De-mobilizing a Mobilized Society: The Effect of the Palestinian Authority on Political Engagement

Despite high levels of mass mobilization in the past, Palestinian society today finds itself polarized and demobilized. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has gained control as a governing apparatus and has become increasingly authoritarian in nature. But the PA does not have complete control over the territories. This variation in control allows isolation of the effect of the PA\u27s authoritarian nature on mobilization patterns and social dynamics. The study argues that mobilization has systematically declined in places where the PA has more direct control. Counter-intuitively, political mobilization today is more prevalent in areas under direct Israeli occupation. Findings suggest the PA has a direct role in this dynamic, using selective cooptation and repression. Overall, authoritarian strategies in the Palestinian territories have led to decreased capacity for mobilization

US Policy in Arab Gulf Opinion: Data from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

This study aims to present the results of the Saudi and Kuwaiti opinion poll on US policy in the Arab region. The study attempts to analyze how Gulf Arab citizens view US policy since President Donald Trump took office Kuwaiti respondents have more condemned US policies in the last five years than the Saudis. The study draws on data provided by the Arab Opinion Index, which has been published by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies every year since 2011

The TikTok Generation Takes to the Streets of Jerusalem

For the past decade, the organization Grassroots Al-Quds has been a hub of Palestinian organizing in Jerusalem (also known by its Arabic name, Al-Quds). The group supports local Palestinian communities in their struggles to resist their ongoing violent displacement by the state; it also studies the history of the city’s varied Palestinian neighborhoods and offers tours and research aids to the public. Besides this on-the-ground work, the group has played a crucial role in communicating with organizers across and beyond the Arab world about the struggles of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Grassroots Al-Quds members have taken part in many of the protests that swelled in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood earlier this month in response to the attempted expulsion of Palestinian families from their homes, and have been an important source of information about conditions on the ground. A few days before the current ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, I spoke with Fayrouz Sharqawi, the director of Grassroots Al-Quds, about the group’s work and the events of the past few weeks

Throttling Gaza

Violence against Palestinians over the last few weeks has been so horrific that it has come to the attention of those who were previously blind to it. Over two hundred dead in Gaza alone, fifty-nine of them children. Media offices bombed, thousands injured and tens of thousands displaced. Palestinians in Israel have been killed by lynch mobs while the police stand by. As a result, the usual taboos are being broken. Six US Congress members condemned the attacks on Gaza from the House floor, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez acknowledged Israel as an ‘apartheid state’. Yet the US is far from rescinding its support for Netanyahu. On three occasions during the latest bombardment it has blocked the UN Security Council’s call for a ceasefire, greenlighting the merciless campaign against the Gaza strip. If Trump was the most brazen supporter of Israeli aggression, his successor is not much different

Religiosity and its Political Effects

What is the effect of religiosity on public opinion? Islamist religiosity in particular has been linked to a variety of outcomes, including authoritarianism and violence. Nevertheless, many scholars have countered that there is in fact no relationship between religiosity in the Arab world and adverse political outcomes. Thus the debate remains unresolved to some degree. To adjudicate this debate, we use the Arab Opinion Index\u27s 2016 data to examine the effect of individual religiosity on public opinion and political behavior. We find that there is no link between increased religiosity and negative views of democracy; in fact, the opposite is the case. There is also no link between religiosity and political participation. Finally, there is a positive correlation between religiosity and political tolerance

What do ordinary Arabs think about normalizing relations with Israel?

On Sept. 15, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Israel formally signed the “Abraham Accords,” establishing normal diplomatic relations. Supporters like President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented the agreement as an unprecedented step toward peace. Not everyone agrees. A number of prominent public figures and civil society groups argue the move is aimed at pressuring Palestinians to accept a state without sovereignty, while granting authoritarian Arab Persian Gulf nations international legitimacy and greater access to new technologies for repression. What do ordinary Arabs think? The 2019-2020 polling data of the Arab Opinion Index suggests that many Arabs are at odds with their governments on the question of Israel. The vast majority of Arabs probably oppose normalization and express a high degree of support for Palestinian statehood and rights

Elections can’t fix the Palestinian Authority.

