Zaire after Mobutu A Case of a Humanitarian Emergency

The recent history of Zaire presents a unique opportunity to understand and explain humanitarian emergencies. This monograph follows an inductive approach in analysing the trajectory of state-building in Zaire as a significant explanatory variable of humanitarian emergencies. By tracing the sources of vulnerability to the colonial legacy, this study shows that Mobutu's rentier state was a vulnerable institution, providing little foundation for a strong state. The concentration of power in the hands of one man weakened the economic base of state-building. The end of the cold war with its democratization wave only accelerated the demise of the rentier state. The analysis suggests that the ruling elite in Zaire saw the democratization process as a threat to its power, social status, and retirement security and was therefore willing to see the remains of the state be totally destroyed rather than bailed it out. By opening up the political system, democratization increased political demands that overloaded the system. The result was a breakdown of the social system and a rise of humanitarian emergencies. Although the statistical analysis is confined to Zaire, the implications of the study's findings extend beyond this particular country. The findings first suggest that the inability of a political regime to adapt to new challenges is a major source of humanitarian emergencies. A social system needs to adapt to changing circumstances. Second, a growing economy that enhances regional integration and rural productivity as well as sound policies that minimize elite polarization and state economic intervention are likely to decrease the chance of humanitarian emergencies. Third, mass mobilization, in the absence of adequate institutional arrangements to handle increased demands, tends to polarize the society and increase the chance of humanitarian emergencies in plural societies. Fourth, political sources of vulnerability indicate that state penetration and the capacity to protect territorial boundaries should reduce humanitarian emergencies. Moreover, political instability is also a major political source of vulnerability in cross-regression. Zaire remains a critical case in Central Africa, given the volatility of Burundi and Rwanda. The international community must avoid all steps that could threaten its shrinking capacities. A fragmented Zaire would complicate any effort for a lasting peace in Central and East Africa. The international community should now direct considerable attention and resources toward strengthening the African civil society, and increasing recognition and respect for basic human rights and freedom. Still, solutions must come from within and be Zairian mandated to have lasting effect. Grassroots solutions should constitute the first preventive tool to avert humanitarian tragedies, because a lasting peace is possible only if it is embedded in local values. Nonetheless, the international community has a moral obligation to protect human life by making state leaders who violate human rights accountable for their actions and by promoting grassroots organizations capable of monitoring government performance. National sovereignty should no longer be an excuse to sacrifice human life, dignity, and freedom

Replication data for: Diverting with Benevolent Military Force

Research on the diversionary use of force has burgeoned in recent years, but the literature remains divided. This paper attempts to reconcile extant findings by advancing a new theoretical framework for diversionary force centered on the agenda setting literature. It expands the conventional conception of diversionary behavior and distinguishes the benevolent use of force over low politics issues (which we term socio-economic intervention, SEI) from belligerent force used over high politics issues (which we term politico-strategic intervention, PSI). This expansion also refines our understanding of strategic conflict avoidance (SCA). Using Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression on 140 countries from 1950 to 1996, we find that democracies and mixed regimes tend to use SEI for diversion even though strategic conflict avoidance does not prevent them from using PSI. We further find that autocracies do not externalize their internal problems with either type of armed force and that, surprisingly, strategic conflict avoidance may constrain autocracies suffering economic decline. These outcomes suggest that our theory has utility and that research on both diversion and SCA would benefit from further theoretical refinement

Rebels, Rivals, and Post-colonial State-Building: Identifying Bellicist Influences on State Extractive Capability

A recent, notable strain of empirical research argues that postcolonial state-building follows a pattern similar to the European state-building experience. It acknowledges that war is less common today, but contends that interstate rivalry now drives state-building. We argue that postcolonial state-managers have little reason to build state capacity in response to rival states. There is only a slight chance that these rivalries will escalate into an existential threat for the government. Attention should instead be focused on the more tangible threat posed by transnational rebels and postcolonial governments’ use of low-scale military force to combat such non-state actors. Using interrupted time series methodology on a sample of 72 countries from 1972 to 2002, we find that postcolonial state military intervention against transnational rebels increases direct taxes (a measure of state penetration) and non-tax revenue (state autonomy) collected by governments, while intervention against rival states reduces direct taxation

Institutional stepping stones for democracy: how and why multipartyism enhances democratic change

cholars of electoral authoritarianism and comparative institutions have emphasized how authoritarian regimes implement multiparty elections to stabilize authoritarian rule and diffuse political opposition. Consequently, the literature has advised against the notion that multiparty elections constitute a general lever for democratization. This article presents evidence in support of a more positive understanding of multipartyism and democracy. We argue that multiparty elections create an institutional space for oppositional parties, instrumentally motivated to promote further positive democratic change. We hypothesize that multiparty regimes are (1) generally more likely to experience positive democratic change, and (2) more importantly, more likely to do so when faced by internal or external regime threats. We test these hypotheses using cross-section time-series data on 166 countries in the period 1973–2010. Our results show a general positive effect of multipartyism for democratic change, and that multiparty regimes are more likely to improve their levels of democracy when faced with demonstrations and economic crisis