Economics of intelligent selection of wireless access networks in a market-based framework : a game-theoretic approach

The Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework where network operators offer communications services with competition at the call level. It strives to address a tussle between the actors involved in a heterogeneous wireless access network. However, as with any market-like institution, it is vital to analyze the Digital Marketplace from the strategic perspective to ensure that all shortcomings are removed prior to implementation. In this paper, we analyze the selling mechanism proposed in the Digital Marketplace. The mechanism is based on a procurement first-price sealed-bid auction where the network operators represent the sellers/bidders, and the end-user of a wireless service is the buyer. However, this auction format is somewhat unusual as the winning bid is a composition of both the network operator’s monetary bid and their reputation rating. We create a simple economic model of the auction, and we show that it is mathematically intractable to derive the equilibrium bidding behavior when there are N network operators, and we make only generic assumptions about the structure of the bidding strategies. We then move on to consider a scenario with only two network operators, and assume that network operators use bidding strategies which are linear functions of their costs. This results in the derivation of the equilibrium bidding behavior in that scenario

Lameness in cows affects daily feeding time but not rumination time as characterized from sensors

Lameness in cows affects daily feeding time but not rumination time as characterized from sensors. 3. DairyCare Conferenc

Lameness affects cow feeding but not rumination behaviour as characterised from sensor data

Using automatic sensor data, this is the first study to characterize individual cow feeding and rumination behavior simultaneously as affected by lameness. A group of mixedparity, lactating Holstein cows were loose-housed with free access to 24 cubicles and 12 automatic feed stations. Cows were milked three times/day. Fresh feed was delivered once daily. During 24 days with effectively 22 days of data, 13,908 feed station visits and 7,697 rumination events obtained from neck-mounted accelerometers on 16 cows were analyzed. During the same period, cows were locomotion scored on four occasions and categorized as lame (n = 9) or not lame (n = 7) throughout the study. Rumination time, number of rumination events, feeding time, feeding frequency, feeding rate, feed intake, and milk yield were calculated per day, and coefficients of variation were used to estimate variation between and within cows. Based on daily sums, using each characteristic as response, the effects of lameness and stage of lactation were tested in a mixed model. With rumination time as response, each of the four feeding characteristics, milk yield, and lameness were tested in a second mixed model. On a visit basis, effects of feeding duration, lameness, and milk yield on feed intake were tested in a third mixed model. Overall, intra-individual variation was <15% and inter-individual variation was up to 50%. Lameness introduced more inter-individual variation in feeding characteristics (26–50%) compared to non-lame cows (17–29%). Lameness decreased daily feeding time and daily feeding frequency, but increased daily feeding rate. Interestingly, lameness did not affect daily rumination behaviors, fresh matter intake, or milk yield. On a visit basis, a high feeding rate was associated with a higher feed intake, a relationship that was exacerbated in the lame cows. In conclusion, cows can be characterized in particular by their feeding behavior, and lame cows differ from their non-lame pen-mates in terms of fewer feed station visits, faster eating, less time spent feeding, and more variable feeding behavior. Further, daily rumination time was slightly negatively associated with feeding rate, a relationship which calls for more research to quantify rumination efficiency relative to feeding rate

