The Journey of Transitioning: Being a Trans-Athlete in College Sport

The NCAA’s stance on transgender athletes is such that universities should adopt new policies and practices to best provide equal opportunities for all transgender students wishing to compete on a collegiate athletic team. However, there is very little research about transgender athletes in college sport. This case study serves as the voice of one collegiate-athlete who is transitioning from female to male while continuing to be a Division I athlete. The limited research on transgender athletes provides some insight into their experiences before, during and after the athlete came out as transgender (e.g., Lucas-Carr & Krane, 2012; Semerjian & Cohen, 2008). However, these accounts were not given as they were happening, they were reported after the fact. This study followed one transgender athlete through his transition, which included social transition and testosterone therapy and treatment. The participant partook in eight semi-structured interviews spread across nine months. This article discusses two overarching themes (collegiate sport and transition) that emerged from our narrative analysis (Smith & Sparkes, 2009) and touches on many smaller subthemes. The implications of this study will be of interest not only to researchers, but also university administrators, coaches, and teammates of individuals who transition during their collegiate career. The participant’s description of his journey throughout the transitioning process will provide important, in depth narratives for all to consider moving forward

Comment: The Project of Freedom

A person’s status may change over time and people should have the right to maximize their autonomy and learn and grow from their experiences. Legal structures must encourage autonomy and growth, rather than producing a static environment that prevents people from challenging external controls imposed upon their lives. Law can create legal structures that sustain an individual’s right to live according to their values. As Ms. Rosen writes, “[i]f an individual is capable of valuing, the wishes stemming from those values should dictate how the individual ought to be treated.” By protecting those values, Ms. Rosen’s Note advises us how the law can be a stronger tool for the project of freedom. The choice of whether to use that tool is ours

Meaningless Guarantees: Comment on Mitchell E. McCloy’s “Blind Justice: Virginia’s Jury Sentencing Scheme and Impermissible Burdens on a Defendant’s Right to a Jury Trial”

Despite the important role that jurors play in the American criminal justice system, jurors are often deprived of critical information that might help them make sense of the law their oaths require them to follow. Such information with regard to sentencing might include the unavailability of parole, geriatric release, sentencing guidelines, or other information that is relevant to determining a defendant’s penalty. Withholding information from juries, particularly in sentencing, risks unjust and inequitable sentences. Keeping jurors in the dark perpetuates injustices and undermines public confidence and trust in the justice system. Mitch McCloy’s excellent Note provides a compelling illustration of this problem in jury sentencing in Virginia. Until very recently, when criminal defendants in Virginia exercised their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, they had been sentenced by that jury in a bifurcated trial system. Although the trial judge provides the jury with information about the statutory minimum and maximum sentences, Virginia law provides that juries are not allowed to receive any information about Virginia’s sentencing guidelines. The jury may not offer recommendations about whether sentences should be suspended or run concurrently or consecutively. Part I of this Comment discusses Mr. McCloy’s findings, analysis, and ultimate conclusions. Part II briefly explores two significant questions that arise from Mr. McCloy’s Note: the consequences of recognizing rights without meaningful enforcement and the problem of jurors’ preference for harsher sentences. This Comment concludes by offering some final thoughts on the necessary work to make our justice system live up to the promise of “Equal Justice Under Law.

Meaningless Guarantees: Comment on Mitchell E. McCloy\u27s “Blind Justice: Virginia\u27s Jury Sentencing Scheme and Impermissible Burdens on a Defendant\u27s Right to a Jury Trial

Despite the important role that jurors play in the American criminal justice system, jurors are often deprived of critical information that might help them make sense of the law their oaths require them to follow. Such information with regard to sentencing might include the unavailability of parole, geriatric release, sentencing guidelines, or other information that is relevant to determining a defendant\u27s penalty. Withholding information from juries, particularly in sentencing, risks unjust and inequitable sentences. Keeping jurors in the dark perpetuates injustices and undermines public confidence and trust in the justice system. Mitch McCloy\u27s excellent Note provides a compelling illustration of this problem in jury sentencing in Virginia. Until very recently, when criminal defendants in Virginia exercised their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, they had been sentenced by that jury in a bifurcated trial system. Although the trial judge provides the jury with information about the statutory minimum and maximum sentences, Virginia law provides that juries are not allowed to receive any information about Virginia\u27s sentencing guidelines. The jury may not offer recommendations about whether sentences should be suspended or run concurrently or consecutively. These sentencing practices led, unsurprisingly, to inequitable results: defendants who exercised their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial tended to receive far harsher sentences than defendants who waived that right and selected a bench trial. Mr. McCloy\u27s Note thoroughly evaluates the statutory and constitutional dimensions of this problem. Mr. McCloy\u27s Note is an exceptional piece of scholarship as well as a useful tool for academics, legislators, practitioners, and judges to understand the complexities of Virginia\u27s sentencing scheme. It is a compelling demonstration of inequity in Virginia\u27s criminal justice system that offers several practical solutions. Part I of this Comment discusses Mr. McCloy\u27s findings, analysis, and ultimate conclusions. Part II briefly explores two significant questions that arise from Mr. McCloy\u27s Note: the consequences of recognizing rights without meaningful enforcement and the problem of jurors\u27 preference for harsher sentences. This Comment concludes by offering some final thoughts on the necessary work to make our justice system live up to the promise of Equal Justice Under Law

When Police Volunteer to Kill

The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of lethal injection, yet states continue to struggle with drug shortages and botched executions. Some states have authorized alternative methods of execution, including the firing squad. Utah, which has consistently carried out firing squad executions throughout its history, relies on police officers from the jurisdiction where the crime took place to volunteer to carry out these executions. This represents a plausible--and probable--method for other states in conducting firing squad executions. Public and academic discussion of the firing squad has centered on questions of pain and suffering. It has not engaged with the consequences of relying on police officers as executioners. Police participation in executions deserves the same scrutiny as physician participation in executions. Using police officers as executioners is inconsistent with the normative and idealized functions of policing, but consistent with the culture and powers of policing. This Article explores the potential consequences of using police officers as executioners. Relying on police officers as executioners will destabilize policing because it encourages negative aspects of policing culture and undermines officers\u27 ability to work within their communities. This practice also risks adding impermissible features to executions, further undermining the retributive justifications for capital punishment. Using police officers from the jurisdiction where the crime occurred has a significant association with retributive and expressive functions of punishment. Pain alone should not be the primary way to assess the constitutionality of an execution. The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that fails to serve legitimate purposes. The Supreme Court has justified capital punishment as an expression of a community\u27s moral outrage and a way to preserve the legitimacy of the justice system by preventing vigilantism and mob violence. This means that punishment must not be undertaken in a way that endorses vigilantism and vengeance. Relying on police officers as executioners in firing squads illustrates that the search for a less painful method of execution may not be without its own serious constitutional defects

Meaningless Guarantees: Comment on Mitchell E. McCloy\u27s “Blind Justice: Virginia\u27s Jury Sentencing Scheme and Impermissible Burdens on a Defendant\u27s Right to a Jury Trial

Despite the important role that jurors play in the American criminal justice system, jurors are often deprived of critical information that might help them make sense of the law their oaths require them to follow. Such information with regard to sentencing might include the unavailability of parole, geriatric release, sentencing guidelines, or other information that is relevant to determining a defendant\u27s penalty. Withholding information from juries, particularly in sentencing, risks unjust and inequitable sentences. Keeping jurors in the dark perpetuates injustices and undermines public confidence and trust in the justice system. Mitch McCloy\u27s excellent Note provides a compelling illustration of this problem in jury sentencing in Virginia. Until very recently, when criminal defendants in Virginia exercised their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, they had been sentenced by that jury in a bifurcated trial system. Although the trial judge provides the jury with information about the statutory minimum and maximum sentences, Virginia law provides that juries are not allowed to receive any information about Virginia\u27s sentencing guidelines. The jury may not offer recommendations about whether sentences should be suspended or run concurrently or consecutively. These sentencing practices led, unsurprisingly, to inequitable results: defendants who exercised their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial tended to receive far harsher sentences than defendants who waived that right and selected a bench trial. Mr. McCloy\u27s Note thoroughly evaluates the statutory and constitutional dimensions of this problem. Mr. McCloy\u27s Note is an exceptional piece of scholarship as well as a useful tool for academics, legislators, practitioners, and judges to understand the complexities of Virginia\u27s sentencing scheme. It is a compelling demonstration of inequity in Virginia\u27s criminal justice system that offers several practical solutions. Part I of this Comment discusses Mr. McCloy\u27s findings, analysis, and ultimate conclusions. Part II briefly explores two significant questions that arise from Mr. McCloy\u27s Note: the consequences of recognizing rights without meaningful enforcement and the problem of jurors\u27 preference for harsher sentences. This Comment concludes by offering some final thoughts on the necessary work to make our justice system live up to the promise of Equal Justice Under Law

