A storage and access architecture for efficient query processing in spatial database systems

Due to the high complexity of objects and queries and also due to extremely large data volumes, geographic database systems impose stringent requirements on their storage and access architecture with respect to efficient query processing. Performance improving concepts such as spatial storage and access structures, approximations, object decompositions and multi-phase query processing have been suggested and analyzed as single building blocks. In this paper, we describe a storage and access architecture which is composed from the above building blocks in a modular fashion. Additionally, we incorporate into our architecture a new ingredient, the scene organization, for efficiently supporting set-oriented access of large-area region queries. An experimental performance comparison demonstrates that the concept of scene organization leads to considerable performance improvements for large-area region queries by a factor of up to 150

An Evolutionary Analysis of World Energy Consumption and World Population

The evolution of large-scale systems is described by a model based on the assumption of hyperbolic growth and saturation processes. It is shown that this Hyper-Logistic Evolution Model (HLEM) successfully describes the development of world population and global primary energy consumption over the past century; the model is also used to provide projections of world population and primary energy consumption up to the year 2100

Protein kinase Ymr291w/Tda1 is essential for glucose signaling in Saccharomyces cerevisiae on the level of hexokinase isoenzyme ScHxk2 phosphorylation

The enzyme ScHxk2 of Saccharomyces cerevisiae is a dual-function hexokinase that besides its catalytic role in glycolysis is involved in the transcriptional regulation of glucose-repressible genes. Relief from glucose repression is accompanied by the phosphorylation of the nuclear fraction of ScHxk2 at serine 15 and the translocation of the phosphoenzyme into the cytosol. Different studies suggest different serine/threonine protein kinases, Ymr291w/Tda1 or Snf1, to accomplish ScHxk2-S15 phosphorylation. The current paper provides evidence that Ymr291w/Tda1 is essential for that modification while protein kinases Ydr477w/Snf1, Ynl307c/Mck1, Yfr014c/Cmk1 and Ykl126w/Ypk1, which co-purified during Ymr291w/Tda1 tandem affinity purification, as well as protein kinases PKA and PKB homolog Sch9 are dispensable. Taking into account the detection of a significantly higher amount of the Ymr291w/Tda1 protein in cells grown in low-glucose media as compared to a high-glucose environment, Ymr291w/Tda1 is likely to contribute to glucose signaling in Saccharomyces cerevisiae on the level of ScHxk2-S15 phosphorylation in a situation of limited external glucose availability. The evolutionary conservation of amino acid residue serine 15 in yeast hexokinases and its phosphorylation is illustrated by the finding that YMR291W/TDA1 of Saccharomyces cerevisiae and the homologous KLLA0A09713 gene of Kluyveromyces lactis allow for cross-complementation of the respective protein kinase single-gene deletion strains

Personhood, consciousness, and god : how to be a proper pantheist

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing the universe as a person. If successful, it removes one bar to endorsing pantheism. I do this by examining a rising school of thought on personhood, on which persons, or selves, are understood as identical to episodes of consciousness. Through a critique of this experiential approach to personhood, I develop a theory of self as constituted of qualitative mental contents, but where these contents are also capable of unconscious existence. On this theory, though we can be conscious of our selves, consciousness turns out to be inessential to personhood. This move, I then argue, provides resources for responding to the pantheist’s problem of God’s person.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

The Real Combination Problem : Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence

Panpsychism harbors an unresolved tension, the seriousness of which has yet to be fully appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer panpsychists advice on how to resolve it. The dilemma, briefly, is as follows. Panpsychists are committed to the perspicuous explanation of macro-mentality in terms of micro-mentality. But panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature not just mental properties, but also micro-subjects to whom these properties belong. Yet it is impossible to explain the constitution of a macro-subject (like one of us) in terms of the assembly of micro-subjects, for, I show, subjects cannot combine. Therefore the panpsychist explanatory project is derailed by the insistence that the world’s ultimate material constituents (ultimates) are subjects of experience. The panpsychist faces a choice of abandoning her explanatory project, or recanting the claim that the ultimates are subjects. This is the dilemma. I argue that the latter option is to be preferred. This needn’t constitute a wholesale abandonment of panpsychism, however, since panpsychists can maintain that the ultimates possess phenomenal qualities, despite not being subjects of those qualities. This proposal requires us to make sense of phenomenal qualities existing independently of experiencing subjects, a challenge I tackle in the penultimate section. The position eventually reached is a form of neutral monism, so another way to express the overall argument is to say that, keeping true to their philosophical motivations, panpsychists should really be neutral monists.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

The Epistemology of Intentionality: Notional Constituents vs. Direct Grasp

Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano’s repeated attempts to analyze intentionality in terms of ‘notional constituents’ – aspects of intentionality which cannot come apart in reality but which can be conceptually distinguished. After bringing out this tension, I explore some options for resolving it, ultimately offering my own favored interpretation

I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience

In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three notions in question, under the labels of “for-me-ness”, “me-ness” and “mineness”. Next, I argue that these notions are not equivalent; in particular, there is no conceptual implication from for-me-ness to me-ness or mineness. Empirical considerations based on clinical cases additionally suggest that the three notions may also correspond to different properties (although the claim of conceptual non-equivalence does not depend on this further point). The aim is clarificatory, cautionary but also critical: I examine four existing arguments from subjective character that are fuelled by an undifferentiated use of the three notions, and find them to be flawed for this reason

The Phenomenology of Mentality

peer reviewedThis paper offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano’s view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano’s theory of inner perception (hereafter IP). Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is, in phenomenological terms. Section 1 addresses Brentano’s claim that IP is one mark of the mental alongside intentionality. Sections 2 and 3 present support for a phenomenological interpretation of IP. And Section 4 briefly discusses two objections.The Phenomenology of Mentality (F.R.S.-FNRS Research Project / PDR