Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis

There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision of public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the non-linear income tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good without imposing strong assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision are completely different and the traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in a very special case.public good provision, distortionary taxation, distribution

Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis

There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision of public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the non-linear income tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good without imposing any separability assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision are completely different and the traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in a very special case.

On the Optimality of Joint Taxation with Household Production

The existing literature suggests that the concern for economic efficiency calls for individual taxation of married couples with a higher rate on the primary earner. This paper reconsiders the choice of tax unit in the Becker model of household production, which includes previous analyses as special cases. In the general framework, where all utility yielding commodities are produced through a combinatiion of market goods and household time, optimal taxation requires joint taxation of the family. This result assumes that there are no restrictions in the use of commodity taxes. In the presence of such restrictions individual taxation is typically optimal. However, this may call for a lower rate on primary earners, unlike the standard result.optimal taxation, household production, time allocation

The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in OECD Countries. Hours of Work Versus Labor Force Participation

A central finding of the modern labor market literature is that labor supply responses tend to be concentrated along the extensive margin (labor force participation) rather than the intensive margin (hours of work). Yet, the literature on the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) focuses solely on the intensive margin. In this paper we demonstrate that it is important to incorporate extensive labor supply responses into the analysis. Firstly, MCF becomes a function of average taxes, rather than just marginal taxes. Secondly, participation decisions and thus MCF depend on the magnitude of transfers for those out of work. Our calculations for 23 OECD countries reveal that the MCF becomes substantially higher once the participation e.ect is accounted for. This is especially the case for continental European countries where average taxes are high and benefit systems are generous.

Endogenous Growth: A Knife-Edge or the Razor's Edge?

According to much of the recent growth literature the dramatic worldwide fertility decline currently taking place should ultimately lead to global economic stagnation. This pessimistic prediction is not shared by the original innovation-based growth literature. However, this strand of literature has in recent year been criticized for resting on implausible knife-edge assumptions and for being inconsistent with available evidence. In this paper, we argue that this conclusion is unwarranted.

Optimal Taxation of Married Couples with Household Production

The literature suggests that the concern for economic efficiency calls for individual-based taxation of married couples with a higher rate on the primary earner. This paper reconsiders the choice of tax unit in the Becker model of household production. Our aim is to study the robustness of previous results to the modelling of time allocation. In addition, we analyze the interaction between the optimal income tax for couples and the chosen commodity tax structure. In the absence of restrictions on the use of commodity taxes, efficient taxation requires joint taxation of the family. In the presence of restricted commodity taxation, the income tax should compensate for the erroneous commodity taxes. In this case, individual taxation is typically optimal, but not necessarily with a higher rate on primary earners as usually suggested.

A Revised Efficiency Principle for the Taxation of Couples

We reconsider the result that efficient taxation involves a lower marginal tax on secondary earners than on primary earners. Introducing labor force participation responses into the analysis, we show that a second-earner tax allowance is better than selective marginal tax rates.optimal taxation; married couples; labor supply behavior

Optimal Provision of Public Goods:A Synthesis

There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision of public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxa-tion and distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the non-linear income tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demon-strating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good without imposing any separability assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision are completely different and the traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in a very special case. (JEL: H41, H23, H11) ∗We are grateful to Kenneth Small for discussions leading up to this paper. We also wish to thank Henrik Jacobsen Kleven for detailed comments on a previous draft.

The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples

This paper analyzes the optimal income tax treatment of couples. Each couple is modelled as a single rational economic agent supplying labor along two dimensions: primary and secondary earnings. We consider fully general joint income tax systems. Separate taxation is never optimal if social welfare depends on total couple incomes. In a model where secondary earners make only a binary work decision (work or not work), we demonstrate that the marginal tax rate of the primary earner is lower when the spouse works. As a result, the tax distortion on the secondary earner decreases with the earnings of the primary earner and actually vanishes to zero asymptotically. Such negative jointness is optimal because redistribution from two-earner toward one-earner couples is more valuable when primary earner income is lower. We also consider a model where both spouses display intensive labor supply responses. In that context, we show that, starting from the optimal separable tax schedules, introducing some negative jointness is always desirable. Numerical simulations suggest that, in that model, it is also optimal for the marginal tax rate on one earner to decrease with the earnings of his/her spouse. We argue that many actual redistribution systems, featuring family-based transfers combined with individually-based taxes, generate schedules with negative jointness.