Economic aspects of intelligent network selection, a game-theoretic approach

Mobile communications has become an indispensable part of our everyday lives, with increasingly more people owning a smartphone, and being given access to a plethora of wireless access technologies: WiFi, 3G, and 4G. In an environment of such diversity, where each wireless access technology has its own distinct characteristics, network selection mechanisms provide an efficient way of handling communications services by matching the services' required quality with the characteristics of a particular access technology. This thesis explores the economic aspects of intelligent network selection in the context of Digital Marketplace - a theoretical market-based framework where network operators compete in a procurement auction-based setting for the right to transport the user's requested service over their infrastructure. It investigates the suitability of a firstprice sealed-bid auction as a network selection mechanism. Since this auction-based mechanism constitutes the main trading mechanism of the Digital Marketplace, the results reported herein affect its feasibility as a market for trading wireless communications services of the future. Since it lacks extensive and rigorous economic analysis, this thesis addresses this deficiency by providing an extensive game theoretic analysis of the network selection mechanism. This thesis creates an economic model of the network selection mechanism, and is the first to characterise the equilibrium bidding behaviour for an arbitrary number of network operators participating in the Digital Marketplace. It proposes three novel numerical methods that allow for numerical derivation of the equilibrium bidding behaviour: forward shooting method (FSM), polynomial projection method (PPM), and extended FSM (EFSM). The FSM and PPM methods allow for numerically approximating equilibrium bidding behaviour for a subset of all possible bidding scenarios, while the EFSM method enables computation of the numerical solution to all bidding scenarios. Finally, since the EFSM method becomes numerically unstable for large number of network operators, a novel methodology for approximating the network selection mechanism with an auction format for which there exist many well-defined and extensively studied numerical solutions is discussed.Mobile communications has become an indispensable part of our everyday lives, with increasingly more people owning a smartphone, and being given access to a plethora of wireless access technologies: WiFi, 3G, and 4G. In an environment of such diversity, where each wireless access technology has its own distinct characteristics, network selection mechanisms provide an efficient way of handling communications services by matching the services' required quality with the characteristics of a particular access technology. This thesis explores the economic aspects of intelligent network selection in the context of Digital Marketplace - a theoretical market-based framework where network operators compete in a procurement auction-based setting for the right to transport the user's requested service over their infrastructure. It investigates the suitability of a firstprice sealed-bid auction as a network selection mechanism. Since this auction-based mechanism constitutes the main trading mechanism of the Digital Marketplace, the results reported herein affect its feasibility as a market for trading wireless communications services of the future. Since it lacks extensive and rigorous economic analysis, this thesis addresses this deficiency by providing an extensive game theoretic analysis of the network selection mechanism. This thesis creates an economic model of the network selection mechanism, and is the first to characterise the equilibrium bidding behaviour for an arbitrary number of network operators participating in the Digital Marketplace. It proposes three novel numerical methods that allow for numerical derivation of the equilibrium bidding behaviour: forward shooting method (FSM), polynomial projection method (PPM), and extended FSM (EFSM). The FSM and PPM methods allow for numerically approximating equilibrium bidding behaviour for a subset of all possible bidding scenarios, while the EFSM method enables computation of the numerical solution to all bidding scenarios. Finally, since the EFSM method becomes numerically unstable for large number of network operators, a novel methodology for approximating the network selection mechanism with an auction format for which there exist many well-defined and extensively studied numerical solutions is discussed

Approximating equilibrium in the digital marketplace

Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework for trading mobile communications services at a service level. It is well suited for managing a future mobile communications environment where the one-to-one mapping between network operators and subscribers no longer holds, and the subscribers are given the option to select a network operator and a wireless access technology that matches their preferences best at a service level. As with any market-based framework, it is important to analyse the selling mechanism from the economic perspective. In this paper, we address the deficiencies of previous research on the economic equilibrium of the Digital Marketplace. We achieve this by proposing an approximation to the equilibrium of the Digital Marketplace through the use of an auction with common prior

Economic aspects of intelligent network selection : a game-theoretic approach

The Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework where network operators offer communications services with competition at the call level. It strives to address a tussle between the actors involved in a heterogeneous wireless access network. However, as with any market-like institution, it is vital to analyse the Digital Marketplace from the strategic perspective to ensure that all shortcomings are removed prior to implementation. This paper presents some preliminary results of such an analysis

Auction-based network selection in a market-based framework for trading wireless communications services

Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework in which a network selection mechanism is facilitated through a variant of procurement first-price sealed-bid auction; that is, wireless network operators bid for the right to transport the subscriber’s requested service over their infrastructure. In this paper, we create an economic model of this mechanism, and characterize the equilibrium under generic assumptions about the costs distributions of the network operators. Furthermore, the equilibrium is explicitly derived under more specific assumptions about the model; that is, two network operators and costs drawn from uniform distributions. In this case, we also characterize the expected prices the subscriber has to pay depending on their preferences about the service; for example, trading off quality for a lower price. Finally, we provide a numerical analysis of the case with more than two network operators

Traffic generation of IEC 61850 sampled values

The work presented in this paper is targeted at the first phase of the test and measurements product life cycle, namely standardisation. During this initial phase of any product, the emphasis is on the development of standards that support new technologies while leaving the scope of implementations as open as possible. To allow the engineer to freely create and invent tools that can quickly help him simulate or emulate his ideas are paramount. Within this scope, a traffic generation system has been developed for IEC 61850 Sampled Values which will help in the evaluation of the data models, data acquisition, data fusion, data integration and data distribution between the various devices and components that use this complex set of evolving standards in Smart Grid systems