Logical Instrumentalism and Concatenation

Logical pluralism is the theory that there is more than one right logic. Logical instrumentalism is the view that a logic is a correct logic if it can be used to fruitfully pursue some deductive inquiry. Logical instrumentalism is a version of logical pluralism, since more than one logic can be used fruitfully. In this paper, I will show that a logical instrumentalist must accept linear logic as a correct logic, since linear logic is useful for studying natural language syntax. I further show that this means that the logical instrumentalist must accept a wide range of connectives, in particular concatenation. I end by explaining why this is a feature rather than a bug

Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of the connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions

Classical Logic

[From introductory section] Typically, a logic consists of a formal or informal language together with a deductive system and/or a model-theoretic semantics. The language has components that correspond to a part of a natural language like English or Greek. The deductive system is to capture, codify, or simply record arguments that are valid for the given language, and the semantics is to capture, codify, or record the meanings, or truth-conditions for at least part of the language. The following sections provide the basics of a typical logic, sometimes called “classical elementary logic” or “classical first-order logic”...

Susan Stebbing

Susan Stebbing (1885-1943) was a founder of Analysis and had a large influence on philosophy during the early 20th century. Recently, the work of Michael Beaney (2000), Siobhan Chapman (2013) and Frederique Janssen- Lauret (2017), amongst others, has begun a resurgence of interest in Stebbing. This paper serves as a brief introduction to some of the major features of her philosophical work

Pluralistic Perspectives on Logic: An Introduction

(First paragraph) Logical pluralism is the view that there are distinct, but equally good logics. Recent years have witnessed a sharp upswing of interest in this view, resulting in an impressive literature. We only expect this trend to continue in the future. More than one commentator has, however, expressed exasperation at the view: what can it mean to be a pluralist about logic of all things? [see, e.g., Eklund (2017); Goddu (2002); Keefe (2014)]. In this introduction, we aim to set out the basic pluralist position, identify some issues over which pluralists disagree amongst themselves, and highlight the topics at the heart of the ongoing debate

Susan Stebbing

Susan Stebbing (1885-1943) was a founder of Analysis and had a large influence on philosophy during the early 20th century. Recently, the work of Michael Beaney (2000), Siobhan Chapman (2013) and Frederique Janssen- Lauret (2017), amongst others, has begun a resurgence of interest in Stebbing. This paper serves as a brief introduction to some of the major features of her philosophical work.Susan Stebbing (1885-1943) fu tra le fondatrici della rivista Analysis, ed ebbe grande influenza sulla filosofia analitica agli inizi del 20esimo secolo. Di recente, grazie al lavoro di Michael Beaney (2000), Siobhan Chapman (2013), e Frederique Janssen-Lauret (2017), tra gli altri, è rinato un grande interesse per la figura di Stebbing. Questo articolo è una breve introduzione ad alcuni degli aspetti principali della sua opera

Classical First-Order Logic

One is often said to be reasoning well when they are reasoning logically. Many attempts to say what logical reasoning is have been proposed, but one commonly proposed system is first-order classical logic. This Element will examine the basics of first-order classical logic and discuss some surrounding philosophical issues. The first half of the Element develops a language for the system, as well as a proof theory and model theory. The authors provide theorems about the system they developed, such as unique readability and the Lindenbaum lemma. They also discuss the meta-theory for the system, and provide several results there, including proving soundness and completeness theorems. The second half of the Element compares first-order classical logic to other systems: classical higher order logic, intuitionistic logic, and several paraconsistent logics which reject the law of ex falso quodlibet. [Amazon.com]https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_books/1029/thumbnail.jp