When President Mahmoud Abbas announced last month that the Palestinian Authority will be holding national elections for the first time in nearly 15 years, it reignited much debate over whether such elections could indeed be meaningful. Given the context of a fragmented Palestinian political body operating under a military occupation, what purpose would elections serve? On the one hand, the decision to hold legislative and presidential elections, scheduled for May 22 and July 31 respectively, are finally addressing a longstanding criticism that the PA has been ignoring the Palestinian public will for far too long. Its leaders, who largely hail from the Fatah party, effectively overturned the results of the 2006 legislative elections through a violent conflict with Hamas, and have since overstayed their positions in power — especially Mahmoud Abbas, who is now a decade past his first term as president. An opportunity to end this status quo at the ballot box has thus been welcomed by many — and for some, there are encouraging signs. During a meeting in Cairo this month, leaders of 14 Palestinian political parties, including Fatah and Hamas, committed to participating in and respecting the election results. If everything goes smoothly, observers argue, the elections could finally bring democratic governance to the Palestinian political system, and end the 14-year division between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank

Palestinian Public Opinion: Latest Trends

First, this paper presents the latest trends in Palestinian public opinion, and analyzes this opinion toward the current government in the West Bank. Secondly, it examines the effect of polarization on Palestinian public opinion. Finally, it deals with the Palestinian public opinion regarding the future of the Palestinian cause

Mechanisms of Co-optation in the Palestinian Territories: Neutralizing Independent Civil Society

The Palestinian Authority (P.A.) was established in 1994 as the government of the Palestinian Territories, following the Oslo Accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) and the Israeli government. From the Palestinian perspective, the P.A. was to serve as the initial stages of the state-building project, in the hopes that a sovereign semi-contiguous state of Palestine would emerge by 1999. Although this deadline came and went (by 18 years), the Palestinian leadership remains committed to the idea of statehood and continues to struggle for this objective to this day. [1] From the Israeli perspective, the Palestinian Authority was a convenient way to ease Israel’s responsibility as an occupying power. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was very clear in his support of this project, because creating the P.A. would help outsource repression of Palestinians to Palestinian security forces. [2] Thus, Israel could more easily avoid criticism from international and domestic human rights organizations. International allies, such as the United States and European Union nations, assisted in this objective by providing overwhelmingly disproportionate aid to the Palestinian security sector. [3] Palestinian critics quickly noticed the over-militarization of the P.A., and subsequent levels of repression.[4] But over-militarization and increasing repressive capacity was not the only way the Palestinian Authority grew more authoritarian in order to adhere to international pressure; co-optation was also heavily employed as a way of neutralizing Palestinian opposition. This is a common strategy used by authoritarian governments, and can include material benefits, entry into decision-making institutions, and other forms of regime control over private behavior. [5] In a similar vein since its inception, with the encouragement of international patrons, the P.A. has attempted to incorporate many of the grass-roots organizations that existed prior to its establishment. In addition to the P.A.’s own efforts, international patrons also stepped in and fostered a dynamic of “NGO-ization,” which helped to neutralize popular committees into single-issue NGO’s, subject to restrictions from international patrons in order to receive continued funding. [6] Thus, in the span of 23 years, a highly vibrant and mobilized independent Palestinian civil society was effectively brought under control, and lost its capacity for dissent and opposition. Previous literature has addressed the effect of P.A. intrusion on civil society; specifically, how P.A. intrusion damages trust between members of civil society organizations. But the mechanisms of P.A. intrusion into civil society have not yet been fully explored. To explain exactly how the P.A. manages control of civil society, I conducted interviews with organizers in the West Bank from a number of different groups, many from leftist organizations. Although these organizations represent a much smaller segment of society than either Fatah or Hamas, they have historically played a large role in political mobilization against the Occupation. They were integral to both social service provision and mobilization during the first intifada, and were responsible for much of the grass-roots organizing that exemplified the pre-P.A. era of Palestinian politics. [7] I also utilized qualitative data derived from the historical record to assess the impact of the Palestinian Authority’s strategies on Islamist groups, and how that affected their role in civil society. This essay discusses the marginalization of civil society groups in the Palestinian Territories. It shows that this outcome was not an organic development but a calculated strategy on the part of the Palestinian Authority (P.A.) and its allies, and as a direct result of its authoritarian practices. The essay explores the ways in which the P.A. achieves this control, and explains how such a strategy affects the functioning of civil society over time. When a regime co-opts and represses civil society organizations, it breeds insularity and polarization. This makes cooperation between groups much less likely and limits the effectiveness of civil society organizations overall

An Arab Assessment of Iranian Foreign Policy

The Arab Opinion Index data provides a look at a number of important issues, including assessments of foreign policy. Every year, the Index asks respondents across the Arab world their opinions on regional and world powers as well as specific foreign policy developments. Aggregate opinions may provide a general assessment of where the Arab world stands, but to understand fully the divisions and polarization that exists in the region today, it is important to look at country differences. In this paper, we will review Arab public opinion towards Iran, and whether there are sub-regional variations in assessment towards Iranian foreign policy. In this way, we can gauge whether polarization on the Iranian issue exists, and where it is most prevalent