136 research outputs found
Blockchain Mining Games with Pay Forward
We study the strategic implications that arise from adding one extra option
to the miners participating in the bitcoin protocol. We propose that when
adding a block, miners also have the ability to pay forward an amount to be
collected by the first miner who successfully extends their branch, giving them
the power to influence the incentives for mining. We formulate a stochastic
game for the study of such incentives and show that with this added option,
smaller miners can guarantee that the best response of even substantially more
powerful miners is to follow the expected behavior intended by the protocol
designer
Truthful Allocation in Graphs and Hypergraphs
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of the well-studied unrelated machines scheduling problem, in which every given task can be executed only by two pre-specified machines in the case of graphs or a given subset of machines in the case of hypergraphs. This corresponds to a multigraph whose nodes are the machines and its hyperedges are the tasks. This class of problems belongs to multidimensional mechanism design, for which there are no known general mechanisms other than the VCG and its generalization to affine minimizers. We propose a new class of mechanisms that are truthful and have significantly better performance than affine minimizers in many settings. Specifically, we provide upper and lower bounds for truthful mechanisms for general multigraphs, as well as special classes of graphs such as stars, trees, planar graphs, k-degenerate graphs, and graphs of a given treewidth. We also consider the objective of minimizing or maximizing the L^p-norm of the values of the players, a generalization of the makespan minimization that corresponds to p = ?, and extend the results to any p > 0
Approaching Utopia: Strong Truthfulness and Externality-Resistant Mechanisms
We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications.
We use strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated
strategies for several problems,including the design of externality resistant
auctions and a variant of multi-dimensional scheduling
The Infinite Server Problem
We study a variant of the k-server problem, the infinite server problem, in which infinitely many servers reside initially at a particular point of the metric space and serve a sequence of requests. In the framework of competitive analysis, we show a surprisingly tight connection between this problem and the (h,k)-server problem, in which an online algorithm with k servers competes against an offline algorithm with h servers. Specifically, we show that the infinite server problem has bounded competitive ratio if and only if the (h,k)-server problem has bounded competitive ratio for some k=O(h). We give a lower bound of 3.146 for the competitive ratio of the infinite server problem, which implies the same lower bound for the (h,k)-server problem even when k>>h and holds also for the line metric; the previous known bounds were 2.4 for general metric spaces and 2 for the line. For weighted trees and layered graphs we obtain upper bounds, although they depend on the depth. Of particular interest is the infinite server problem on the line, which we show to be equivalent to the seemingly easier case in which all requests are in a fixed bounded interval away from the original position of the servers. This is a special case of a more general reduction from arbitrary metric spaces to bounded subspaces. Unfortunately, classical approaches (double coverage and generalizations, work function algorithm, balancing algorithms) fail even for this special case
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