18 research outputs found
Why local banking market concentration hinders IPOs and how it can work to issuers’ advantage
General sample evidence conceals the influence of banking market structure on a fraction of IPO issuers with limited financing options: small non-venture-capital-backed firms (SNVC). Using U.S. county-level data, we reveal that concentrated banking markets contract IPO activity, as they cause SNVCs to incur high underpricing at listing. However, when the size of the local banks is small, both the time to IPO and underpricing decrease. Our evidence infers that, unless banks are organizationally capable of tapping into soft information, they generally use market power for rent extraction, which has important spillover effects on the IPO market.PostprintPeer reviewe
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Political connections of new business ventures
The perceived capability of corporate organizations to influence politics, although fueling an ongoing public debate, features in literature as a source of probable benefits. According to the majority of the pertinent studies, these benefits, more often than not, materialize with important value-adding implications. In the U.S. context, whereby political money contributions constitute the prevalent way of establishing connections, this can result in a hefty return on a firm’s political investment.
Our research posits that if political connections formed via monetary donations elevate the donor to a higher status, this should reflect in circumstances whereby a firm needs to assert its quality to other economic agents. This is the case for firms that are plagued by the market newness liability. Whether as a form of insurance from tail risk or entitlement to economic rents, proximity to politics offers legitimacy and a compelling way of introducing a new venture to the marketplace. To prove this conjecture, we mainly draw from IPOs for representing a setting of acute uncertainty.
Our findings confirm that both lobbying and PAC (Political Action Committee) expenditure pays off on listing day as donors incur less underpricing; an effect which can be amplified with contribution size and strategic targeting of recipients. Donor IPOs also experience negative offer price revisions and lower aftermarket volatility. Collectively, these results offer new empirical grounding to uncertainty and signaling theories.
Subsequently, we frame IPO pricing as an efficiency problem for prospective issuers and develop an approach of general application in finance, where relationships of influence are suspected. Rather than imposing a regression-based framework, we allow relationships to manifest themselves in a data-driven manner. Our analysis reveals nonlinearities between IPO pricing efficiency and the two contribution avenues (justifying the fully nonparametric treatment). We are able to uncover relationships separately according to business sector, which we interpret in terms of varied competitive environments.
Broadening up our scope prior to and after the IPO event, we document that connected firms are associated with a longer time to venture or other equity capital financing, attesting to a greater financial autonomy. Additionally, they attain larger market shares and have a superior likelihood of survival in the public domain
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The value of in-person banking: evidence from U.S. small businesses
We produce the first systematic study of the determinants and implications of in-person banking. Using survey data from the U.S., we show that firms which are informationally opaque or operate in rural areas are liable to contact their primary bank in-person. This tendency extends to older, less educated, and female business owners. We find that a relationship based on face-to-face communication, on average, lasts 17.88 months longer, spans a wider range of financial services, and is more likely to be exclusive. The associated loans mature 3.37 months later and bear interest rates which are 11 basis points lower. For good quality firms, in-person communication also relates to less discouraged borrowing. These results are robust to multiple approaches for endogeneity, including recursive bivariate probits, treatment effect models, and instrumental variables regressions. Overall, our findings offer empirical grounding to soft information theory and a note of caution to banks against suppressing channels of interpersonal communication
Why local banking market concentration hinders IPOs and how it can work to issuers’ advantage
General sample evidence conceals the influence of banking market structure on a fraction of IPO issuers with limited financing options: small non-venture-capital-backed firms (SNVC). Using U.S. county-level data, we reveal that concentrated banking markets contract IPO activity, as they cause SNVCs to incur high underpricing at listing. However, when the size of the local banks is small, both the time to IPO and underpricing decrease. Our evidence infers that, unless banks are organizationally capable of tapping into soft information, they generally use market power for rent extraction, which has important spillover effects on the IPO market
Political connections and IPO underpricing: An efficiency problem
We frame IPO pricing as an efficiency problem for prospective issuers and explore the effect of connections formed via lobbying and PAC (Political Action Committee) contributions. We develop an approach of general application in finance, where relationships of influence are suspected. Rather than imposing a regression-based framework, we allow relationships to manifest themselves in a data-driven manner. Our analysis reveals nonlinearities between IPO pricing efficiency and the two contribution avenues (justifying the fully nonparametric treatment). We are able to uncover relationships separately according to business sector, which we interpret in terms of varied competitive environments
Management earnings forecasts and IPO performance: evidence of a regime change
Companies undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs) in Greece were obliged to include next-year profit forecast in their prospectuses, until the regulation changed in 2001 to voluntary forecasting. Drawing evidence from IPOs issued in the period 1993–2015, this is the first study to investigate the effect of disclosure regime on management earnings forecasts and IPO long-term performance. The findings show mainly positive forecast errors (forecasts are lower than actual earnings) and higher long-term returns during the mandatory period, suggesting that the mandatory disclosure requirement causes issuers to systematically bias profit forecasts downwards as they opt for the safety of accounting conservatism. The mandatory disclosure requirement artificially improves IPO share performance. Overall, our results show that mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts can impede capital market efficiency once it goes beyond historical financial information to involve compulsory projections of future performance
Can we trust the accounting discretion of firms with political money contributions? Evidence from U.S. IPOs
Using hand-collected data from the U.S., we examine the influence of political money contributions (PMC) on IPO financial reporting. Unraveling the conflicting managerial incentives, we develop and test three distinct hypotheses whereby accounting discretion is utilized to downplay, embellish, or truthfully impart the PMC firm’s prospects. Consistent with the last two hypotheses, we document income-increasing reporting. The effects are strongest for firms sensitive to policy outcomes, and least affected by contemporaneous political events. Post-issue analysis shows that at-issue discretionary accruals systematically predict future accounting performance but are unrelated to stock returns. Survival analysis indicates a lower probability of IPO failure. Robust to a battery of checks, our results support the value-relevance of financial information and a novel use of accounting discretion as a means of signaling expected political gains.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe