Lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the United States

The authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data. The authors test the model using a detailed cross-sectional data set of agricultural protection, subsidies, and political action committee (PAC) contributions in the late 1990s. The model is qualitatively affirmed by the data. They make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model's quantitative implications, also found in recent studies. This solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decisionmaking process in real world government. The results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge.Economic Theory&Research,Free Trade,Consumption,Markets and Market Access,Technology Industry

The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches

In order to explain the prevalence and persistence of trade protection, a large body of work that departs from the notion of welfare maximizing governments and emphasizes instead political-economic determinants of policy has recently emerged. This survey paper summarizes and evaluates analytically the empirical component of this literature. We discuss a broad set of empirical findings which provide a convincing confirmation of the presence and significance of political economy influences. We also discuss some puzzles and controversies that have emerged in recent work.

Trade Barriers As Bargaining Outcomes

Whether bilateral trade barrier data conform with the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model’s predictions about “trade talks” is examined in this article. A simple form of the prediction from the model is tested. Bilateral US-Japan and US-EU data from the 1990s are employed. The results are the first in the literature.Trade talks equilibrium; Nontariff barriers;

The structure of lobbying and protection in U.S. agriculture

The author surveys the empirical literature on the political economy of agricultural protection. He uses a detailed data set of agricultural Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions over five U.S. congressional election cycles over the 1991-2000 period to investigate the relationship between lobbying spending and agricultural protection. A detailed graphical analysis of campaign contributions by the agricultural PACs indicates that although there are very many PACs, in most sectors the majority of contributions are made by very few PACs. Econometric analysis reveals that lobbying spending by agricultural PACs is positively associated with the use of nontariff barriers and specific tariffs by the United States. There is a strong association between the average U.S. tariff on goods that benefit from U.S. export subsidies and lobbying spending. And there is no association between agricultural protection and trade measures such as import penetration and the export-to-output ratio.Economic Theory&Research,Politics and Government,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,Wetlands,ICT Policy and Strategies

Underlying dimensions of knowledge assessment : factor analysis of the knowledge assessment methodology data

The Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) database measures variables that may be used to assess the readiness of countries for the knowledge economy and has many policy uses. Formal analysis using KAM data is faced with the problem of which variables to choose and why. Rather than make these decisions in an ad hoc manner, the authors recommend factor-analytic methods to distill the information contained in the many KAM variables into a smaller set of"factors."Their main objective is to quantify the factors for each country, and to do so in a way that allows comparisons of the factor scores over time. The authors investigate both principal components as well as true factor analytic methods, and emphasize simple structures that help provide a clear political-economic meaning of the factors, but also allow comparisons over time.Statistical&Mathematical Sciences,Econometrics,Economic Theory&Research,Education for Development (superceded),Innovation

Determinants of trade policy responses to the 2008 financial crisis

The collapse in trade and contraction of output that occurred during 2008-09 was comparable to, and in many countries more severe than, the Great Depression of 1930, but did not give rise to the rampant protectionism that followed the Great Crash. Theory suggests several hypotheses for why it was not in the interest of many firms to lobby for protection, including much greater macroeconomic"policy space"today, the rise of intra-industry trade (specialization in specific varieties), and the fragmentation of production across global value chains ("vertical"specialization and the associated growth of trade in intermediates). Institutions may also have played a role in limiting the extent of protectionist responses. World Trade Organization disciplines raise the cost of using trade policies for member countries and have proved to be a stable foundation for the open multilateral trading system that has been built over the last fifty years. This paper empirically examines the power of these and other theories to explain the observed pattern of trade policy responses to the 2008 crisis, using trade and protection data for seven large emerging market countries that have a history of active use of trade policy. Vertical specialization (global fragmentation) is found to be the most powerful economic factor determining trade policy responses.Free Trade,Trade Policy,Economic Theory&Research,International Trade and Trade Rules,Debt Markets

Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy

In popular discussion much has been made recently of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners. The general presumption has also been that such interactions have a deleterious effect on the home economy. However, it can be argued that, in a trade policy context, bending policy in a direction that would suit foreigners may not in fact be harmful: If the policy outcome absent any lobbying by foreigners is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, lobbying by foreigners may result in reductions in such barriers and raise consumer surplus (and possibly improve welfare). Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the US, this paper investigates the relationship between trade protection and lobbying activity empirically. The approach taken in this paper is primarily a structural one. To model the role of foreign and domestic lobbies in determining trade policy, we develop first a theoretical framework building on the well-known work of Grossman and Helpman (1994); the econometric work that follows is very closely linked to the theory. Our analysis of the data suggests that foreign lobbying activity has significant impact on trade policy - and in the predicted direction: Tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity. We consider also extended specifications in which we include a large number of additional explanatory variables that have been suggested in the literature as determinants of trade policy (but that emerge from outside of the theoretical structure described above) and confirm the robustness of our findings in this setting.

Governance and Performance: Theory-Based Evidence from US Coast Guard Inspections

Given three stylized facts about the US Coast Guard (USCG), namely, soft penalties for safety violations, low incidence of penalties relative to the number of violations, and substantial resources devoted to inspections of vessels, this paper seeks (i) a theoretical lens to view USCG activities and (ii) an empirical assessment of whether those activities improve performance. Harrington’s (1988) model is motivated by these stylized facts about US regulation in general, and provides a solution via targeting of good and poor performers. The model generates hypotheses about optimal regulation in the context of pollution prevention activities of the USCG. An organization-level panel data set consisting of thousands of US flag tank barges is constructed to test those hypotheses. A count model that controls for vessel heterogeneity yields mixed evidence. If USCG inspections are considered exogenous variables (as the theory presumes), they appear to prevent pollution spills. But if inspections are endogenous and respond to previous spills then correcting for endogeneity reverses the earlier result. In addition, violations are found to be good predictors of pollution occurrences, suggesting that inspections are not as effective as they could be. Targeting as in Harrington’s model therefore appears to be incomplete, and the findings suggest that more complete targeting could increase performance. An interesting finding is that stronger penalties could increase performance.Harrington model; Inspections; Penalties; Oil Spills; USCG;

Can foreign lobbying enhance development ? The case of tourism in the Caribbean

There exist legal channels for informational lobbying of U.S. policymakers by foreign principals. Foreign governments and private sector principals frequently and intensively use this institutional channel to lobby on trade and tourism issues. The authors empirically study whether such lobbying effectively achieves its goal of trade promotion in the context of Caribbean tourism and it is the first paper to examine the potential for using foreign lobbying as a vehicle for development. They use panel data to explore and quantify the association between foreign lobbying by Caribbean principals and U.S. tourist arrivals to Caribbean destinations. A variety of sensitivity analyses support the finding of a strong association. The policy implications are obvious and potentially important for developing countries.Tourism and Ecotourism,Economic Theory&Research,Accommodation&Tourism Industry,Political Systems and Analysis,Politics and Government

What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade

Policymaking power enables governments to redistribute income to powerful interests in society. However, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others. This government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political, and institutional factors. Trade policy, being fundamentally redistributive, provides a valuable context in which the welfare-mindedness of governments may be empirically evaluated. This article investigates quantitatively the welfare-mindedness of governments and attempts to understand these political and institutional determinants of the differences in government behavior across countrie