On Representative Social Capital

This paper analyzes data for a random sample drawn from the Dutch population who reveal their propensity to invest and reward investments in building up social capital by means of an economic experiment.We find substantial heterogeneity and asymmetries in the propensity to invest and in the propensity to reward investments.In particular, we find strong evidence that the young, elderly, and low educated individuals invest relatively less, but are relatively more likely to reward investments in social capital.On the other hand, labor market participation, income, and religion do not have any significant impact on behavior in the experiment. Series: CentER Discussion PaperSocial Capital Investments;Experimental Economics;Representative samples

Myopic Loss Aversion: Information Feedback vs. Investment Flexibility

We experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexibility on the investment behavior of a myopically loss averse investor.Our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of Myopic Loss Aversion.information;investment

Actions and Beliefs: Estimating Distribution-Based Preferences Using a Large Scale Experiment with Probability Questions on Expectations

We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations elicited in the form of subjective probability questions, and the choice data of proposers ("dictator") in a dictator game to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty.We use a large and representative sample of subjects drawn from the Dutch population.Our results indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences for equity in the population.Changes in preferences have an important impact on decisions of dictators in the dictator game and responders in the ultimatum game, but a smaller impact on decisions of proposer's in the ultimatum game, a result due to proposers subjective expectations about responders' decisions.The model which uses subjective data on expectations has better predictive power and lower noise level than a model which assumes that players have rational expectations.ultimatum game;inquity aversion;subjective expectations

Preferences, Intentions, and Expectations: A Large-Scale Experiment With a Representative Subject Pool

We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities responders attach to the possible offers. We estimate the model on a large representative sample from the Dutch population. We find that the relative importance of distributional preferences and perceived intentions depends significantly on the socioeconomic characteristics of responders. Strong inequity aversion to the other player’s disadvantage is found for lower educated and older respondents. Responders tend to punish unfavorable offers more if they expect that fair proposals will occur with higher probability.Inequity aversion;intentions;subjective expectations

Preferences, Intentions, and Expectations:A Large-Scale Experiment With a Representative Subject Pool

We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities responders attach to the possible offers. We estimate the model on a large representative sample from the Dutch population. We find that the relative importance of distributional preferences and perceived intentions depends significantly on the socio-economic characteristics of responders. Strong inequity aversion to the other player's disadvantage is found for lower educated and older respondents. Responders tend to punish unfavorable offers more if they expect that fair proposals will occur with higher probability