Supplemental materials for paper: Statistically Validated Indices for COVID-19 Public Health Policies

See below for our SI file for our paper (kubinec_covid_index_si.pdf)

Politically-Connected Firms and the Military-Clientelist Complex in North Africa

I present a conjoint survey experiment of 2,496 firm managers and employees in Algiera, Egypt and Tunisia that offers the first detailed observational and experimental estimates of firm political activity in the region. In addition, I put forward a theory differentiating individual and collective firm political engagement. I argue that firm political activity will tend to emphasize individual firm interests in rent-seeking unless an economic institution exists that can encourage firm collective action. While firms in Egypt under the military dictatorship show evidence of this type of firm collective action due to the economic involvement of the military, firms in Tunisia and Algeria are more likely to pursue individualistic political strategies aimed at securing a narrow definition of the firms' interests. The near-monolithic support among elites for Egypt's military dictatorship suggests that firm collective behavior matters for regime survival