Analysing the power of the European Union’s diplomatic service : do the EU member states control the European external action service?

By applying the rational choice principal–agent model, this article examines the European Union member states’ principal control of the European External Action Service (EEAS) agent. More specifically, the article applies mechanisms of agency monitoring, control and sanctions that are inherent in the principal–agent model to analyse the establishment and functioning of the EEAS. These mechanisms aim to ensure the EEAS’s compliance with its mandate, thereby curtailing its ability to pursue own objectives that are independent from the principal. The findings reveal that the EEAS is tightly controlled by the EU member states. Moreover the European Commission has tools to exercise horizontal checks vis-à-vis the EEAS. The application of the principal–agent model to control the EEAS is not without its limits. The model falls short of conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier to this model

Why Moldova’s European integration is failing

As anti-government demonstrations continued in Chisinau, EU foreign ministers reaffirmed their support for Moldova’s political association and economic integration with the EU in the Council conclusions of 15 February 2016. The ministers also confirmed that all 28 EU member states have ratified the Association Agreement between Moldova and the EU. Despite this progress, Moldova’s European integration project is in tatters. According to an authoritative survey commissioned by the National Democratic Institute in November 2015, only 40% Moldovans support European integration; 44% are in favour of Eurasian integration, however. As Russia steps up the pressure on Moldova, these trends are worrying for the EU. At first sight, it is puzzling that Moldova should lose the support of its population for integration with Europe. The country has received considerable financial support and political backing from the EU, and is governed by an elite that proclaims itself to be pro-European. An analysis of domestic and external factors might shed some light on this question

The civil society forum of the eastern partnership four years on: progress, challenges and prospects

Established in 2009, during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Prague, the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum supports the development of civil society organisations from the EU-28 and the six Partnership countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. After four years of operation, the Secretariat of the Forum’s Steering Committee commissioned CEPS to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of its programme. This report singles out the institutionalisation and socialisation inculcated among its members as the Forum’s greatest accomplishment. In contrast to its internal developments, it argues that the external policy successes of the Forum remain modest. This report is the first attempt to conduct an in-depth assessment of the Forum's Annual Assembly, the Steering Committee and its Secretariat, the Working Groups and National Platforms. Ten actionable recommendations are put forward aimed at improving the Civil Society Forum’s standing and performance

The EEAS and the eastern partnership: let the blame game stop

In the first year and a half of its existence, the EEAS and its head have become the target of extensive criticism for the shortcomings of EU foreign policy; shortcomings that in fact date back to the creation of the European Union. The EU’s diplomatic service has been blamed variously for ‘lacking clarity,’ ‘acting too slowly’ and ‘being unable to bridge the institutional divide’. In this Commentary author Hrant Kostanyan argues that the EEAS’ discretionary power in the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework is restricted by the decision-making procedures between a wide range of stakeholders: the member states and the partner countries, as well as by the EU institutions, international organisations and the Civil Society Forum. Since this decision-making process places a substantial number of brakes on the discretionary power of the EEAS, any responsible analysis or critique of the service should take these constraints into consideration. Ultimately, the EEAS is only able to craft EU foreign policy insofar as it is allowed to do so

Ukraine’s unimplemented anti-corruption reform.

Almost three years after the Euromaidan revolution, Ukraine’s leadership has fallen woefully short in delivering on its promises to fight against corruption within the judiciary, clean up political party financing and decentralise government functions. The customs service has yet to be reformed, property rights are far from being ensured and state-owned enterprises have not been privatised. Major reforms aimed at combating corruption have consistently been resisted, delayed, manipulated or appear on paper only. The country’s elite must produce more tangible results in order to earn the trust of the citizens and ease the growing fatigue among Ukraine’s international partners

Spillovers from the Arab Revolts: is Armenia next in line?

Regime changes through taking to the streets do not always progress peacefully and produce intended results. The recent successful revolutions that have brought down two North African dictators have also inspired reform advocates in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. The coming months are expected to see developments of major if not decisive importance especially for the future of Armenia. Given the uncertainty of the eventual outcome in Armenia, this Policy Brief contemplates four possible scenarios for the country’s future development and suggests possible responses from the EU. The revolutions of the Arab world caught everyone by surprise. There should be no surprises regarding the Union’s Eastern neighbour Armenia

Towards a fragmented neighbourhood: policies of the EU and Russia and their consequences for the area that lies in between

In the current volatile climate, the EU needs a strategy towards Russia that goes beyond sanctions. In reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s incoming leadership should be more sensitive towards the existing political, diplomatic, economic, energy and military ties between Russia and the countries in the common neighbourhood. After all, it is by exploiting these ties that Russia was able to turn this neighbourhood into an area of destructive competition − the primary victim of which is Ukraine. Understanding Russia’s perceptions and being sensitive to these longstanding ties does not mean justifying their use by the Kremlin. Nevertheless, factoring these ties into the EU’s policies vis-à-vis its Eastern neighbourhood is a prerequisite for more reflective, responsive and effective EU policies

Seizing the Second Chance in EU-Armenia Relations

For much of its history, Armenia has been a prisoner of its difficult geography. Situated at a strategic crossroads, it has lost out in competition with much larger regional powers and empires, and was the victim of the first genocide of the 20th century. Armenia is now at a crucial political crossroads yet again, this time with the fate of the country’s strategic orientation and domestic stability in the balance