Reform in Lieu of Change: Tastes Great, Less Filling

In this response to Light, Koppell argues that the increasing frequency of reform may reflect Congress\u27s inability to make significant changes to the substance of entrenched government programs. Moreover, he observes that the more profound evolution in government has been the movement toward the market-based provision of services, which has created a demand for new competencies in the public sector

Administration without Borders

To thrive in 2020, we must conceive of the field of public administration in the broadest possible terms. Phenomena that typically have been treated peripherally in our literature are emerging center stage in recent years, confirming that the “old” boundaries of our discipline do not reflect contemporary reality. After reviewing three key developments—the rise of mixed and nongovernmental institutions in public policy, the increasing importance of market mechanisms, and the assertion of meaningful global regulation—an argument is made for a broader reconception of “publicness” that goes hand in hand with the embrace of governance in lieu of administration

The Challenge of Administration by Regulation: Preliminary Findings Regarding the U.S. Government\u27s Venture Capital Funds

This article assesses the ability of elected officials to control public policy as implemented by public/private hybrid organizations, specifically, government venture capital funds. The study reveals greater control over OPIC investment funds than Enterprise Funds despite the existence of more traditional administrative tools of control for Enterprise Funds. This finding suggests that the regulatory infrastructure for hybrid organizations is more determinative of control than the existence (or lack) of traditional administrative control tools. Thus the challenge of hybrid government centers on the development of regulation as a substitute for administration

Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests: The Case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

This article explores the political influence of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Using Congress\u27s overhaul of the regulatory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a case study, the article presents two principal findings: (1) The characteristics that distinguish government-sponsored enterprises from traditional government agencies and private companies endow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources; and (2) the alignment of interest groups around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is subject to strategic manipulation by the GSEs. A triangular model of this alignment is proposed and employed to analyze the legislative outcome. The case has implications for students of organizational theory as well as policy makers considering the use of GSEs or other hybrid organizations

Differentiating Regulation of Public and Private Institutions: A Preliminary Inquiry

Twenty years ago, James Q. Wilson and Patricia Rachal argued that government cannot regulate itself. In an era of revived federalism, increased reliance on contractors, and proliferation of quasi-public organizations, the importance of government self-regulation is greater than ever. This paper tests an underlying assumption of Wilson and Rachal\u27s claim: that regulation of public and private organizations can be differentiated. Employing a meta-research design, this pilot study uses existing regulatory case studies to create regulatory relationship profiles for public and private organizations. These profiles include information on the structure of the regulator, the intent of the regulation, the enforcement tools available, the culture of the regulatory relationship, and the involvement of the Judiciary in the regulatory process. Although preliminary findings do not reveal dramatic differences in the regulatory relationship profiles of public and private organizations, the results do suggest that public organizations have a distinguishing culture and level of judicial involvement

The Effects of Ballot Position on Election Outcomes

This article presents evidence of name-order effects in balloting from a study of the 1998 Democratic primary in New York City, in which the order of candidates\u27 names was rotated by precinct. In 71 of 79 individual nominating contests, candidates received a greater proportion of the vote when listed first than when listed in any other position. In seven of those 71 contests, the advantage to first position exceeded the winner\u27s margin of victory, suggesting that ballot position would have determined the election outcomes if one candidate had held the top spot in all precincts

Can Non-State Certification Systems Bolster State-Centered Efforts to Promote Sustainable Development through the Clean Development Mechanism

Increasing economic globalization has coincided with the emergence and escalating influence of non-state actors and organizations in domestic and international policymaking, from shaping policy agendas to promoting private authority. The latter phenomenon has arisen, at least in part, from a critique of states\u27 failures to adopt effective and enduring environmental policies. Rather than contest command and control institutions, non-state strategies embrace market approaches built around incentives and price mechanisms. Several forms of non-state authority have emerged, including corporate social responsibility, provision of information through labeling, and self-reporting

University Rankings: Evidence and a Conceptual Framework

University ranking has high public visibility, the ranking business has flourished, and institutions of higher education have not been able to ignore it. This study of university ranking presents general considerations of ranking and institutional responses to it, particularly considering reactions to ranking, ranking as a self-fulfilling prophecy, and ranking as a means of transforming qualities into quantities. The authors present a conceptual framework of university ranking based on three propositions and carry out a descriptive statistical analysis of U.S. and international ranking data to evaluate those propositions. The first proposition of university ranking is that ranking systems are demarcated by a high degree of stability, equilibrium, and path dependence. The second proposition links ranking to institutional identity. The third proposition posits that rankings function as a catalyst for institutional isomorphism. The conclusion reviews some important new developments in university ranking

Arizona\u27s Vulnerable Populations

Arizona’s vulnerable populations are struggling on a daily basis but usually do so in silence, undetected by traditional radar and rankings, often unaware themselves of their high risk for being pushed or pulled into a full crisis. Ineligible for financial assistance under strict eligibility guidelines, they don’t qualify as poor because vulnerable populations are not yet in full crisis. To be clear, this report is not about the “poor,” at least not in the limited sense of the word. It is about our underemployed wage earners, our single-parent households, our deployed or returning military members, our under-educated and unskilled workforce, our debt-ridden neighbors, our uninsured friends, our family members with no savings for an emergency, much less retirement