The Freedom to Pursue a Common Calling: Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Occupational Licensing Statutes

After the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the monks at St. Joseph Abbey in Louisiana sought a new source of income. They began producing simple wooden coffins priced at much lower rates than caskets sold in funeral homes. After the Abbey had made a large investment in its business, St. Joseph Woodworks, the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors ordered it to close. Although the monks did not provide funeral or embalming services, a Louisiana statute regulating the funeral industry prohibited the monks from selling coffins. Under the statute, funeral directing included any service whatsoever connected with... the purchase of caskets or other funeral merchandise.” The statute additionally specified that only licensed funeral directors operating out of duly licensed Louisiana funeral establishment [s] could engage in funeral directing. Even though Louisiana did not require a casket for burial, nor did any law prevent a customer from building his own or purchasing one out of state, the monks were unable to sell their caskets in Louisiana. Obtaining the necessary credentials was both cost and time prohibitive, leaving the monks out of business. They sought relief from the legislature without success before turning to the courts. The problem St. Joseph Abbey faced is one that many individuals attempting to enter a profession or open a new business share: occupational licensing

The Beginning of the End: Abolishing Capital Punishment in Virginia

When thinking about the history of capital punishment in the United States, I suspect that the average person is likely to identify Texas as the state that has played the most significant role in the death penalty. The state of Texas has killed more than five hundred people in executions since the Supreme Court approved of states’ modified capital punishment schemes in 1976. By contrast, Virginia has executed 113 people since 1976. But Virginia has played a significant role in the history of capital punishment. After all, the first recorded execution in Colonial America took place in 1608 at Jamestown, when Captain George Kendall was shot to death by a firing squad. Virginia has officially executed 1,390 people, more than any other state.6 I write officially, because Virginia, like many other states also has a history of extrajudicial executions through lynching. The Equal Justice Initiative has calculated that between 1877 and 1950, eighty-four people were lynched in Virginia. Lynchings were arguably a form of “extrajudicial execution” because they frequently involved either the deliberate ignorance or enthusiastic cooperation of local officials and were tools of social control, just like legislatively enacted capital punishment. Over four hundred years since Captain Kendall died at Jamestown, Virginia has decided to end its brutal regime of capital punishment. This is a truly historic moment. Virginia will be the first southern state, as well as the first state of the group of eleven states that seceded and formed the Confederate States of America during the Civil War to do so

Only to Have a Say in the Way He Dies : Bodily Autonomy and Methods of Execution

Capital punishment is one of the most significant intrusions into a person\u27s bodily autonomy; the state takes a person\u27s life. Even though the state has stripped a person on death row of much of their autonomy and intends to kill them, removing all autonomy, a person sentenced to death may, in some circumstances, choose how they will die. While most states rely on a single method of execution, some states permit a condemned person to choose among two or more methods of execution. Constitutional challenges to methods of execution requires the challenger to demonstrate a substantial risk of severe pain that can be alleviated by an alternative method of execution. This Article explores the contradictions of bodily autonomy in executions. Choosing among method of executions is an illusory exercise of bodily autonomy. No matter the method, it is still a choice among deaths, conflicting with the crucial bodily autonomy interest of living. Statutes or precedent that permit a choice among methods of execution produce an illusion of autonomy, but ultimately serve state interests and strengthen the institution of capital punishment. Yet sometimes a choice among methods of execution or a choice about how a person dies reflect genuine exercises of bodily autonomy interests, such as avoiding pain, dignity, preserving bodily integrity, or sending expressive messages. These actions deserve recognition as exercises of bodily autonomy that may temporarily break through the grant of illusory autonomy. This Article identifies exercises of bodily autonomy in executions and analyzes some of the ways legislatures, courts, and corrections agencies render these choices illusory

A Few Words for the Firing Squad (editorial)

South Carolina’s governor has signed into law a bill adding the firing squad as one of the methods of execution that a person sentenced to death must choose between if lethal injection drugs are unavailable. This editorial discusses the inherent issues with the bill