Consumption decisions and welfare under PSR in Scenario II (<i>ρ</i> > <i>ρ</i>*).

Consumption decisions and welfare under PSR in Scenario II (ρ > ρ*).</p

Impacts of excess information on consumer decisions and welfare when only the high-quality firm provides excess information.

Impacts of excess information on consumer decisions and welfare when only the high-quality firm provides excess information.</p

Consumption decisions and welfare under PSR in Scenario I (<i>ρ</i> < <i>ρ</i>*).

Consumption decisions and welfare under PSR in Scenario I (ρ ρ*).</p

FAH and FAFH are horizontally differentiated.

(DOCX)</p

Market effects of the introduction of PSR with information provision in Case 2.

Market effects of the introduction of PSR with information provision in Case 2.</p

pone.0275800.t001 - Causes and consequences of fake transparency/excess information in food claims

pone.0275800.t001 - Causes and consequences of fake transparency/excess information in food claims</p

pone.0275800.t003 - Causes and consequences of fake transparency/excess information in food claims

pone.0275800.t003 - Causes and consequences of fake transparency/excess information in food claims</p

Impacts of excess information on consumer decisions and welfare when only the low-quality firm provides excess information.

Impacts of excess information on consumer decisions and welfare when only the low-quality firm provides excess information.</p

Equilibrium conditions before portion size reduction (pre-PSR).

Equilibrium conditions before portion size reduction (pre-PSR).</p

pone.0275800.t002 - Causes and consequences of fake transparency/excess information in food claims

pone.0275800.t002 - Causes and consequences of fake transparency/excess information in food claims</p