30 research outputs found
The LIOn's share: How the Liberal International Order Contributes to its Own Legitimacy Crisis. Harvard CES Open Forum Series2019-2020
The liberal international order (LIO) is experiencing a legitimacy crisis in its Western heartland. What causes this crisis? Existing approaches focus on the LIOâs unequal allocation of wealth and values that produces losers and thus breeds dissatisfaction. Yet, why this dissatisfaction translates into a delegitimation of the order rather than a contestation over policies remains unaccounted for. Complementing the cultural and economic backlash hypotheses, this paper advances an institutionalist explanationfor the current crisis of the LIO, which accounts for the growing resistance to the LIO with a political backlash hypothesis. Our argument is that the institutional characteristics of the LIOâs political order trigger self-undermining processes by inciting opposition that cannot be politically accommodated and is thus bound to turn into polity contestation. In particular, we hold that IOsâ predominantly technocratic legitimation rationale on the one hand, and their increasing political authority with distributional effects on the other, create a democracy gap. It implies that avenues to absorb opposition through input channels are largely missing and thus incite the erosion of the LIOâs general acceptance. We illustrate the plausibility of this argument with evidence from the European Union (EU) as well as the international regimes on trade and human rights
Political secrecy in Europe: crisis management and crisis exploitation
This article theorises the relationship of crisis and political secrecy in European public policy. Combining the literatures on crisis management and securitisation, it introduces two distinct types of crisis-related secrecy. (1) Reactive secrecy denotes the deliberate concealment of information from the public with the aim of reducing immediate negative crisis consequences. It presents itself as a functional necessity of crisis management. (2) Active secrecy is about substantive or procedural secrecy employed by authority-holders to implement their interests with fewer restraints. Here, secrecy is an instrument of crisis exploitation, reducing obstacles to extraordinary measures. This distinction is based on an understanding of authority-holders as simultaneous legitimacy- and discretion-seekers whose secrecy politics depend on the constraints and opportunities presented by crises. In order to illustrate active and reactive secrecy, the article uses examples from the euro crisis (Eurogroup summitry, ECB sovereign bond purchases) and the security crisis after 9/11 (terror lists)
WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health
This article analyses the emergency governance of international organizations by combining securitization theory with legal theory on the state of exception. Our main argument is that where issues are securitized as global threats, exceptionalism can emerge at the level of supranational bodies, endowing them with the decisionist authority to define emergencies and guide political responses. We theorize the 'emergency trap', which is triggered when the emergency powers of international organizations reduce the obstacles to, and increase the incentives for, the securitization of further issues. Based on the idea that the emergency trap functions as an institutional driver of securitization, we also highlight the importance of the constitutional containment of emergency competencies as an alternative to discursive desecuritization strategies. We illustrate this security-emergency dynamic in a case study of the recent empowerment of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the governance of global health emergencies. The article shows how WHO's exceptional response to the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis paved the way for an institutionalization of emergency powers within the organization and contributed to securitizing the 2009 swine influenza outbreak as a global pandemic. However, WHO's crisis governance has also triggered internal and external processes of constitutional contention
After fragmentation: norm collisions, interface conflicts, and conflict management
Fragmentation, institutional overlaps, and norm collisions are often seen as fundamental problems for the global (legal) order. Supposedly, they incite conflict and disorder. However, some scholars have also emphasised functional and normative advantages of the resulting institutional pluralism. We argue that the consequences of the increasing international institutional density are conditional on whether and how different norms, institutions, and authorities are coordinated. In distinction from the fragmentation framework in international law and the regime complexity framework in international relations, this introduction outlines an interface conflict framework that enables important insights into this question and guides the contributions assembled in this issue. It zooms in on the micro-level of conflict between actors that justify incompatible positional differences with reference to different international norms. In particular, the concept of interface conflicts allows studying the conditions under which overlaps and norm collisions become activated in conflicts as well as the ways in which such conflicts are handled. Foreshadowing the main findings of the contributions to this Special Issue, we hold that interface conflicts are neither inevitable nor unmanageable. Most importantly, it seems that, more often than not, conflicts stimulate cooperative forms of management and contribute to the building of inter-institutional order
Der lange Schatten des Notstands
Nach den TerroranschlĂ€gen am 11. September 2001 in New York ergriff der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen MaĂnahmen, die grundlegende Verfahrensrechte missachteten. Erst nach fast zehn Jahren wurde die Praxis schrittweise rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipien unterworfen. Dieser Beitrag analysiert den politischen Konflikt zwischen BefĂŒrwortern und Gegnern des Sanktionsregimes.In the wake of 9/11, the UN Security Council adopted emergency measures, the so-called 'terror lists', which violated basic due process rights of the targeted persons. It took almost a decade before the regime of individual sanctions was gradually subjected to principles of due process. Since the most powerful members of the Council profited from the regimeâs executive
discretion, they eagerly defended it against external attempts at its containment. Only when the critics enlisted other international organizations, in particular the European Court of Justice, were they able to turn the tides. Yet, the resulting institutional checks on the Council are both incomplete and risking negative side effects
Varieties of contested multilateralism: positive and negative consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions
This essay analyses the consequences of contested multilateralism (CM) for the level of constitutionalisation of specific multilateral institutions. We argue that CM has implications for institutionsâ constitutional quality in particular if it is polity-driven and not (merely) policy-driven, that is, when actorsâ employment of alternative institutions stems from their dissatisfaction with the political order of an institution rather than individual policies. Given the co-existence of constitutionalised and non-constitutionalised multilateral institutions in todayâs international order, state and non-state actors can use alternative institutions to contest the constraining or discretionary character of an institutionâs polity. We hold that CM is likely to have negative consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions if it is employed âtop-downâ by states to enhance their freedom to wield discretionary authority, but that it is likely to have positive consequence if it is employed âbottom-upâ by society actors to constrain the exercise of discretionary authority through multilateral institutions. We illustrate the empirical plausibility of our claims in two cases involving top-down contestation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and bottom-up contestation of the World Health Organization (WHO)
Suprastaatliche Verfassungspolitik: Markus Patberg fragt nach den Legitimationsbedingungen einer demokratischen Ordnung jenseits des Staates
Markus Patberg: Usurpation und Autorisierung: Konstituierende Gewalt im globalen Zeitalter. Frankfurt am Main / New York: Campus 2018. 978-3-593-50886-
Gendarmerieeinheiten in internationalen Stabilisierungsmissionen: eine Option fĂŒr Deutschland?
