L’augmentation humaine : un rôle à jouer pour le philosophe des sciences

L’augmentation humaine – la quête visant à améliorer ou même transformer les humains par des moyens technologiques – a été qualifiée de plus important problème du xxie siècle. Pourtant, le grand public est mal préparé à l’affronter. Certes, le sujet a été discuté depuis des années par des experts dans des domaines aussi divers que la bioéthique et l’économie, les nanotechnologies et le droit, et même dans les écrits de science-fiction et en philosophie de l’esprit. Mais cette discussion souffre de graves lacunes, tout autant empiriques que normatives. Le résultat en fut des recommandations concernant l’augmentation humaine insuffisamment argumentées, plutôt qu’un plan d’action cohérent et bien développé. Dans cet article, j’argumente qu’il existe au moins trois façons pour les philosophes des sciences, qui ont jusqu’à présent brillé par leur absence, de contribuer au débat. Et je tente de convaincre mes collègues philosophes des sciences de le faire.Human enhancement – the quest to improve or even transform human beings through technological means – has been called the most important issue of the twenty-first century. Yet, the public is ill prepared to deal with it. True, the issue has been publicly discussed for years by experts in fields as diverse as bioethics and economics, nanotechnology and the law, even science fiction writing and philosophy of mind. But the discussion has been marred by serious shortcomings, empirical as well as normative. As a result, the public has been offered wildly divergent, incompletely argued recommendations regarding human enhancement rather than a coherent, well-developed plan of action. I argue that there are at least three important ways in which philosophers of science – philosophers who have thus far been visibly absent from the enhancement debate – can contribute to it. And I try to cajole my fellow philosophers of science into doing so

Introducing the Issues

Carrier M, Kourany J. Introducing the Issues. In: Kourany J, Carrier M, eds. Science and the Production of Ignorance. When the Quest for Knowledge is Thwarted. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press; 2020: 3-25

Science and the Production of Ignorance. When the Quest for Knowledge is Thwarted

Kourany J, Carrier M, eds. Science and the Production of Ignorance. When the Quest for Knowledge is Thwarted. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press; 2020

The challenge of the social and the pressure of practice: science and values revisited

Carrier M, Howard D, Kourany J, eds. The challenge of the social and the pressure of practice: science and values revisited. Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press; 2008

Agnotological Challenges: How to Capture the Production of Ignorance in Science

Carrier M. Agnotological Challenges: How to Capture the Production of Ignorance in Science. In: Kourany J, Carrier M, eds. Science and the Production of Ignorance. When the Quest for Knowledge is Thwarted. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press; 2020: 59-88

How Robust is "Socially Robust Knowledge"?

Weingart P. How Robust is "Socially Robust Knowledge"? In: Carrier M, Howard D, Kourany J, eds. The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and Values Revisited. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; 2008: 131-145

Introduction: Science and the Social

Carrier M. Introduction: Science and the Social. In: Carrier M, Howard D, Kourany J, eds. The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and Values Revisited. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Pittsburgh University Press; 2008: 1-13

Feminist philosophies : problems, theories, and applications

ix, 406 p.; 23 cm