Revenue allocation in Formula One: a pairwise comparison approach

A model is proposed to allocate Formula One World Championship prize money among the constructors. The methodology is based on pairwise comparison matrices, allows for the use of any weighting method, and makes possible to tune the level of inequality. We introduce an axiom called scale invariance, which requires the ranking of the teams to be independent of the parameter controlling inequality. The eigenvector method is revealed to violate this condition in our dataset, while the row geometric mean method always satisfies it. The revenue allocation is not influenced by the arbitrary valuation given to the race prizes in the official points scoring system of Formula One and takes the intensity of pairwise preferences into account, contrary to the standard Condorcet method. Our approach can be used to share revenues among groups when group members are ranked several times.Comment: 19 pages, 3 figures, 6 table

Indikatorenbasierte Länderrankings

Rankings of countries have become of great interest to the business community, governments and academics. They provide single and composite indicators on the competitiveness and growth prospects of countries. This article presents the rankings of the World Economic Forum, the International Institute for Management Development, the Fraser Institute, the Heritage Foundation and the Bertelsmann Foundation. We conclude that although the rankings provide useful information their methodology is in general rudimentary and calls for further improvement. Government policy should be cautious when drawing conclusions from such rankings. Copyright 2008 die Autoren Journal compilation 2008, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Regulation and shadow economy: empirical evidence for 25 OECD-countries

Regulation, Quality of institutions, Shadow economy, Underground economy, Random effects models, O17, K42, J22, H26,