different potential explanation of social inequalities in education, specifically that social differences in aspiration level result in different educational choices. Having existed for a long time in the sociology of education, this explanation can be justified if aspiration levels are seen as reference points in a Prospect Theory framework. In order to test this explanation, this article applies the method of experimental economics to the issue of education choice and behaviour. One hundred twenty-nine individuals participated in an experiment in which they had to perform a task over fifteen stages grouped in three blocks or levels. In order to continue through the experiment, a minimum level of success was required at the end of each level. Rewards were dependent on the final level successfully reached. At the end of each level, participants could either choose to stop and take their reward or to pay a cost to continue further in order to possibly receive higher rewards. To test the impact of aspiration levels, outcomes were either presented as gains or losses relative to an initial sum. In accordance with the theoretical predictions, participants in the loss framing group choose to go further in the experiment. There was also a significant and interesting gender effect in the loss framing treatment, such that males performed better and reached higher levels.Education inequality, Prospect Theory, Experimental Economics

A micro-foundation for the Laffer curve in a real effort experiment

A conjecture of Laffer, which had considerable influence on fiscal doctrine, is that tax revenues of a Leviathan state eventually decrease when the tax rate exceeds a threshold value. We conduct a real effort experiment, in which a "worker" is matched with a non-working partner, to elicit the conditions under which a Laffer curve can be observed. We ran four different treatments by manipulating work opportunities and the power to tax. In the endogenous treatment, the non-working partner chooses a tax rate among the set of possibilities and receives the revenue generated by her choice and the worker's effort response to this tax rate. In the exogenous treatment, the tax rate is randomly selected by the computer and the non-working partner merely receives the revenue from taxes. The Laffer curve phenomenon cannot be observed in the exogenous treatments, but arises in endogenous treatments. Tax revenues are then maximized at a 50% tax rate. We demonstrate that an "efficiency tax" model (with or without inequity aversion) falls short of predicting our experimental Laffer curve but an alternative model of social preferences provides a micro-foundation for the latter. This new model endogenously generates a social norm of fair taxation at a 50% tax rate under asymmetric information about workers' type. Taxpayers manage to enforce this norm by working less whenever it has been violated but do not systematically reward "kind" tax setters. Workers who maximize their expected wealth adjust work to the tax rate equitably so that tax revenues remain at a fair level. Workers who respond affectively to norm violations just refuse to work so that tax revenues are cut down. Workers endowed with higher work opportunities tend to respond more emotionally to unfair taxation in our experiment, which is consistent with the observed Laffer curve and with the history of tax revolts.Taxation and labor supply, Laffer curve, experimental economies.

On-the-job learning and earnings

A simple model of informal learning on-the-job which combines learning by oneself and learning from others is proposed in this paper. It yields a closed-form solution that revises Mincer-Jovanovic's (1981) treatment of tenure in the human capital earnings function by relating earnings to the individual's learning potential from jobs and firms. We estimate the structural parameters of this non-linear model on a large French survey with matched employer-employee data. We find that workers on average can learn from others ten percent of their own human capital on entering the firm, and catch half of their learning potential in just two years. The measurement of worker's learning potential in their jobs and establishments provides a simple characterization of primary-type and secondary-type jobs and establishments. We find a strong relationship between the job-specific learning potential and tenure. Predictions of dual labor market theory regarding the positive match of primary-type firms (which offer high learning opportunities) with highly endowed workers (educated, high wages) are visible at the establishment level but seem to vanish at the job's level.Human capital, earnings functions, informal training, learning from others, learning by oneself, returns to tenure, dualism.

Job Satisfaction and Quits: Theory and Evidence from the German Socioeconomic Panel

We test the simple wealth maximization theory of quitting behavior on the German Socioeconomic Panel (1985-1993). We develop a new methodology to extract a consistent estimate of how the expected present value of one's job (including the non-pecuniary component) compares with outside opportunities in the future from subjective questions about job and job-related satisfactions. It is based on the interpretation of job satisfaction as an expression of the experienced preference for the present job against available alternatives. With this interpretation, the propensity to stay in the present job is simply related to the residual of a job satisfaction equation. Our tests validate this theory of job satisfaction and the economiceconomic theory of quits. We also find that the residual of a job satisfaction equation is a better predictor of quits than the overall level of satisfaction. Dans cette étude, en utilisant les données du Panel Socio-économique Allemand (1985-1993), nous soumettons à réfutation un modèle simple de maximisation de la richesse pour expliquer le fait de quitter une entreprise. ¸ l'aide de questions subjectives sur la satisfaction dans l'emploi et dans d'autres domaines (loisir, santé...)autres types de satisfaction, nous développons une méthodologie permettant de comparer la valeur présente attendue de son emploi (incluant une composante non-pécuniaire) aux opportunités d'emplois extérieures. L'approche retenue est basée sur l'idée que une interprétation dela satisfaction qui exprime une préférence expérimentée de l'emploi actuel contre les alternatives d'emplois disponibles. La propension à garder l'emploi occupé dans ce contexte dépend estsimplementreliée aux du résidus de l'équation de satisfaction dans l'emploi. Nos tests confirment cette théorie de la satisfaction et le modèle classique de mobilité volontairela théorie économique de quitter volontairement son emploi. Finalement, nous observons que le résidu de l'équation de satisfaction dans l'emploi offre une meilleure prédiction du départ volontaire que le niveau général de la satisfaction.Voluntary quit, job satisfaction, wealth maximization model, Mobilité volontaire, satisfaction à l'emploi, modèle de maximisation de la richesse