The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame

It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. She raises a challenge: one must explain what is distinct about hypocritical blame such that the hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame, even if the arrogant or petty blamer does not. Of those writing on hypocrisy, only we offer a direct response to Bell’s challenge. Recently, however, our account has come under criticism. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses Bell’s challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because answering Bell’s challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best on offer

Understanding the Dangers of Mind Changes in Political Leadership (and How to Avoid Them)

Political leaders may change their mind about a policy, or even a significant moral issue. While genuinely changing one’s mind is not hypocritical, there are reasons to think that leaders who claim such a change are merely hypocritically pandering for political advantage. Indeed, some social science studies allegedly confirm that constituents will judge political leaders who change positions as hypocritical. Yet these studies are missing crucial details that we normally use to distinguish genuine mind changers from hollow hypocrites. These details suggest ways in which political leaders can communicate that their mind change is genuine without necessarily being judged hypocritical

The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame

It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. She raises a challenge: one must explain what is distinct about hypocritical blame such that the hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame, even if the arrogant or petty blamer does not. Of those writing on hypocrisy, only we offer a direct response to Bell’s challenge. Recently, however, our account has come under criticism. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses Bell’s challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because answering Bell’s challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best on offer

A Standing Asymmetry Between Blame and Forgiveness

Sometimes it is not one's place to blame or forgive. This phenomenon is captured under the philosophical notion of standing. However, there is an asymmetry to be explained here. One can successfully blame, even if one lacks the standing to do so. Yet, one cannot successfully forgive if one lacks the standing to do so. In this paper we explain this asymmetry. We argue that a complete explanation depends upon not only a difference in the natures of the standing to blame and forgive, but also a difference in the nature of blame and forgiveness themselves

Review Essay: A Deeper Understanding of Moral Standing

Hypocrites, we are told, lack the moral standing to blame. But what is this standing to blame? Why would hypocrisy undermine it? Do any other conditions compromise standing to blame? Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s The Beam and the Mote offers the first book-length treatment on such complex questions. Yet the book admirably pushes even further, extending the scope of standing into other normative domains, such as praise, forgiveness, and encouragement. In our review, we critically engage with four of the book’s central topics: (1) the nature and scope of the moral standing to blame, (2) why hypocrisy undermines standing to blame, (3) what other conditions undermine standing to blame, and (4) standing in other normative domains. Although we argue that Lippert-Rasmussen’s views on (2) and (4) require further development, his expansion of standing into underexplored domains is praiseworthy

Two Problems of Self-Blame for Accounts of Moral Standing

Traditionally, those writing on blame have been concerned with blaming others, including when one has the standing to blame others. Yet some alleged problems for such accounts of standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. But this would lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, in addition to hypocrites, there may be hypercrites, who blame themselves more severely than others. Leading accounts for why hypocrites lack standing to blame others would also seem to imply that hypercrites lack the standing to blame others, but some may find this counterintuitive. We argue that neither of these problems from self-blame poses a unique threat to leading accounts of standing

Staphylococcus aureus bacteremia in pediatric patients: Uncovering a rural health challenge

BACKGROUND: METHODS: To investigate factors influencing RESULTS: Of 251 patients, 69 (27%) were from rural areas; 28 (11%) were initially admitted to an OSH. Treatment failure occurred in 39 (16%) patients. Patients from rural areas were more likely to be infected with methicillin-resistant CONCLUSIONS: Children from rural areas face barriers to specialized health care. These challenges may contribute to severe illness and worse outcomes among children wit

A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame

Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: 1. One’s blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent’s wrongdoing. 3. One must be warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the wrongdoing. 4. The target’s wrongdoing must some of “one’s business”. These conditions are often proposed as both conditions on one and the same thing, and as marking fundamentally different ways of “losing standing.” Here I call these claims into question. First, I claim that conditions (3) and (4) are simply conditions on different things than are conditions (1) and (2). Second, I argue that condition (2) reduces to condition (1): when “involvement” removes someone’s standing to blame, it does so only by indicating something further about that agent, viz., that he or she lacks commitment to the values that condemn the wrongdoer’s action. The result: after we clarify the nature of the non-hypocrisy condition, we will have a unified account of moral standing to blame. Issues also discussed: whether standing can ever be regained, the relationship between standing and our "moral fragility", the difference between mere inconsistency and hypocrisy, and whether a condition of standing might be derived from deeper facts about the "equality of persons"

A novel role for NUAK1 in promoting ovarian cancer metastasis through regulation of fibronectin production in Spheroids

Epithelial ovarian cancer (EOC) has a unique mode of metastasis, where cells shed from the primary tumour, form aggregates called spheroids to evade anoikis, spread through the peritoneal cavity, and adhere to secondary sites. We previously showed that the master kinase Liver kinase B1 (LKB1) is required for EOC spheroid viability and metastasis. We have identified novel (nua) kinase 1 (NUAK1) as a top candidate LKB1 substrate in EOC cells and spheroids using a multiplex inhibitor beads-mass spectrometry approach. We confirmed that LKB1 maintains NUAK1 phosphorylation and promotes its stabilization. We next investigated NUAK1 function in EOC cells. Ectopic NUAK1-overexpressing EOC cell lines had increased adhesion, whereas the reverse was seen in OVCAR8-NUAK1KO cells. In fact, cells with NUAK1 loss generate spheroids with reduced integrity, leading to increased cell death after long-term culture. Following transcriptome analysis, we identified reduced enrichment for cell interaction gene expression pathways in OVCAR8-NUAK1KO spheroids. In fact, the FN1 gene, encoding fibronectin, exhibited a 745-fold decreased expression in NUAK1KO spheroids. Fibronectin expression was induced during native spheroid formation, yet this was completely lost in NUAK1KO spheroids. Co-incubation with soluble fibronectin restored the compact spheroid phenotype to OVCAR8-NUAK1KO cells. In a xenograft model of intraperitoneal metastasis, NUAK1 loss extended survival and reduced fibronectin expression in tumours. Thus, we have identified a new mechanism controlling EOC metastasis, through which LKB1-NUAK1 activity promotes spheroid formation and secondary tumours via fibronectin production