Informational lobbying in the European Union: Explaining information supply to the European Commission

Information supply is an important instrument through which interest groups can exert influence on political decisions. However, information supply to decision-makers varies extensively across interest groups. How can this be explained? Why do some interest groups provide more information than others? I argue that variation in information supply can largely be explained by organizational characteristics, more specifically the resources, the functional differentiation, the professionalization and the decentralization of interest groups. I test my theoretical expectations based on a large new dataset: Using multilevel modeling, I examine information supply to the European Commission across 56 policy issues and a wide range of interest groups by combining an analysis of consultation submissions with a survey conducted among interest groups

Framing policy debates in the EU: new techniques to answer old questions

This talk was presented at the 5th ESRC Research Methods Festival in July 2012

Etude experimentale de l'effet d'echelle sur le rayonnement acoustique des propulseurs a poudre

Communication to : 3eme Congres francais d'acoustique, Toulouse (FRANCE), 2-6 mai 1994SIGLEAvailable at INIST (FR), Document Supply Service, under shelf-number : 22419, issue : a.1994 n.84 / INIST-CNRS - Institut de l'Information Scientifique et TechniqueFRFranc