'Die Bilanz der internationalen BemĂŒhungen um eine StĂ€rkung staatlicher Strukturen auf dem Balkan, im Irak und in Afghanistan kann nicht zufriedenstellen. In vielen EinsĂ€tzen werden die Grenzen zwischen militĂ€rischen und polizeilichen Aufgaben immer durchlĂ€ssiger. Dort tut sich eine Grauzone auf, in der es weder dem MilitĂ€r noch den zivilen (Polizei-)KrĂ€ften gelingt, eine labile, gewaltdurchsetzte Situation so weit zu verbessern, dass der Aufbau eines dauerhaften Sicherheitssektors möglich wird. Es fehlt eine Kraft, die in einem instabilen Umfeld eigenstĂ€ndig operieren kann und imstande ist, Unruhen und organisierte KriminalitĂ€t einzudĂ€mmen. Wo Gendarmen oder robuste PolizeikrĂ€fte in AuslandseinsĂ€tze entsendet wurden, haben sie sich als wirkungsvolles Instrument erwiesen, insbesondere bei der BekĂ€mpfung von AufstĂ€nden und organisiertem Verbrechen. Auch Deutschland könnte sich mit einer Gendarmerie ein wichtiges Instrument fĂŒr Stabilisierungsoperationen verschaffen. Noch aber stehen dem verfassungsrechtliche Bedenken entgegen, denn das Grundgesetz gebietet die Trennung von Polizei und MilitĂ€r. Die Schaffung einer deutschen Gendarmerie, so wird eingewandt, wĂ€re mit diesem Verfassungsprinzip nicht zu vereinbaren. Werden solche robusten PolizeikrĂ€fte aber allein fĂŒr die Auslandsverwendung geschaffen, erĂŒbrigt sich dieser Einwand, denn das Grundgesetz schreibt weder explizit noch implizit vor, im Ausland polizeiliche und militĂ€rische Aufgaben und Befugnisse zu trennen. Will die Bundesrepublik einen deutschen Gendarmerieverband fĂŒr den Auslandseinsatz ins Leben rufen, stehen ihr zwei Möglichkeiten offen: Sie kann ein Kontingent bei der Bundespolizei bilden oder die MilitĂ€rpolizei der Bundeswehr (FeldjĂ€ger) funktional erweitern.' (Autorenreferat
Zwischen Hoffen und Bangen: Zum VerhÀltnis von AutoritÀt, Politisierung und Demokratisierung in internationalen Organisationen
Das Standardnarrativ der Politisierungsliteratur sieht die Politisierung internationaler Organisationen (IOs) einerseits als Folge der wachsenden AutoritĂ€t von IOs (AutoritĂ€ts-Politisierungs-Nexus) und besagt andererseits, dass sie die Demokratisierung von IOs begĂŒnstigt (Politisierungs-Demokratisierungs-Nexus). WĂ€hrend wir dem AutoritĂ€ts-Politisierungs-Nexus zustimmen, sind wir hinsichtlich des Politisierungs-Demokratisierungs-Nexus skeptisch. Wir argumentieren, dass sich aufgrund der mangelnden demokratischen Legitimation von IO-AutoritĂ€t die Politisierung ihrer 'policies' zumeist auch in eine Politisierung ihrer 'polity' ĂŒbersetzt. Diese bringt in den beteiligten Gesellschaften sowohl kosmopolitische als auch kommunitaristische Demokratisierungsforderungen mit sich. Dabei besitzen allerdings - und dies ist unser Hauptargument - kommunitaristische gegenĂŒber kosmopolitischen Forderungen einen systematischen Mobilisierungsvorteil. Aufgrund des damit gleichsam anwachsenden âconstraining dissensusâ sehen sich politische EntscheidungstrĂ€gerInnen, die die AutoritĂ€t von IOs stĂŒtzen wollen, zunehmend zu AutoritĂ€tstransfers durch nicht-demokratische HintertĂŒren veranlasst, welche die kommunitaristische Kritik an der AutoritĂ€t von IOs bestĂ€tigen und weiter befördern. Es setzt ein Teufelskreis ein, der kurz- und mittelfristig eine Entdemokratisierung von IOs bewirkt, welche sich langfristig sogar in eine Renationalisierung ihrer AutoritĂ€t ĂŒbersetzen kann