183 research outputs found

    Public Goods Agreements with Other-Regarding Preferences

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    Why cooperation occurs when noncooperation appears to be individually rational has been an issue in economics for at least a half century. In the 1960’s and 1970’s the context was cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game; in the 1980’s concern shifted to voluntary provision of public goods; in the 1990’s, the literature on coalition formation for public goods provision emerged, in the context of coalitions to provide transboundary pollution abatement. The problem is that theory suggests fairly low (even zero) levels of contributions to the public good and high levels of free riding. Experiments and empirical evidence suggests higher levels of cooperation. This is a major reason for the emergence in the 1990’s and more recently of the literature on other-regarding preferences (also known as social preferences). Such preferences tend to involve higher levels of cooperation (though not always). This paper contributes to the literature on coalitions, public good provision and other-regarding preferences. For standard preferences, the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to investing in the public good must be greater than one for contributing to be individually rational. We find that Charness-Rabin preferences tend to reduce this threshold for individual contributions. We also find that Charness-Rabin preferences reduce the equilibrium size of a coalition of agents formed to provide the public good. In contrast to much of the literature, we treat the wealth of agents as heterogeneous. In such cases, we find that transfers among agents of the coalition may be necessary to sustain cooperation (regardless of the nature of preferences). An example drawn from experiments is provided as an illustration of the effectiveness of social preferences.

    Computing Cournot-Nash equilibria / 1441

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    Includes bibliographical references (p. 22-23)

    USING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO CONTROL POLLUTION IN RUSSIA

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    This paper investigates Russia's system of environmental management, especially economic tools used to control pollution. It also describes the Russian experience with a system of pollution fees. In particular, we consider how the system of pollution fees works, how fee levels are set, the incentive properties of the fees, and the ultimate use to the Russian government of the revenue from the emission fees. Although the emission fees are quite substantial for some pollutants, the incentive properties of the fees are almost nonexistent. The primary purpose of pollution fees is to generate funds for state-owned enterprises to invest in pollution abatement equipment. This is substantially different from the operation of a pollution fee in the West.Environmental Economics and Policy,

    Foreign Direct Investment, Exchange Rate Variability and Demand Uncertainty

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    Variable real exchange rates influence the country choice for location of production facilities by a multinational enterprise. With risk averse investors and fixed productive factors, a parent company should not be indifferent to the choice of production capacity location, even when the expected costs of production are identical across countries. If a non-negative correlation exists between real export demand shocks and real exchange rate shocks, the multinational will optimally locate some of its productive capacity abroad. The share of production capacity optimally located abroad increases as exchange rate volatility rises and as export demand shocks become more correlated. These theoretical results are confirmed by empirical analysis of quarterly United States bilateral foreign-direct- investment flows with Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

    Regulatory Choice with Pollution and Innovation

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    This paper develops a simple model of a polluting industry and an innovating firm. The polluting industry is faced with regulation and costly abatement. Regulation may be taxes or marketable permits. The innovating firm invests in R&D and develops technologies which reduce the cost of pollution abatement. The innovating firm can patent this innovation and use a licensing fee to generate revenue. In a world of certainty, the first best level of innovation and abatement can be supported by either a pollution tax or a marketable permit. However, the returns to the innovator from innovation are not the same under the two regimes. A marketable permit system allows the innovator to capture all of the gains to innovation; a tax system involves sharing the gains of innovation between the innovator and the polluting industry.

    Bayesian learning, growth, and pollution

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    Environmental problems, such as climate change, have great uncertainties. Current expectations are that uncertainties about climate change will be resolved quickly. We examine this hypothesis theoretically and computationally. We consider Bayesian learning about the relationship between greenhouse gas levels and global mean temperature changes, a key uncertainty. Learning is non-trivial because of a stochastic shock to the realized temperature. We find theoretically the expected learning time, which is related to the variance of the shock and the emissions policy, implying a tradeoff between the benefits of controlling emissions and information. We imbed the learning model into an optimal growth model with a climate sector and solve the resulting dynamic program. We find computationally that learning takes on average over 90 yr, far longer tha
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