A tradeable obligation approach to the CRA

Community Reinvestment Act of 1977

An Economic Analysis of Bank Regulatory Reform: The Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991

This Article analyzes the interaction between the bank regulatory system and the market for financial services and examines the ways in which bank regulation affected profitability and risk-taking both before and after 1980. The Article focuses on the range of business strategies available to banks during each period and the incentives operating on bank shareholders and managers in selecting from available strategies. The Article suggests that although banks have always been subject to restrictions in the services they may provide, before 1980 those restrictions did not prevent banks from adopting profitable, low-risk business strategies. Indeed, the bank regulatory system induced banks to adopt such strategies. As a result of changes in financial services markets that began in the mid-1970s, however, the profitability of legally permissible low-risk strategies declined for many banks. The deposit insurance system\u27s implicit subsidy of risk-taking consequently became more attractive to bank shareholders and managers than it had been in past. The Article then suggests the type of regulatory reform that is necessary in order to allow banks to operate effectively in the modem market for financial services. Finally, the Article discusses the ways in which FISCCA would respond to the need for reform

The Distribution of Patterns in Random Trees

Let $T\_n$ denote the set of unrooted labeled trees of size $n$ and let $T\_n$ be a particular (finite, unlabeled) tree. Assuming that every tree of $T\_n$ is equally likely, it is shown that the limiting distribution as $n$ goes to infinity of the number of occurrences of $M$ as an induced subtree is asymptotically normal with mean value and variance asymptotically equivalent to $\mu n$ and $\sigma^2n$, respectively, where the constants $\mu>0$ and $\sigma\ge 0$ are computable

Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases

Part I of this Article reviews our prior analysis of increasing returns in corporate contract terms. Within the rubric of increasing returns, we discuss learning and network externalities in corporate contracts. Parts II and III examine how agency costs and behavioral biases can lead to standardization