Termination of closed end funds and behavior of their discounts

Based on an extensive sample of U.S. closed-end funds undergoing open-ending, we examine the behavior of discounts prior to the announcement till open-ending. Discounts are significantly reduced upon announcement of open-ending with price increase. Announcement period return is directly related to the pre-announcement discount, and other hypothesized characteristics of the fund and investor behavior. The role of investor sentiments as an explanator of discounts is weaker after announcement. We decompose the pre-announcement discount into structural and idiosyncratic parts, and report that there is a greater reduction of the idiosyncratcic part of the discount at announcement. Time series behavior of discounts lends support to investor confidence. We find that small amounts of discounts remain at the time of the open-ending.Closed-end funds, open-ending, discounts, investor sentiment.

Modeling the fat tails in Asian stock markets

We test whether stock returns in the Asian markets are characterized by infinite variance or just large variance, which has an important implication for the applicability of many financial models in Asian market data. Employing the extreme value framework, we find that the Asian index return distributions are fat-tailed but have finite variance. However, the tails of the distributions behave similarly to those in the U.S. and the MSCI World index returns, suggesting that any financial model or risk management tool that incorporates the second moment would work equally well for the Asian market data as it does for developed market data. We apply the Value-at-Risk method using Asian and U.S. data and find no significant difference in performance.Asian stock markets Fat tails Value-at-Risk

Does Delaware Incorporation Affect Executive Compensation? An Empirical Analysis

Motivated by agency theory, this study attempts to ascertain whether chief executive compensation is influenced by legal rules. In particular, we analyze whether Delaware law has an impact on CEO pay. Legal rules have been argued to impact agency conflicts. Agency costs, in turn, affect CEO compensation. Thus, we contend that Delaware law influences CEO pay through their associations with agency problems. The empirical evidence corroborates this hypothesis, showing that Delaware firms pay their CEOs significantly more generously than do non-Delaware firms (about 36% higher in total compensation). Furthermore, Delaware firms exhibit significantly lower pay-performance sensitivity (almost 50% lower), implying that the higher pay more likely reflects rent expropriation rather than shareholder wealth maximization

Electronic versus open outcry trading in agricultural commodities futures markets

The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) introduced side by side trading of its agricultural futures commodities in August 2006. We analyze and compare market quality conditions in corn, soybeans, and wheat futures when these contracts trade simultaneously on open outcry and electronic trading venues. We find that volume migrates from floor trading to electronic trading and transaction costs are higher for floor than for screen-based trading. Nonetheless, we observe that both trading venues contribute significantly to price discovery. Given the recent surge in volatility in commodities futures markets, we also investigate activity variables such as volume that can help explain volatility in the two different trading platforms. We find that for agricultural commodities, variables that help describe volatility are not characteristic of the type of trading venue.Corn Commodity futures Market quality Soybeans Wheat